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1 Introduction
Monetary institutions differ considerably between  the main industrial countries. Differences
in preferences, labor market characteristics, political stability and the structure of the
economy make that different countries have different needs. These different needs are also
reflected in the design of monetary institutions or, more specifically, central banks.   This
book takes a political economy view on monetary policy making. Our starting point is that
the  central  bank and rational agents  in the private economy interact strategically.     The
central bank sets monetary policy (usually the rate of inflation) and the private agents
rationally form expectations about the rate of inflation. The monetary policy maker has an
information advantage about the state of the economy and in the last part of this book also
about its own preferences. Using this simple game-theoretic framework, we analyze the
effects of different institutional set-ups on macroeconomic policy outcomes.
In designing monetary institutions, countries have four fundamental questions to answer:
What is the position of the central bank vis-A-vis the government?
What is (are) the ultimate goal(s) of monetary policy?
What is (are) the intermediate target(s) of monetary policy?
What are the instruments of monetary policy?
In this book we will restrict ourselves to the first two questions.
The first question deals with the trade off between central bank independence and central
bank accountability. The government, which is accountable to a democratically elected
parliament, delegates monetary policy to an independent central bank.  It is very important
that the independent central bank, in turn, is (directly or indirectly) subject to democratic
control  and  can  be made accountable  for  its  actions.
The second question deals with the trade off between price stability (credibility) and
economic growth or employment (flexibility) in the short and long run. Most economists
would agree that the only feasible objective for monetary policy in the long run is to achieve
price stability. However, in the short run monetary policy can very well be used to
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accommodate stochastic supply shocks in order to stabilize  the  economy. This trade  off
between credibility and flexibility was first discussed by Rogoff (1985a) and still plays a
central role in the discussion about central bank independence and conservativeness.
The third question deals with the choice of the intermediate target(s). In order to reach the
ultimate goal of price stability, central banks can use several intermediate targets.   The
Deutsche Bundesbank has achieved great success by targeting a monetary aggregate, M3
(see, for instance, Issing, 1994). This approach has yielded several decades with a low and
stable rate of inflation in Germany and will also be adopted by the European Central Bank.
Other possible intermediate targets are the exchange rate (see Ungerer, 1990) as is done in
the Netherlands or an inflation forecast as is done by the Bank of England (see Svensson,
1997b).
Finally, the fourth question deals with the choice of the instruments of the central bank.   In
order to reach the intermediate targets, central banks can use open market transactions,
reserve requirements, official short term interest rates or combinations of these and other
instruments (see Boonstra and Eijffinger, 1997).
The answeri to these four questions ultimately determine the design of monetary
institutions.  In this book we will focus on two questions: the position of the central bank
vis-A-vis the government  and  on the ultimate goals of monetary policy.    We will address
these issues mostly from a positive point of view, explaining why monetary institutions
differ among countries and describing on which factors these differences depend. However,
at some instances we will also take a nor/native approach. In these cases, we look at the
optimal design of monetary institutions and give recommendations for improving the design
of monetary institutions.
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1.1     Structure of the Book
This book systematically investigates  two  of the four fundamental questions  in six chapters.
Table 1.1 gives an overview  of the structure  of the book.    The six chapters that follow after
the introduction cover five subjects that are related to the two questions that we want to
address in this book.
Table 1.1 Structure of the book
Ch. 2 Ch. 3 Ch. 4 Ch. 5 Ch. 6 Ch. 7
Credibility vs. Flexibility                  x          x          x         x        x        x
Independence vs. Conservativeness                -                         -                         x                       -
Preference Uncertainty                    -          -          -         xxx
Goal vs. Instrument Independence         -                        -          -         x         -
Independence vs. Accountability          -          -           -          -         -         x
The credibility vs. flexibility trade off is a key feature in all the models used in this book.
This subject returns in all the chapters of the book and is related to the question about the
ultimate goal(s) of monetary policy.   The next issue, independence vs. conservativeness, is
discussed in chapter 4. This issue is related to both the question of the ultimate goal(s)
(conservativeness) and the question of the central bank's position vis-A-vis the government
(independence). The preference uncertainty topic features in chapters 5,6 and 7 and is also
related to both questions. Uncertain central bank preferences influence the ultimate goal(s)
of monetary policy, but are also related to the independence vs. accountability issue as is
shown in chapter 7.  The goal vs. instrument independence issue deals with the position of
the central bank with respect to the government and is investigated in chapter 6. A central
bank loses goal independence when it is subject to an inflation target A la Svensson (1997a)
or a linear inflation contract, as proposed by Walsh (1995).
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Chapter 7 deals with the independence vs. accountability topic and is also related to the
question about the position of the central bank with respect to the government.
The first chapter after the introduction, chapter 2, investigates empirically the relationship
between various measures of central bank independence on the one hand and
macroeconomic performance on the other hand. Using a standard Rogoff (19852) model we
derive propositions on the variance of output, the variance of inflation and the level of
inflation. These propositions are tested for nineteen industrial countries. This chapter deals
with the fundamental questions about the position of the central bank and the ultimate goal
of monetary policy.     Does an independent central  bank  with a clear mandate for achieving
price stability actually deliver a low and stable rate of inflation at the cost of a higher
variance of output?
Chapter 3 extends the standard Rogoff model and applies  it  to  an open economy.    We
investigate which factors determine whether a central bank focuses more on price stability
or on the accommodation of supply shocks. The weight that the central bank attaches to
stabilizing the inflation rate should depend on the country's economic and political
characteristics.
The literature on central banking often fails to distinguish between central bank
independence on the one hand and central bank conservativeness on the other. In chapter 4
we explicitly make this distinction. Central bank independence is related to the fundamental
question of the position of the central bank. An independent central bank can set monetary
policy without interference from the government.  In the model we introduce central bank
independence as the influence that the central bank has in setting monetary policy. Central
bank conservativeness is related to the fundamental question of the ultimate goal of
monetary policy and appears in the model as the weight that the central bank attaches to
inflation stabilization relative to output stabilization.
The last three chapters deal with uncertainty about the central bank's preferences. In these
chapters we do not explicitly introduce central bank independence (as was done in chapter
4) because doing this would complicate the discussion without yielding new insights.
Chapter 5 looks at the effect of uncertain central bank preferences on monetary policy and
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macro economic outcomes. In particular, we investigate the effects of preference
uncertainty on the level of inflation, the variance of inflation and the variance of output
growth. In chapter 6 we introduce a linear inflation contract and an inflation target to a
model  with a central banker with uncertain preferences.    In the standard models (without
preference uncertainty) these two institutional arrangements turn out to be equivalent.  We
will  show  that this equivalence breaks  down  in the presence of preference uncertainty.
The last chapter, chapter 7 turns to the first fundamental question about the position of the
central bank relative to the government. We introduce two features that are related to the
accountability of a central bank: transparency and final responsibility.  Then we analyze the
effects of these two types of accountability  on macroeconomic performance.
1.2    Detailed Overview
The success of the Deutsche Bundesbank in keeping the rate of inflation stable at a low level
for several decades has caught the eye of both economic theorists and policymakers.
Economic theory as developed by Rogoff (1985a), Neumann (1991) and Lohmann (1992)
suggests that delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank yields a lower
inflation rate. As pointed out by Kydland and Prescott (1977), politicians face a time-
inconsistency problem when they try to implement their preferred policies and this leads to
inferior policy outcomes. The time-inconsistency problem can be mitigated by delegating
monetary policy to an independent central bank that is more conservative than the
government in the sense that it cares more about inflation. However, the improved
credibility that brings the lower  rate of inflation comes  at the  cost of having less flexibility.
Since the conservative central bank cares more about a low and stable rate of inflation, it
will  care less about stabilizing output shocks.    This credibility/flexibility trade-off follows
from the Rogoff (1985a) model. In chapter 2 we derive propositions about the level of
inflation, the variability of inflation, the level of economic growth and the variability of
economic growth. We confront these theoretical results with the data for twenty industrial
countries.    We also investigate how sensitive the empirical results  are  for the measure  of
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central bank independence and the sample period that is chosen. Therefore, we do a
sensitivity analysis with four different measures for central bank independence and for both
the whole sample period and two subperiods 1972-1982 and 1983-1992.
There are four important conclusions that follow from this chapter. First, our estimation
results show an inverse relationship between central bank independence and the level of
inflation that is also found by Alesina (1988, 1989) and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti
(1992). Including openness as an additional explanatory variable as suggested by Romer
(1993) doesn't change our results. Secondly, like Alesina and Summers (1993), we find
some empirical evidence that the more independent the central bank, the lower the variance
of inflation. Thirdly, we do not find empirical support for the implication of the Rogoff
(1985a) model that more central bank independence leads to a higher variance of real output
growth. Finally, after controlling for other factors that influence economic growth as
described by Barro (1991), De Long and Summers (1992) and Levine and Renelt (1992),
we find no empirical relationship between central bank independence and the level of real
output growth.
Chapter 3 deals with the determinants of central bank independence in an open economy.
Empirical work on central bank independence [Alesina (1989), Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini (1991), Cukierman (1992), De Haan and Sturm (1992), Eijffinger and Schaling
(1993a,  1996, 1998), Alesina and Summers (1993) and chapter 2 of this book] has focussed
on the quantification of central bank independence and its relationship with macroeconomic
outcomes. Broadly speaking, the conclusion is that the more independent the central bank,
the lower the inflation rate, whilst the rate of output growth is unaffected.
However, this literature does not explain the observed differences in central bank
independence. For instance, no explanation is offered for the high independence of the
Bundesbank.  It has often been pointed out that this fact may be explained by Germany's
underlying aversion to inflation associated with its experience of hyperinflation in the
19203.'
1 See for instance Issing (1993) and Eijffinger and De Haan (1996).
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In this chapter we extend the Rogoff (1985a) model to the open economy case and allow the
exchange rate to deviate from purchasing power parity. Using a graphical method, we
determine the optimal degree of conservativeness and express the boundaries of the interval
containing the optimal degree of conservativeness in terms of the structural parameters of
the model.
Furthermore, we derive propositions concerning the relation between economic and political
factors  and the optimal degree of central bank conservativeness.    We  show that optimal
central bank conservativeness is higher, the higher the natural rate of unemployment, the
greater the benefits of unanticipated inflation (the slope of the Phillips curve), the less
inflation-averse society, the smaller the variance of productivity shocks, the smaller real
exchange rate variability and the smaller the openness of the economy. These propositions
are tested for nineteen industrial countries. We employ a latent variables approach (LIS-
REL) in order to distinguish between actual and optimal monetary regimes.
Chapter 4 makes an explicit distinction between central bank independence and central bank
conservativeness. Central bank independence  is the extent to which the central  bank  can  set
monetary policy without interference of the government. Central bank conservativeness, on
the other hand, is the central bank's preference for inflation stabilization relative to
employment (or output) stabilization. It turns out that the product of independence and
conservativeness (sometimes called efective central bank independence) is what really
matters in monetary policy making.
In this chapter we try to explain the optimal degree of central bank independence and
conservativeness by four economic and political determinants (the natural rate of
unemployment, society's preferences for unemployment stabilization relative to inflation
stabilization, the variance of productivity shocks and the benefits of unanticipated inflation)
both theoretically and empirically. The empirical results  are only given for the (twelve)
member states of the European Union.
Chapter 5 investigates society's incentives to design monetary institutions that allow for
central bank secrecy.  We find that the main reason for central bank secrecy is its
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potentially beneficial effect on stabilization policy. Contrary to Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986), we obtain this result even with a zero degree of persistence in the central bank's
objectives. Unlike Lewis (1991), this result does not require the social planner's future
preferences for policy objectives to change over time with changing economic
circurnstances.
More specifically, optimal central bank secrecy involves trading-off the harmful effects of
uncertainty about monetary policy and the associated higher expected inflation, versus the
potentially beneficial effects on the stabilization of output. The latter trade-off depends on
the severity of society's time-consistency problem vis-A-vis its need for stabilization policy.
The analysis predicts that if the credibility problem is large relative to the need for
flexibility, optimal central bank institutions will be very open and transparent and vice
versa. This reverses an earlier result by Garfinkel and Oh (1995).
Moreover it explains why high credibility institutions such as the Bundesbank and the future
European Central Bank (ECB), can afford to be relatively closed, and why low credibility
institutions such as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and Banco d'Espafia need to be very
open and need to publish e.g inflation and monetary policy reports of some kind, in
addition to standard bank bulletins.
In chapter 6 we look at a conservative central banker with preference uncertainty in
combination with a linear Walsh inflation performance contract and/or a Svensson inflation
target. Walsh (1995) has shown that an optimal linear inflation contract can eliminate the
inflationary bias without distorting stabilization policy.   Thus the credibility-flexibility trade-
off is eliminated and makes inflation targeting superior to Rogoffs conservative central
banker. Moreover, Svensson (1997a) has shown that the linear contract can be mapped into
an optimal inflation target. This means that these delegation arrangements are equivalent.
They are both able to produce the pre-commitment outcome.
However, both Walsh (1995) and Svensson (1997a) on the one hand and Rogoff (1985a) on
the other assume symmetric information in the principal-agent relationship. More specific,
they assume that both the political principal and the private sector know the central banker's
preferences.
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Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997) and - most recently - Beetsma and Jensen (1997)
abandoned this assumption. Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997) demonstrated that if a
monopolistic trade union has more information about productivity shocks than the principal,
maximum social welfare can be achieved by having a conservative central banker with
perverse preferences on top of the contract.
Beetsma and Jensen (1997), building on earlier work on preference uncertainty by Briault,
Haldane and King (1996) and Nolan and Schaling (1996), find that the equivalence between
the linear Walsh contract and the Svensson inflation target breaks down if the private sector
and the political principal have imperfect information about the central banker's
preferences.    They  show  that the optimal linear inflation contract performs strictly better
than the optimal inflation target when there is uncertainty about the central banker's
preferences.
However, in their model there is no effect from preference uncertainty on the private
sector's inflation expectations.  In this chapter we investigate the effects of relaxing this
restriction. Using a model  that is otherwise similar to theirs,  we find results  that  are  very
different  - and sometimes exactly the opposite  -  of the Beetsma and Jensen (1997) model.
Contrary to Beetsma and Jensen (1997), we find that it is optimal for the government to
impose an inflation target on the central bank that depends on the degree of uncertainty
about its preferences. Furthermore, for the case of the Walsh contract we find that it is
optimal to offer a linear inflation contract to a central banker that does not depend on the
degree of uncertainty about its preferences.   Here our result is the same as in Walsh (1995)
for  the case without preference uncertainty. Again,  this  is in contrast to Beetsma and Jensen
(1997), who find that the optimal linear contract does depend on the degree of preference
uncertainty.
Finally, we find that in case of uncertain central banker preferences the optimal delegation
arrangement is a combination of a linear inflation contract and a quadratic contract.  Here
the quadratic contract is equivalent to a Rogoff (1985a) conservative central banker. Again,
this is different from Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that a combination of a linear
inflation contract, an inflation mrget and a quadratic contract performs best.
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Moreover, our result is in line with Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997), and hence suggests
that their 'restoration' of Rogoff appears to be a very robust result indeed.
In chapter 7 we present a theoretical model of central bank accountability. As Stiglitz
(1998) notes "Monetary policy is a key determinant of economic performance...  [and that]
...this key determinant of what happens to society - this key collective action - should be so
removed from control of democratically elected officials should at least raise questions."
Central banks must be accountable to democratically elected institutions.  De Haan,
Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1998) distinguish three features of central bank accountability:
the ultimate 04/ectives of monetary policy, transparency of actual monetary policy and the
jinat responsibility for monetary policy.
In this chapter we focus on transparency of actual monetary policy  and  on  the jinat
responsibility for monetary policy. The third feature of accountability, setting the ultimate
objectives of monetary policy. is related to the question of goal independence of a central
bank and is not discussed here. Our model builds on earlier work by Lohmann (1992) and
Nolan and Schaling (1996). The government delegates monetary policy to a conservative
central banker. However, the government and society don't know exactly the central
banker's preferences for inflation stabilization relative to output stabilization. The extent to
which the central bank has private information about its preferences is determined by the
transparency of monetary policy. After the central  bank has proposed its preferred  rate  of
inflation, the government can decide to override the central bank at a fixed cost.  In this set
up, the central bank is partially independent.   The cost of overriding is related to the
question of who has final responsibility for monetary policy.   If this cost is prohibitive, final
responsibility lies with the central bank.  If, on the other hand, this cost is negligible, final
responsibility rests with the government.
In this chapter we discuss the implications of these two types of accountability for
macroeconomic outcomes. In particular, we look at the effects on the level of inflation and
the  stabilization of supply shocks.
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We show that more transparency leads, in expectation, to a lower rate of inflation and less
stabilization of supply shocks.  A low cost of overriding leads to a higher rate of inflation
and more stabilization of supply shocks.
2   Central Bank Independence: A Sensitivity Analysis
2.1 Introduction
In both economic research and policy making, the issue of central bank independence has
been widely investigated and discussed during the last decade.  To a large extent, this
interest is motivated by the success of the Deutsche Bundesbank in keeping the rate of
inflation  stable  at  a  low  level for several decades. Economic theory as developed by Rogoff
(19858), Neumann (1991) and Lohmann (1992) suggests that countries having an
independent central bank can achieve low inflation rates because politicians cannot so easily
influence monetary policy.  This is good because politicians face a time-inconsistency
problem when they try to implement their preferred policies and this leads to inferior
outcomes. The time-inconsistency problem can be mitigated by delegating monetary policy
to an independent central bank that is more conservative than the government in the sense
that it cares more about inflation.  However, the improved credibility that brings the lower
rate of inflation comes  at the  cost of having less.#exibility. Since the conservative central
bank cares more about a low and stable rate of inflation, it will care less about stabilizing
output shocks.     In this chapter  we  want to confront these theoretical results  with  the  data  for
twenty industrial countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States) for the post-
Bretton Woods period (1972-1992).  We also want to investigate how sensitive the empirical
results are for the measure of central bank independence and the sample period that is
chosen. Therefore, we do our regressions with four different measures for central bank
independence and for both the whole sample period and two subperiods (1972-1982) and
(1983-1992).
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There are four important conclusions that follow from our chapter. First, our estimation
results show an inverse relationship between central bank independence and the level of
inflation that is also found by Alesina (1988, 1989) and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti
(1992). Including openness as an additional explanatory variable as suggested by Romer
(1993) doesn't change our results. Secondly, like Alesina and Summers (1993), we find
some empirical evidence that the more independent the central bank, the lower the variance
of inflation.  Thirdly, we do not find empirical support for the implication of the Rogoff
(1985a) model that more central bank independence leads to a higher variance of real output
growth. Finally, after controlling for other factors that influence economic growth as
described by Barro (1991), De Long and Summers (1992) and Levine and Renelt (1992),
we find no empirical relationship between central bank independence and the level of real
output growth.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. In section 2, building on the Rogoff (19858) model
we briefly analyze the theoretical relationships of central bank independence with the
distributions of output and inflation. In section 3 we confront the propositions from the
game-theoretic model with empirical evidence. We perform a sensitivity analysis that
consists of using various indices of central bank independence, looking at two subperiods
and adding control variables. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2.2    Credibility vs. Flexibility
2.2.1   Recapitulation of the Monetary Policy Game
This section offers a short sketch of the theoretical background for the empirical work. It
links the Rogoff model to the empirical work on indices of central bank independence
(henceforth  CBI).
There are two players, wage-setters and the central bank. Wage-setters unilaterally choose
the nominal wage every period, and the central bank controls monetary policy.  The labor
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market is characterized by one-period nominal wage contracts  [Gray (1976), Fischer
(1977a)] Therefore, output rises with unanticipated inflation. The behavior of wage-setters
is captured by a standard Phillips curve and can be derived from a Cobb-Douglas
production function and a competitive labor market (Schaling, 1995).
y,  =-(,r,-Et.tirt + v,) 0<B<1 (2.1)
1-B
where y is output,  (1 - B)-'  are the output gains of unanticipated inflation (the slope of the
Phillips curve), Tr is the rate of inflation and vt is an aggregate supply shock with mean zero
and finite variance ai2. The natural level of expected output is normalized at zero.
The social loss function S penalizes both inflation and deviations from output target y'  >  0.
1  2 Z,   '2St=- (,r,)  + - CY, -Y ) 0<%<= (2.2)22
The parameter x is the relative weight of output stabilization relative to inflation
stabilization in the preferences of society.   It is well-known that the minimization of (2.2)
subject to the Phillips curve (2.1) results in a counterproductive inflation bias [Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983)] with no gains in the form of systematic
higher output.
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2.2.2 The Legislative Approach
In this chapter we consider the legislative approach to monetary stability, namely to create
by law a very independent central bank with an unequivocal mandate to focus on price
stability. Academic contributions in this area are Rogoff (1985a) and Lohmann (1992).
Rogoff proofs that society (the principal) can reduce the time-consistent inflation rate, at the
expense of a less flexible response to output shocks, by delegating monetary policy to an
agent who is known to place a greater weight on inflation stabilization than is embodied in
the  social loss function  (2.2).
This agent minimizes
1+E  2 Z
L,= --2    (,rt)  +2(y,- y.)2 0<6<99 (2.3)
When e is strictly greater than zero, then this agent is more "conservative" than society.
In the empirical part of this chapter several measures (indices) of central bank independence
are used. According to these indices, central banks in which the only or main objective of
monetary policy (as specified in the central bank law) is price stability are classified as
being more independent than central bank laws with a number of objectives in addition to
price stability, or central banks in whose law price stability is not mentioned as an objective
at all.
Therefore, following most of the literature we proxy CBI as the strength of the
"conservative bias"  of the central bank as embodied in the law.'
' Chapter 4 explicitly distinguishes between conservativeness and independence.  De Haan and Kooi
(1997) decompose tWO indices of central bank independence into a conservativeness part and various
aspects of independence.
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2.2.3   Implications of the Credibility vs. Flexibility Model
The algorithm for deriving the time-consistent equilibrium under central bank independence
(equation  (2.3)) is standard. The resulting output and inflation rates are given  by
(1 - B)(1 + E)
y, -                           v,                                                                            (2.4)(1-B)2(1+E)+X
X.         Xlr,-                   Y                              v,                                                   (2.5)
(1 - B)(1 + E) (1 -B)2(1 + E)+ z
From (2.4) and (2.5) we can easily derive the expressions for the variance of output and
inflation
<      (1 -  )(1 + E)
,2
Var(y)=  (1-p)2(1+E)+Z,   a.1                                                                            (2.6)
Var(,r) = 1                X
)2
(2.7)
((1 -B)2(1 + E) + Z)
Following Cukierman  (1992, pp. 353-355)  in this section we investigate the effects  of CBI
on the implied distributions of output and inflation.  As is suggested by the main intuition of
the Rogoff model (see (2.6) and (2.D), there is an inverse relation between CBI (E) and the
mean and variance of the inflation rate and a positive relation between CBI and the variance
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of output. The reason is simple, increasing the central bank's commitment to fighting
inflation reduces society's credibility problem (and hence the mean and variance of
inflation) at the expense of a distorted response to output shocks, - i.e. flexibility -
increasing the variance of output. Finally, the mean output level is unaffected by CBI, as is
to be expected in a natural rate model.2
We now move on to confront the implications of the credibility vs. flexibility model with
some empirical evidence.
2.3   Empirical Evidence on Central Bank Independence
This section takes a hard look into the empirical evidence regarding the link between central
bank independence and the level and variability of inflation and economic growth,
respectively. Unfortunately, most existing research has focused on one measure of central
bank independence only, so that it is not clear whether conclusions drawn are 'measure
specific'. To overcome this difficulty,  we use the measures of Alesina (1988, 1989), Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Eijffinger and Schaling (1992, 1993a) and Cukierman
(1992) as explanatory variables. We compare the outcomes of our empirical analysis on the
relationship between central bank independence and the level and variability of inflation and
economic growth with results reported in the literature.
2.3.1 The Level of Inflation
According to Alesina (1988, 1989), countries with an independent central bank will have
lower rates of inflation than do countries with a dependent central bank. This well-known
inverse relationship between central bank independence and the level of inflation is also
2              Formally this can be shown by taking the first derivative of both moments of output and inflation with
respect to s.
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supported by empirical studies of De Haan and Sturm (1992), Alesina and Summers (1993)
and Eijffinger and Schaling (1993b). It should, however, be noted that a negative
correlation between central bank independence and inflation does not necessarily imply
causation. The correlation between both variables could be explained by a third factor, e.g.
the  culture and tradition of monetary stability  in a country, explaining  both an independent
central bank and low inflation.'
Still, the degree of central bank independence may be an important factor in explaining the
level of inflation, because central bank independence reflects the ability and willingness to
conduct an autonomous monetary policy directed at price stability.    If not seriously
hampered by wage increases, budget deficits and government debt, such policy will
eventually lead to a low and sustainable level of inflation. The ultimate determinants of
central bank independence are discussed more extensively in Eijffinger and De Haan
(1996).
Using OLS regressions we investigate the link between the average level of inflation (annual
percentage change of the Consumer Price Index) and the degree of central bank
independence according to the measures of Alesina (AL), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
(GMT), Eijffinger and Schaling (ES) and Cukierman (LVAU). The countries considered
are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The relationship between average
inflation in ihese countries and the four indices of central bank independence is analyzed for
the post-Bretton-Woods period 1972-1992. Under the Bretton-Woods system of fixed
exchange rates, countries were committed to an exchange rate target and had little room to
conduct an autonomous domestic monetary policy.  Thus, the relationship between central
bank independence and inflation is likely to be much less straightforward before 1972.
Regression analysis by De Haan and Sturm (1992) supports this view. These authors found
no significant relationship between both variables for the period 1961-1969.
3            The standard example is the case of Germany, where the hyperinflation in the 1920s led to a culture
and tradition of monetary stability.
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In our analysis the post-Bretton-Woods period is divided into two subperiods (1972-1982
and 1983-1992) in order to distinguish between EMS countries (Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and, partly, Austria, Portugal, Spain and the
United Kingdom) on the one hand and non-EMS countries (Australia, Canada, Finland,
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States) On the other.
Although the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS (ERM) was enacted in March 1979
after the 'snake arrangement', Ungerer (1990) characterizes the first phase  of the  EMS
(1979-1982) as a period of 'initial orientation' full of frequent and, sometimes, large
realignments of central rates.   From 1982 onwards, the EMS enters a second phase of
'consolidation' (1982-1987), and - after the accord of Basle-Nyborg - moves into a third
phase of 're-examination' (1987-present).' Consequently, the negative correlation between
central bank independence and inflation is expected to be less clear cut during the second
subperiod (1983-1992) than during the first subperiod (1972-1982), because of the priority
EMS countries gave at that time to exchange rate stability. After 1982 monetary policy in
these countries - except Germany as the anchor country - has become increasingly
endogenous because exchange rate targets became dominant.
Table 2.1 shows our estimation results for average inflation  and  the four measures of central
bank independence during the whole period (1972-1992) and both subperiods (1972-1982
and 1983-1992). Following Romer (1993) we have also included the variable "openness"
as measured by the percentage share of imports in GDP in the regression equation as an
explanatory variable for the level of inflation. During the post-Bretton-Woods period and
both subperiods, the inverse relationship between inflation and central bank independence
appears  to be significant  for all measures. It should  also be noted that including the variable
openness doesn't change the results much, indicating that the estimated coefficients are
robust.
4                   According to Ungerer (1990) the phase of consolidation was marked by " . . .a widespread consensus to
follow stability-oriented policies, an increasing convergence in the development of costs, prices and
monetary aggregates, and by long periods without realignments of central rates. " (p. 338).
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The conclusion that follows from table 2.1 is that the more independent a central bank is,
the  lower  the  rate of inflation  in  the  long  run  will  be. The table also confirms our intuition
that the inflation reducing effect of a one-unit increase in an index of CBI is larger in the
first subperiod than in the second. This holds for all four indices of CBI.
Cukierman has elaborated his legal independence index (LVAU) for 68 countries - i.e. 21
developed industrial countries and 47 developing countries. Cukierman found no significant
link between central bank independence and inflation  for the group of developing countries.
In his opinion, this is a consequence of the fact that these countries have "less regard for the
law. "5
Because the four indices of CBI that we used in our analysis are all defined on a different
scale, the size of the parameters is difficult to interpret. Therefore, we also calculated the
elasticities of inflation with respect to the different measures of CBI.  We did this by
estimating a regression equation in which the log of inflation is explained by the log of CBI
and a constant. The results are presented in table 2.2.
5              This is only valid for the legal measure of Cukierman for central bank independence. If the 'turnover
rate' of central bank governors is used as a measure of actual independence, Cukierman (1992) finds
a significant negative relationship for developing countries.
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Table 2.1 Average Inflation and the Measures of CBI
Explanatory variables 1972-1992 1972-1982 1983-1992
Constant 12.40 14.10 16.05 18.40 8.38 9.33
(12.74) (12.51) (12.58) (12.27) (9.51) (8.61)
Alesina (AL) -2.24 -2.27 -2.78 -2.82 -1.65 -1.66
(-5.33)" (-6.14)" (-5.04)- (-5.84) - (-4.34)" (-4.50)'=
Openness -5.75 -8.01 -3.23
(-2.23)' (-2.35)= (-1.43)
R2 (adjusted) 0.63 0.72 0.60 0.70 0.52 0.56
Constant 15.27 15.85 19.46 20.03 7.85 8.89
(9.53) (7.46) (11.05) (8.42) (7.41) (6.79)
Grilli et al. (GMT) -0.92 -0.93 -1.11 -1.12 -0.42 -0.43
(4.81)- (-4.69)- (-5.30)- (-5.16)- (-3.28)- (-3.43)-
Openness -1.74 -1.77 -3.01
(-0.43) (-0.38) (-1.30)
R2 (adjusted) 0.58 0.56 0.63 0.61 0.38 0.41
Constant 12.27 11.88 15.53 15.35 7.56 7.67
(7.47) (5.75) (8.43) (6.53) (8.60) (7.12)
Eijffinger-Schaling (ES) -1.60 -1.65 -1.90 -1.93 -1.03 -1.01
(-2.85)* (-2.75)' (-3.03)" (-2.84)' (-3.42)=' (-3.14)"
Openness 1.78 0.84 -0.53
(0.32) (0.13) (-0.19)
R2 (adjusted) 0.28 0.24 0.31 0.27 0.37 0.34
Constant 10.74 11.49 14.28 14.95 6.84 7.61
(9.06) (7.19) (8.43) (6.84) (7.14) (6.16)
Cukierman (LVAU) -8.83 -8.78 -11.50 -11.50 -5.89 -5.79
(-2.92)' (-2.86)' (-2.87)' (-2.80)* (-2.41)' (2.36)'
Openness -2.52 -2.25 -2.58
(-0.72) (-0.46) (-0.99)
R2 (adjusted) 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.21
Notes: t-values  are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates  that the coefficient is significantly
different from zero at a 95% confidence level, two asterisks indicate that the coefficient is
significant at a 99% confidence level.
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Table 2.2 Elasticity of Inflation with Respect to the Measures of CBI
Explanatory 1972-1992 1972-1982 1983-1992
variables
Constant 2.44 2.70 2.04
(25.58) (28.34) (12.80)
Alesina (AL) -0.68 -0.63 -0.82
(-5.67)" (-5.29)" (4.08)"
R2 (adjusted) 0.66 0.63 0.49
Constant 3.54 3.73 2.66
(11.83) (13.11) (6.02)
Grilli et al. (GMT) -0.78 -0.73 -0.62
(-5.26)" (-5.15)" (-2.85)'
R2 (adjusted) 0.62 0.61 0.31
Constant 2.42 2.66 1.98
(15.35) (18.17) (11.02)
Eijffinger-Schaling (ES) -0.48 -0.44 -0.57
(-3.06)" (-2.99)" (-3.17)"
R (adjusted) 0.32 0.31 0.34
Constant 1.54 1.84 1.07
(8.11) (9.95) (4.00)
Cukierman (LVAU) -0.38 -0.38 -0.35
(-2.42)' (-2.51)' (-1.58)
R (adjusted) 0.21 0.23 0.08
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates that the coefficient is significantly
different from zero at a 95 % confidence level, two asterisks indicate that the coefficient is
significant at a 99% confidence level.
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From table 2.2 we conclude that for the whole sample period and for the first subperiod a
one- percent increase in CBI as measured by the GMT index yields the highest reduction in
the rate of inflation.   For the second subperiod, the elasticity of inflation with respect to the
Alesina index is the highest. Interestingly, a comparison between the first and the second
subperiod doesn't give a clear-cut result in table 2.2, as it did in table 2.1. The elasticity of
C 8,r  CBI) .inflation with respect to CBI I I is more or less constant over the subperiods,
CDCBI  'r J
whereas the marginal effects of CBI on inflation are lower in the second subperiod.   The
reason for this difference lies in the fact that inflation in the second subperiod (on average,
for the whole sample 4.8%)  was much lower than in the first one  (10.7 %). The decline  for
the low CBI - high inflation countries was larger than for the high CBI - low inflation
countries which explains the lower marginal effect in the second subperiod. Inflation has
decreased substantially and CBI hasn't changed.  So the factor  CBIl makes that the
C A j
elasticity is constant  over the subperiods.
Finally,  it is interesting to note that Debelle and Fischer (1995) have shown that if the GMT
measure is split into various components (lack of goal independence, political independence
and economic independence) the two variables that most closely tied to inflation
performance are lack of goal independence (i.e. the bank has a statutory requirement to
pursue price stability) and economic independence (i.e. instrument independence); the
variables relating to appointment procedures are not significantly related to inflation.
2.3.2 The Variability of Inflation
What is the empirical relationship between central bank independence and the variability of
inflation? Chowdhury (1991) has investigated the relation between the level and variability
of inflation in 66 countries for the period from 1955 to 1985. He concludes that during this
period there exists a significant, positive correlation between both variables.  De Haan and
Sturm (1992) have also examined this relation in eighteen industrial countries for the period
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1961-1987. They found a clear, positive correlation between both variables for the post-
Bretton-Woods subperiods 1970-1978 and 1979-1987, but no for the subperiod 1961-1969.
We expect that greater independence should lead to less variability of inflation. We assume
the various measures of central bank independence (AL, GMT, ES and LVAU) to be the
explanatory variables of the variance of inflation (CPI) for the sample. Again, the
relationship between the four indices and the variance of inflation is examined for the
complete post-Bretton-Woods period (1972-1992) and our two subperiods (1972-1982 and
1983-1992). During the second subperiod, the negative correlation between central bank
independence and inflation variability is also expected to be less clear cut than during the
first subperiod as a consequence of growing exchange rate stability between EMS countries.
Table 2.3 shows the results  for the variance of inflation and  the four measures of central
bank independence using  data  from the sample. The inverse relationship between inflation
variability and independence is significant  for the index of Grilli  et  al. (all periods),  for  the
Cukierman index (whole period and first subperiod) and for the Alesina index (second
subperiod).  For the other indices and periods, we find a negative but insignificant relation
for both the whole period, and its two subperiods.  From this table, it may be concluded
that there is some evidence that greater independence of a central bank guarantees a more
stable inflation. 6 Hence there is some empirical evidence that the more independent the
central bank, the lower the variance of the inflation rate.
6            De Haan and Sturm (1992) find a significant negative relationship for the modified measure of Grilli
et al. and for the Alesina and ES indices during the period 1961-1987. Alesina and Summers (1993)
report similar results for an average of the Alesina and GMT index.
26                                                   Chapter 2
Table 2.3 Variance of Inflation and the Measures of CBI
Explanatory 1972-1992 1972-1982 1983-1992
variables
Constant 25.34 11.85 12.02
(4.61) (2.23) (4.06)
Alesina (AL) -4.61 -0.72 -3.31
(-2.02) (-0.31) (-2.59)'
R2 (adjusted) 0.16 -0.06 0.26
Constant 45.51 30.93 25.25
(8.15) (5.77) (4.28)
Grilli  et  al. (GMT) -3.40 -2.35 -2.31
(-5.09)" (-3.41)- (-3.27)"
R2 (adjusted) 0.61 0.40 0.38
Constant 26.38 17.70 11.59
(4.13) (2.99) (1.93)
Eijffinger-Schaling (ES) -3.63 -2.31 -1.79
(-1.66) (-1.15) (-0.87)
R2 (adjusted) 0.09 0.02 -0.01
Constant 27.04 18.60 8.60
(5.09) (4.59) (3.08)
Cukierman (LVAU) -30.41 -23.10 -10.60
(-2.24)' (-2.24)' (-1.49)
R (adjusted) 0.18 0.18 0.06
Notes: t-values  are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates  that the coefficient is significantly
different from zero at a 95% confidence level, two asterisks indicate that the coefficient is
significant at a 99% confidence level.
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We have also calculated, for each measure of CBI, how much of the strong positive
association between the mean and the variance of inflation is due to their common
association with CBI. This analysis is performed along the lines of Cukierman (1992) and
Cukierman and Webb (1995). We predicted the mean and the variance of inflation. using
only  CBI  as an explanatory variable. The ratio between the covariance  of the predictions
and the covariance of the actual mean and variance of inflation are a measure for the extent
to which the positive association between variance and mean can be attributed to CBI.  We
find the following ratios as presented in table 2.4.' Cukierman (1992) reports a value of
0.19 for developed countries for the period 1950-1989. This comes close to our value of
0.21 for the LVAU index for our sample period.  The most striking result that we find in
table 2.4 is that between 86 and 100% of the positive covariance between the mean and the
variance of inflation  can  be  explained by cross country variations  of the GMT index.
Table 2.4 CBI and the Association between Mean and Variance of Inflation
Index 1972-1992 1972-1982 1983-1992
AL 0.24 0.06 0.50
GMT 0.86 0.89 1.02
ES 0.25 0.23 0.30
LVAU 0.21 0.26 0.19
Note: The figures in the table represent the fraction of the covariance between the mean
and the variance of inflation that is due to their common association with the index of CBI
for the different periods.
7          The fact that for the GMT index the ratio is larger than one must be due to negative correlation
between the residuals of the two regressions.
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2.3.3 Economic Growth
Central bank independence may stimulate economic growth in the longer run because with a
low and stable rate of inflation the functioning of the price mechanism will be better.
Empirical research by Grimes (1991) and Fischer (1993) shows that inflation reduces
economic growth.8  This may be explained by the positive correlation between the level and
variability of inflation. Greater variation in the rate of inflation can imply increasing
uncertainty about inflation and may, thereby, lead to lower economic growth.  This
relationship between inflation variability and economic growth is, however, not supported
by most studies.
Various studies have examined directly whether central bank independence affects economic
growth. Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), De Haan and Sturm (1992), Eijffinger
and Schaling (1993b) and Alesina and Summers (1993) all conclude that central bank
independence has no effect on economic growth.
This  conclusion is supported by results reported in table 2.5 which presents estimates  for  the
average annual growth rate of per capita real Gross Domestic Product, and the four
measures of central bank independence. The literature on long-run economic growth
identifies various factors that determine the growth  rate  of a country. Based on Barro
(1991), De Long and Summers (1992) and Levine and Renelt (1992) we have chosen two
additional variables to be included in the regression: Initial GDP per capita (Y60) and the
share of investment  in  GDP  (I/Y). The relationship between real economic growth  and
central bank independence appears to be insignificant except for the GMT index during the
second subperiod (1983-1992) where central bank independence has a positive effect on
growth. The coefficients for the other indices and periods have mixed signs and are
insignificant. In general, empirical evidence shows that there is no relationship between
"              This conclusion of Grimes (1991) and Fischer (1993) is contradicted in a study by Karras (1993).
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central bank independence and average real output growth.' We also note that a one-unit
increase in an index for CBI leads to more expected output growth in the second subperiod
than in the first one.
2.3.4 The Variability of Output Growth
Another question is whether there exists a relationship between central bank independence
and the variation of economic growth. Theory predicts different outcomes. According  to
Rogoff (1985a), independent central banks purchase a lower level of inflation at the price of
a higher variability of real economic growth. In contrast, Alesina and Summers (1993)
argue that an autonomous central bank will be less inclined to conduct a 'stop-go' policy
which may limit fluctuations in economic growth. Alesina and Gatti (1995) formalize this
point.
Table 2.6 shows the results of our regression analysis where the four measures of central
bank  independence  try to explain the variance of annual economic growth rates.    For  none
of the four measures, the coefficient appears to be significantly different from zero.  On top
of that, we also find most coefficients to be negative, indicating that more central bank
independence is associated with lower variance of output growth. Consequently, we may
conclude that a higher degree of central bank independence is not associated with greater
variation of real economic growth rates. Alesina and Gatti (1995) provide a possible
theoretical explanation  for this empirical finding. They suggest that variance of output
growth consists of two components. Apart from productivity shocks that are also present in
Rogoff (19853), Alesina and Gatti (1995) have politically induced output shocks in their
9          Cukierman (1993, p. 284) reports that when similar experiments are repeated for LDCs, again, no
association is found between legal independence and growth. Using several behavioral measures of
central bank independence, like the turnover rate of central bank governors, and controlling for other
determinants of growth Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers and Webb (1993) find a ceteris paribus
positive association between growth and central bank independence.
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model.     They  show  that the effect of these shocks  can be reduced by making the central
bank more independent. So there are two opposite effects, which may explain these
empirical findings. Comparing  the two subperiods shows  us  that an increase  in CBI leads  to
a larger expected reduction of the variance of output growth in the second subperiod than in
the first one.
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Table 2.5 Average Economic Growth and the Measures of CBI
Explanatory
variables 1972-1992 1972-1982 1983-1992
Constant 3.50 1.73 4.44
(3.64) (1.26) (3.80)
Alesina (AL) 0.20 0.04 0.38
(1.52) (0.20) (2.03)
I/Y -0.00 0.06 -0.05
(-0.00) (1.65) (-1.24)
Y60 -0.31 -0.25 -0.33
(-4.62)" (-2.49)' (-3.81)"
R (adjusted) 0.62 0.52 0.43
Constant 3.89 3.19 4.40
(5.85) (2.78) (6.18)
Grilli et  al. (GMT) 0.07 0.04 0.11
(2.06) (0.75) (2.24)'
I/Y -0.01 0.01 -0.03
(-0.34) (0.34) (-0.95)
Y60 -0.37 -0.32 -0.41
(-7.42)" (-3.99)" (-6.27)-
R2 (adjusted) 0.81 0.62 0.72
Constant 3.61 1.81 4.70
(4.49) (1.69) (4.67)
Eijffinger-Schaling (ES) -0.03 -0.11 0.04
(-0.33) (-0.97) (0.32)
I/Y 0.01 0.07 -0.03
(0.42) (2.19)' (-0.95)
Y60 -0.29 -0.23 -0.32
(-5.41)" (-3.14)" (4.13)"
R2 (adjusted) 0.66 0.59 0.46
Constant 3.45 1.95 4.26
(3.82) (1.58) (3.95)
Cukierman (LVAU) 0.26 -0.47 1.17
(0.36) (-0.51) (1.17)
I/Y 0.01 0.06 -0.02
(0.47) (1.85) (-0.70)
Y60 -0.30 -0.24 -0.33
(-4.65)" (-2.70)' (-3.86)-
R (adjusted) 0.62 0.57 0.41
Notes: t-values  are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates  that the coefficient is significantly
different  from  zero  at  a  95 % confidence level, two asterisks indicate  that the coefficient  is
significant at a 99% confidence  level.
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Table 2.6 Variance of Economic Growth and the Measures of CBI
Explanatory 1972-1992 1972-1982 1983-1992
variables
Constant 7.95 7.96 7.33
(3.59) (4.06) (2.25)
Alesina (AL) -0.65 -0.14 -1.11
(-0.68) (-0.17) (-0.79)
R2 (adjusted) -0.03 -0.06 -0.03
Constant 11.63 12.31 10.48
(4.36) (5.12) (2.98)
Grilli et al. (GMT) -0.60 -0.50 -0.69
(-1.88) (-1.74) (-1.63)
R2 (adjusted) 0.14 0.11 O.09
Constant 9.06 8.40 9.30
(3.32) (3.73) (2.55)
Eijffinger-Schaling (ES) -0.71 -0.10 -1.34
(-0.77) (-0.14) (-1.08)
R (adjusted) -0.02 -0.06 O.01
Constant 6.97 6.64 6.75
(3.69) (4.01) (2.39)
Cukierman (LVAU) -1.51 2.11 -4.84
(-0.31) (0.50) (-0.67)
RI (adjusted) -0.05 -0.04 -0.03
Notes: t-values  are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates  that the coefficient is significantly
different from zero at a 95% confidence level, two asterisks indicate that the coefficient is
significant at a 99% confidence level.
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2.4 Conclusion
The main conclusions of this theoretical and empirical analysis of central bank independence
with respect to the level and variability of inflation and economic growth are the following.
First of all, both our model and estimation results give further support to the well-known
inverse relationship between the degree of central bank independence and the level of
inflation found by Alesina (1988, 1989) and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992).
Secondly, we find some empirical evidence - especially for the Cukierman and GMT indices
- supporting our proposition that the more independent the central bank is, the lower the
variability of inflation.
Thirdly, according to our proposition that the level of economic growth does not depend on
the prevailing monetary regime, no relationship can be found between central bank
independence and the level of real output growth in the long run. Our interpretation of this
outcome is that the attainment and maintenance of low inflation by an independent central
bank is not accompanied by large costs or benefits in terms of sustainable economic growth.
Fourthly and finally, our estimation results clearly reject the proposition of a positive
relation between independence and the variability of real output growth. An independent
central bank does not lead to more variable economic growth in the short run. In other
words, inflation-averse central banks  do  not  bear the costs of triggering recessions  nor  do
politically sensitive central banks reap the benefits of avoiding recessions. The absence of a
long-run trade off between CBI and the mean and variance of economic growth implies that
the  establishment of central bank independence in countries which  did  not  use  to  have  this,
is a  yree lunch" (Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini,  1991).
When looking at the differences between the subperiods that we distinguish, there are three
observations with respect to the point estimates of CBI that can be made for all four indices.
First, the inflation reducing effect of a one-unit increase of CBI, according to all indices,
was larger in the first subperiod than in the second. Interestingly, this doesn't hold in terms
of elasticities. Secondly, after controlling for initial  GDP  and the share of investment,  a
one unit increase of CBI leads to more output growth in the second subperiod than in the
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first. Thirdly, a one-unit increase of CBI leads to a larger reduction of the variance of
output growth in the second subperiod than in the first.
2.5 Appendix
The Data
The mean and variance of inflation have been calculated from Consumer Prices- All Items,
Non-adjusted, OECD Main Economic Indicators;
The mean and variance of per capita output growth, initial (1960) per capita real GDP and
the share of investment over GDP are calculated from Penn World Tables;
Openness as measured by the share of imports in GDP is calculated from the National
Accounts of OECD Countries, 1960-1977, 1977-1989, 1978-1992. (Imports of goods and
services/GDP), in current prices. OECD Paris, 1979, 1991, 1994.
The indices for CBI can be found in Eijffinger and De Haan (1996). Some observations are
not available for the sample of 20 countries. For AL, Austria, Ireland and Portugal are not
available, for GMT, Finland, Norway and Sweden, for ES, Ireland and for LVAU Portugal
are  lacking.
3 Optimal Central Bank Conservativeness in an Open Economy
3.1 Introduction
Recently,   in many countries both political and monetary authorities have shown  an
increasing interest in the objective of monetary stability and the position of the central bank.
As pointed out by Persson and Tabellini (1993) recent policy reform, as well as historical
experience, suggests two different routes to price stability.
The first way is the legislative approach, namely to create by law a very independent central
bank with an unequivocal mandate to focus on price stability. Interest in this approach is
motivated by the success of the Deutsche Bundesbank in maintaining one of the lowest rates
of inflation for several decades. Moreover, the accepted statute of the European Central
Bank is strongly influenced by the law governing the Bundesbank and France and Spain
made their central banks more independent of government. Furthermore, the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland increased the legal independence of their central banks.
Academic contributions in this area are Rogoff (1985a), Neumann (1991) and Lohmann
(1992).
The second way is the mrgeting or contraaing approach, namely to let the political
principal of the central bank impose an explicit inflation target for monetary policy, and
make the central bank governor explicitly accountable for his success in meeting this target.
Recently, New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom have made some progress on this
route.' Important theoretical work on this approach is done by Persson and Tabellini (1993)
and Walsh (1995).
' For recent surveys see Haldane (1995) and Leiderm:in and Svensson (1995).
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In this chapter we build on the Rogoff (19858) model and therefore restrict the analysis to
the legislative approach. Empirical work On the legislative approach [Alesina (1989),
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Cukierman (1992), Eijffinger and Schaling
(1993a, 1996, 1998), Alesina and Summers (1993)] has focused on the quantification of
independence using a number of legal attributes from central  bank laws. These studies
focus on the positive issue of the relation between monetary regimes and economic
performance. Broadly speaking, the conclusion is that the more independent the central
bank, the lower the inflation rate, whilst the rate of output growth is unaffected.
However, this literature does not explain the observed differences in central bank
independence. For instance, no explanation is offered for the high independence of the
Bundesbank.  It has often been pointed out that this fact may be explained by Germany's
underlying aversion to inflation associated with its experience of hyper-inflation in the
1920s.2
This brings us to a key issue in the political economy of central banking: the relation
between institutional design and individual and collective preferences. An important study
in this field is Cukierman (1994). Building on the seminal paper of Lohmann (1992), he
identifies the economic and political factors that induce politicians to delegate authority to
the central bank. His theory predicts that central bank independence will be higher the
larger the employment-motivated inflationary bias, the higher political instability and the
larger the government debt.
These predictions were tested and, subsequently, rejected by De Haan and Van 't Hag
(1995). In testing the model, they employ measures of central bank independence that in -
Rogoffs (1985a) terminology - reflect the strength of the 'conservative bias' of the central
bank as embodied in the law. In Cukierman's model, following Lohmann (1992), central
bank  independence is defined  as  the  cost of overriding the central bank, rather  than as  the
degree of conservativeness. Cukierman's (1994) theory also generates propositions about
optimal regimes, whilst the legal measures describe actual monetary regimes.
2          See for instance Issing (1993) and Eijffinger and De Haan (1996).
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In this chapter we try to overcome these pitfalls. We extend the Rogoff (1985a) model to
the open economy  case and allow for deviations from purchasing power parity. Using  a
graphical method, we determine the optimal degree of conservativeness and express the
boundaries of the interval containing the optimal degree of conservativeness in terms of the
structural parameters  of the model.
Furthermore, we derive propositions concerning the relation between economic and political
factors  and the optimal degree of central bank conservativeness.     We  show that optimal
central bank conservativeness is higher, the higher the natural rate of unemployment, the
greater the benefits of unanticipated inflation (the slope of the Phillips curve), the less
inflation-averse society, the smaller the variance of productivity shocks, the smaller real
exchange rate variability  and the smaller the openness  of the economy. These propositions
are tested for nineteen industrial countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States) for the period
1960-1993. We employ a latent variables approach (LISREL) in order to distinguish
between actual and optimal monetary regimes.
The chapter is organized into four remaining sections, followed by an appendix. In Section
2  we  present the theoretical model. Section 3 contains the derivation  of the optimal degree
of central bank conservativeness. In Section 4 we test the model with the latent variables
method. Our conclusions are given in Section  5.
3.2   A Simple Macromodel
We assume that there are two types of agents, wage-setters (the union) and the central bank.
Wage-setters unilaterally choose the nominal wage every period, and the central bank con-
trols monetary policy.
The sequence of events is standard. In the first stage wage-setters sign nominal wage
contracts. Wage-setters know the domestic monetary regime.  They take this information
into account in forming their expectations.  In the second stage stochastic shocks to
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productivity and the real exchange rate realize. These shocks are random and cannot be
observed at the time wage contracts are signed. In the third stage the central bank observes
the values of the shocks and - contingent on the chosen regime - reacts to the shocks
accordingly. In the fourth and final stage employment is determined by competitive firms.
3.2.1 Aggregate Supply
Consider the following supply block. Capital will be assumed fixed, and output is given by
a short-run Cobb-Douglas production function
y,=BE, + 4 0<B<1 (3.1)
where lower-case letters refer to logarithmic deviations from steady state values. Thus, y is
the log of output, F the log of employment, and v a measure of productivity. B is the
exponent of labor and is less than unity.
For simplicity we assume that shocks to productivity are normally distributed with zero
mean and finite variance
5 -N(0,32) 0.2)
Firms determine employment by equalizing the marginal product of labor to the real wage
w, - p,. This yields the following employment function
1
ft --1-.B (w,-P,-log#- v,) 0.3)
where w is the log of the nominal wage and p the log of the price level.
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The nominal wage is set at the beginning of each period and remains fixed for one period.
The objective of wage-setters is to stabilize the real consumer wage around a target level.
Thus,  wages  in each period  are  set to minimize
1
W,=E,-1 12(w,- P., + log # -T (3.4)
where Ert is the operator of rational expectations, conditional on information at the end of
period t -  1. t  >  0 is the real wage target of the union.'
The consumer price index p. is defined as
pu   =(1-p)pt  +  B(p,' +e,)  =  p,  +  p(p,'  +  e, - pt) (3.5)
where Fl is the share of imports in GDP, e is the nominal exchange rate (defined as the
domestic currency  price of foreign exchange)  and  p'  is the foreign price level.
Having redefined the CPI in terms of the producer's price level (p) and the real exchange
rate, it remains to specify how the nominal exchange rate is determined.
Here we are concerned with the factors that ultimately determine the degree of central bank
conservativeness, that is, with the longer-term behavior of the exchange rate. As pointed out
by Mussa (1991, p. 14) , long-term relationships between movements in nominal exchange
rates and the ratio of national price levels support the empirical relevance of purchasing
power parity: Therefore, we assume the nominal exchange rate to be governed by
3           Alternatively, the loss function (3.4) could be assumed quadratic in both the deviations of
employment and the real wage from certain target levels. For an analysis along these lines see
Schaling (1995), Chapter 7.
4            It is well known that this theory has, generally, provided a poor explanation of shorter term
movements of exchange rates. See e.g. Dornbusch (1976, 1988).
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et=p,-PI+Z, z,  - N(0, a -2 ) (3.6)
where z is a shock to the real exchange rate with zero mean and finite variance at.  We
assume this shock is uncorrelated with the supply shock, i.e. E,lv,z, = 0. From the first-
order conditions for a minimum of 0.4), the CPI-indexed nominal wage is given bys
wt = E,-1 pe, + lo g B + r (3.7)
Taking account of (3.6) and 0.7) and of the fact that shocks to the real exchange rate
cannot be observed at the time wage contracts are signed, we get
w, = E,-1 pt + log # 4- r 0.8)
Substituting (3.8) in the labor demand function 0.3) and subtracting this expression from
the labor force #' (using the approximation that the rate of unemployment u = 9' - 9) we get
the following expression for the short-run determination of unemployment
1
u, = u--(B-E,-ipt + v,) 0.9)
1-B
where ii':= f ' + -L .     can be thought of as the equilibrium or "natural" rate of
1-B
unemployment in this model. Thus, 0.9) is the well-known expectations augmented Phillips
curve.  We can now incorporate the Phillips curve into a monetary policy game.
5              For a similar specification see Rogoff (1985b, p. 212). Note that the nature of the employment
contract is such that the union agrees to supply whatever amount of labor is determined by firms in
period t, provided firms pay the negotiated wage.
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3.2.2 Time-Consistent Equilibrium under a "Conservative" Central Banker
As stated by Rogoff (1985a, p.  1180), the adoption of central bank conservativeness may be
viewed as an institutional response to the time-consistency problem. He demonstrates that
society can make itself better off by selecting an agent to head the central bank who is
known to place a greater - but finite - weight on inflation stabilization (relative to unem-
ployment stabilization) than is embodied in the social loss function S,. The social loss
function S depends on deviations of unemployment and CPI inflation from their optimal
(socially desired) levels
St = 1 (,r„)2 + Z (u,-u')2 (3.10)2
where 0<x< - , CPI inflation is ;ra = pa - p<,_,  and u' is society's unemployment
target. Society's CPI inflation target has been normalized to zero. The parameter x is the
weight of unemployment stabilization relative to inflation stabilization in the preferences of
society. Normalizing p», at zero we get 6
s,= 1 Pt + 31 (u, -u')2 (3.11)22
6 This means that the Svensson (19973) approach of designing a "too low" inflation target is not
considered here. He shows that the latter can mimic the incentive structure of the optimal [Walsh
(1995)] contract. Moreover, price-level targeting and inflation-rate targeting are equivalent here,
since  Pc,., is known at the time the central bank commits itself to achieving a target for  p   -p.Cl       .1-1
Once monetary control errors are taken into account it becomes important to make the distinction
between a zero i,!flation larger and a target ofpnce smbility. See Fischer (1994, pp. 33-34).
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In period t-1 society (the principal) selects an agent to head the central bank in period t.
The reputation of this individual is such that it is known that,  if he is appointed to head the
central bank, he will minimize the following loss function
(1 + E)    2      Z
L,  2 P('+2(u,-u')2 0<6<00 (3.12)
When e is strictly greater than zero, then this agent places a greater relative weight on CPI
inflation stabilization then society does. Hence, following Rogoff we view the coefficient e
as a measure of the conservativeness of the central bank. The higher e the more conserva-
tive the central  bank.  Note  that,  if g   = 0, equation (3.12) reduces  to the social loss function
(3.11).
The derivation of the time-consistent equilibrium is standard. The resulting GDP price level
and unemployment rate are
c    .r   (u-u') rv,+B(1+E)(1-B)lz, (3.13)
P,  -  (1 - B)(1 + E) (1 + E)(1- Pft x
(1+E)(1- B)uF =(D- U. ) (V, - p Zt) (3.14)
(1+E)(1- B )2 + X
where superscript C stands for conservative central bank regime, and u - u' measures the
wedge between and the central bank's unemployment target and the natural rate of
unemployment; this determines the incentive of the central bank to create surprise inflation,
and therefore the intensity of the time-consistency problem.
Following Rogoff (19858) in the remainder of this chapter we assume that u - u'   >  0. This
assumption is standard in the credibility literature and ensures that we end up with a positive
inflationary bias (see equation 0.13)).
Note that a real depreciation increases unemployment (it acts like an adverse productivity
shock). The reason for this is simple. Shocks that tend to cause real depreciations of the
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domestic currency are stabilized by the central bank, because of their potentially adverse
effects on CPI inflation. The associated monetary tightening causes - given the level of
nominal wages - a rise in real labor costs (reducing the producer's wage), thus driving down
labor demand. Given the supply of labor, unemployment then increases.
3.3   Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy
3.3.1 Social Welfare under a "Conservative" Central Banker
We  are  now  able to evaluate central bank conservativeness  from the perspective of society.
To facilitate exposition in later sections, following Rogoff (1985a, pp. 1175-1176), we shall
first develop a notation for evaluating the expected value of society's loss function under
any arbitrary monetary policy regime "A", Er,S,A:
E,-,St=    (u- u.)2 + 1-IA + rA (3.15)
where  rIA E * E,., (PA)2, PA is the CPI in period t, and
rA =1-     f" [v t + (P: - E,-1 P:)12 + , r     A,21
1     - 2  t'-1  'C [              1-B              -1        (Pa - il'.1 p" .1   
Again, the first component of  E,-1 S,A,    [K (u  -u'  )2] is non-stochastic and invariant across
monetary regimes. It represents the deadweight  loss  due  to the labor market distortion
(u -u'  >0).  This loss cannot be reduced through monetary policy  in a time-consistent
rational expectations equilibrium. The second term, I-IA, depends on the mean inflation
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rate. This term is also non-stochastic but does depend on the choice of monetary policy
regime.
The final term. I-A, represents the stabilization component of the loss function. It measures
how successfully the central bank offsets disturbances to stabilize unemployment and CPI
inflation around their mean values.
By  substituting the results relevant  for the central  bank  [(3.13)  and  0.14)] into society's
loss function (3.11) and taking expectations, we obtain the C regime counterpart of
expression (3.15). Abstracting from the (common) deadweight loss, one gets
2
llc+rc- (U-U  ) + . [a: + *2 a:] 0.16)r                 ,-        •   2     ZI(1 + E)2(1 -B)2 +X]
2[(1 + E)(1 - B)]2 2[(1 +E)(1- B )2 +X]'
3.3.2 The Ultimate Determinants of Central Bank Conservativeness
The optimal degree of central bank conservativeness e' is defined as that value of £ that
minimizes the expected value of the loss function of society E„1 S,c
To solve' for the value of e that minimizes E,_t S,c, differentiate 0.16) with respect to E
D E,-1 st = a nc + a I.c (3.17)
88     88    8%
arc - /2 (1 - B)2 E [a: +*2 at]
(3.18)
DE   [(1+6)(1 -B)2+X]1
As pointed out by Rogoff (19853, p.  1178), it is difficult to write down a closed-form solution for e'.
The latter is given in an appendix to Chapter 4.
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a rIC-    - %2 (u- u , )2 (3.19)
DE  (1+E)1(1 -B)2
From (3.19) it can be seen that increasing the central bank's commitment to inflation
stabilization decreases the credibility component of the social loss function.  On the other
hand, from (3.18) it follows that having a more conservative central bank increases the
stabilization component of the loss function.
Hence, optimal commitment in monetary policy involves trading off the credibility gains
associated with lower average inflation versus loss of flexibility due to a distorted response
to  productivity  and real exchange rate shocks.
Rogoff is unable to write down a closed-form solution for e' and to derive propositions
concerning the comparative static properties of this equilibrium. Using a graphical method,
we develop an alternative way of determining the optimal degree of central bank conserva-
tiveness. Next, we show how this result is conditioned on the natural rate of unemployment
u, society's preferences for unemployment stabilization (x), the variance of productivity
shocks (a:), the slope' of the Phillips curve ((1-B)-9, the variance of shocks to the real
exchange  rate  (azz)  and the degree of openness  (p)
By setting 0.17) equal to zero we obtain the first-order condition for a minimum of E, 1 Scr
o = fIle+ fr.1 O.20)
86    BE
Substituting (3.18) and (3.19) into O.20), yields
- %2 (U - U.)2   + %2(1. #)2 6 [a: + &12 a ] -0 (3.21)
(1- B )2(1+6)3 [(1 + E)(1- B )2+Z]3
8 Assuming unemployment on the vertical and inflation on the horizontal axis.
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Equation (3.21) determines e' as an implicit function of X, u, a,2, P, 0,2 and p. A solution
for e' always exists and is unique.
To show this and to do comparative statics we use a graphical method.9 Rewrite (3.21) as
[(1 + E)(1- B)2 +Z ]1(17 -u' )2
E- ,   = F(E) (3.22)
Ia:+,12 a ](1 -B)4(1 +E)"'
The function F(£) on the right-hand side of equation (3.22) is monotonically decreasing in e
and it can be shown that
F(0) - ,lim F(E) - and
[(1-*)2+X]3(7-u.)2 (1 -P)2(ii-u')2
[a: + 512 a:](1 -B)4 .-loo [a: + /12 a:]
 1-    2(U- U' )2 I(1 -B)2 t h ]1(i7- u')2
< F(E) <
[a: + Bl a:] [a: + #2 Oi ] (1 . B)4
We are now ready to prove:
(1 -B)2 (il-u' )2 [(1 - B )2 + %]3(u -u')2Proposition 3.1: , <84 <
[a: + 512 a:] [a: + /12 a ](1 - #)4
Proof: The left-hand side of (3.22) is a 45-degree straight line through the origin.   Since
F(0) - and  - <0. these two functions must intersect at one andIcl-B,2+z]1(u-u')2   BF
[at + B2 al.] (1 - #)4 88   '
(1-B)2(u -u')2 I(1- B )2 +1'13(u -u' 12only one point. Moreover, since . F(E) < :   , the
[a: + Bl a:] [a: + 512 a ] (1 -B)'
9 This method was first applied in the context of a dynamic game by Cukierman (1992, pp. 170-172).
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(1 -  )2(U -U')2intersection occurs at a value of e that is bounded between and
[a: + PZ a ]
I(1 -B)2 +Z]3 (u  -u'  )1
[a: + #20:](1 - #)4     .
Figure 3.1 Optimal conservativeness in an open economy
P
[(1- B)2+Zl'    .(U-U')
[a: + /1 20:](1 -B)
0-m2     -     .2(U -U )
attplal » le
Figure 3.1 illustrates the argument graphically. Clearly, a solution  for g exists  and  is
unique.  We  are now ready to investigate the factors affecting the optimal degree Of central
bank conservativeness (hereafter OC). Hence, we identify economic and political factors
that induce politicians to delegate more or less authority to this institution. We show that the
delegation of authority to the central bank depends on the natural rate of unemployment,
society's preferences for unemployment stabilization, the variance of productivity shocks,
the slope of the Phillips curve, the degree of openness of the economy and the variance of
shocks  to  the real exchange  rate. The results are derived by performing comparative static
experiments with respect to various parameters on Figure 3.1. Derivations are published  in
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a separate technical appendix [Eijffinger and Schaling (1998)] which is available to the
interested reader on request. We summarize the main results in the following six
propositions.
Proposition 3.2: If the central bank partly accommodates the natural rate of unemployment
(au'/eu    <   1), the higher the natural  rate of unemployment, the higher OC.
OF [ au'l approof:  - =1 1- -1
eu       [        au    ]  8(u- u' )
where eu/8 u   is the accommodation coefficient and the second term is positive if u - u'   >
0.'°  Under the above conditions aFFE  > 0, implying that when u goes up, the curve F(e)
in Figure 3.1 shifts upward.    As a consequence, the equilibrium value  of £ increases.
The intuition behind this result is the following. A higher natural rate of unemployment
implies a higher time-consistent rate of inflation (see equation 0.13)) and, consequently, a
higher credibility component of the social loss function. This means that society's credibil-
ity problem is increased. Hence, with an unaltered relative weight placed on inflation
versus unemployment stabilization the monetary authorities' commitment to fight inflation is
now too low.
Note that, if either society's and wage-setters' preferences are consistent (u'  =  u) or target
unemployment rates fully adjust one for one to changes in the natural rate eu*/aii  = 1), we
should observe no relationship between the natural rate of unemployment and optimal
central bank conservativeness.
DFSee the last part of Section 3.2.   In the (less plausible) case that  u - u'   < 0. becomes
2(ii - u.)
au.negative and the condition On the accommodation coefficient becomes -  >  1.
aU
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Proposition 3.3: The higher society's preferences for unemployment stabilization relative to
inflation stabilization (the higher x),the higher OC.
8Fproof The technical appendix shows that - >0, implying that when x goes up, the curve
8x
F(e)  in Figure  3.1 shifts upward.  Thus, the equilibrium value of E  increases.
The underlying intuition is that, if society becomes more concerned with unemployment and
more lax about inflation, the time-consistent inflation rate goes up (See equation 0.13)).
Therefore, society's credibility problem becomes more pressing. With an unchanged weight
placed on inflation stabilization, the balance between credibility and flexibility needs to be
adjusted in favor of increased commitment of fighting inflation.
Proposition 3.4: The higher the variance Ofproductivity shocks (the higher a.2), the lower
OC.
8F
Proof The technical appendix shows that - <0. implying that when a,2 goes up, the
8 0-:
curve  F(£) in Figure 3.1 shifts downward. Therefore, the equilibrium value  of e decreases.
This result may be explained as follows. If the variance of productivity shocks increases,
ceteris paribus, the economy becomes more unstable.  Thus, the need for active stabilization
policy increases (the f component of the social loss function goes up)
With an unaltered relative weight placed on inflation stabilization the balance between
credibility and flexibility then needs to be shifted towards more monetary accommodation.
<  (1+E)(1 -B)2)Proposition 3.5: If society is relatively unconcerned with inflatiory %> 1, the1     )
greater the bene#ts Ofunanticipated inflation (the higher (1-11)-'), the higher OC.
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(1 + E)(1-#)2 apProof The technical appendix shows that, if x  > > 0, implying2              9  8(1 -B)-i
that when (1-11)-' goes up, the curve F(c) shifts upward. Consequently, the equilibrium value
of e  increases.
The intuition behind this proposition is that, if the benefits of unanticipated inflation rise
(See equation 0.9)), it becomes more tempting to inflate the economy. Therefore, society's
credibility problem gains in importance. With the same emphasis on inflation stabilization,
the balance between credibility and flexibility needs to be shifted towards increased
commitment to price stability.
Proposition 3.6: If the economy is more open to international trade (the higher 61), the
lower OC.
8F
Proof: The technical appendix shows that - <0, implying that when ki goes up. the
aB
curve F(e) in Figure 3.1 shifts downward. Therefore, the equilibrium value of e decreases.
The underlying argument is the following. If the economy becomes more open, domestic
inflation and unemployment become more vulnerable to shocks to the real exchange rate.
This means that if p goes up, ex ante variability of both inflation and unemployment
increase (see equations (3.13) and 0.14)). Note that this implication is consistent with
empirical evidence found by Romer (1993) that openness accounts for a substantial fraction
of the variation in inflation among countries.  As a consequence the need for active
stabilization policy by the central bank increases. Thus, the balance between credibility and
flexibility needs to be shifted towards more monetary accommodation.
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Proposition 3.7: The higher real exchange rate variability (the higher a j), the lower OC.
aFproof The technical appendix shows that 8-2<0,
implying that when aj  goes up, the
C.
curve  F(Er) in Figure 3.1 shifts downward. Therefore, the equilibrium value of E decreases.
The intuition is similar to that behind the previous proposition. If ex ante real exchange rate
variability rises, both domestic inflation and unemployment will become more volatile (see
equations (3.13) and (3.14)). Thus, the need for active stabilization policy increases (the f
component of the social loss function goes up). So, the balance between credibility and
flexibility must be shifted towards less commitment.
In order to confront these propositions with some cross-country evidence, we can now move
on to the empirical evidence. This is the subject of the next section.
3.4   Empirical Evidence
In this section, the ultimate determinants of central bank conservativeness are empirically
investigated. We will use, for that purpose, a latent variables approach (LISREL) to make a
distinction between the optimal and actual degree of central bank conservativeness.  The
reason for this distinction is that the propositions derived in the former section are related to
the optimal degree of central bank conservativeness and not to the actual degree.
Importantly, the former  is an unobservable conceptual variable. Therefore  we  need  an
observable proxy  for  OC.   As a proxy  we  use the legal degree of central bank independence
according to the four main measures in the literature. According to these measures central
banks in which the only or main objective of monetary policy (as specified in the law) is
price stability, are classified as being more independent than central banks with a number of
objectives in addition to price stability, or banks in whose law price stability is not
mentioned as an objective at all. Therefore, these measures reflect the central bank's
mandate for price stability and hence the strength of the conservative bias as embodied in
the  CB  law.
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3.4.1  The Data
As proxies for the ultimate determinants of central bank conservativeness, we have chosen
the following economic and political variables (See for a detailed account of these variables:
Appendix A).  For the natural rate of unemployment, the non-accelerating inflation rate of
unemployment (NAIRU) is taken from Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). They estimated
the NAIRU fur nineteen industrial countries in the period 1960-1988. The proxy for
society's preferences for unemployment stabilization relative to inflation stabilization is the
number of years that a left-wing (socialist) party has been in government as a share of the
total number of years (WLEFT). For, a left-wing government has a higher preference for
unemployment stabilization and, thereby, the optimal degree of central bank conserv-
ativeness increases under a left-wing government." The variance of productivity shocks is
proxied by the variance Ofoutput growth (GDP) on an annual basis (VPROD). We compute
the slope of the Phillips curve, using labor's income share in GDP." Because data for
labor's income share are not available for all countries in our sample, we have taken the
ratio between the compensation Of employees paid by resident producers to resident
households  and GDP (SLOPE).
The degree of openness is measured by the ratio between the impons of goods and services
and  GDP  (OPEN). The proxy  for the variance of shocks  to  the real exchange  rate  is  the
variance of the ratio between the CPI inflation minus GDP deflator and the degree of
openness (VREER).
"          According to Alesina (1989, p. 61), empirical evidence provides support for the view that
redistributional considerations provide an incentive for the left to be expansionary and unemployment
fighting and for the right to be inflation-fighting and less concerned about unemployment.
12 Since we use a Cobb-Douglas production function (equation (3.1)), the production elasticity of labor,
B, equals labor's income share in GDP.
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3.4.2 The Latent Variables Method
According to Bentler (1982), the essential characteristic of a latent variable is revealed by
the fact that the system of linear structural equations in which the latent variable appears
cannot be manipulated so as to express this variable as a function of measured variables
only."
Aigner et al. (1984) state that, since 1970, there has been a resurgence of interest in
econometrics in the topic of models involving latent variables. "That interest in such models
had to be restimulated at all may seem surprising since there can be no doubt that economic
quantities frequently are measured with error and, moreover, that many applications depend
on the use of observable proxies for otherwise unobservable conceptual variables" (p.
1323).
Estimation of a simultaneous equations model with latent variables can be done by means of
a computer program for the analysis of covariance structures, such a LISREL (Linear
Structural Relations). The idea behind LISREL is to compare a sample covariance matrix
with the parametric structure imposed on it by the hypothesized model. Under normality,
LISREL delivers Full Infonnation Marimum Likelihood (FIML) estimates of the model
parameters. The specification of the latent variables model to be analyzed by LISREL is as
follows.  Let  OCN  be the latent dependent variable,  i.e. the latent optimal degree of central
bank conservativeness -nonnalized between zero and unity-, and x a vector of observed
explanatory variables being the six ultimate determinants of central bank conservativeness.
0CN and x are measured in deviations from their means and satisfy the following linear
system:
(?)(+)(-)(+)(-)(-)
OCN-M=   [bi  bi  bjb4 bs b6l ·x+4 0.23)
13            For this definition of a latent variable, see: P.M. Bentler (1982). A clear overview of the latem
variable approach is given by: D.J. Aigner (et al) (1984).








The expected signs are denoted above the vector of coefficients and 4 is a disturbance term.
Instead of the latent vector OCN-M, a vector y of legal indices of central bank indepen-









= OPCBCN-M + y (3.25)ESN- M
LVAU- M
Hence, the optimal degree of central bank conservativeness is approximated by the legal
degree, according to the four main indices of central bank independence in the literature.
'4             The legal index of Cukierman (LVAU) is already normalized on its theoretical scale i.e. in theory is
lowest value is 0 and its highest value 1.
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The index of Alesina (AL) is a narrow measure of independence and based on Alesina
(1989). The total index of political and economic independence of Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini (GMT) is a broad measure based on Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). The
index of policy independence of Eijffinger and Schaling (ES) is, however, a narrow
measure based on Eijffinger and Schaling (1993a, 1998) and extended by Eijffinger and Van
Keulen (1995). The unweighted legal index of Cukierman (LVAU) is a very broad measure
of independence and derived from Cukierman (1992).
For our cross-country analysis, a set of nineteen industrial (OECD) countries is taken which
are ranked - with some exceptions - by the above-mentioned indices. The sample period that
we have chosen covers more than thirty years, namely the period 1960-1993 (for NAIRU:
1960-1988). The argument to choose such a long period is that it contains many political
and business cycles and, thus, comprises changes of the political and economic structure
affecting the optimal degree of central bank conservativeness. Of course, y is the vector of
measurement errors with E(y) = E(yQ = 0.
Furthermore, 0 and T are defined as the covariance matrix of x and the variance of 4,
respectively and ® as the variance-covariance matrix of y.  Then it follows  from the above
assumptions  that the variance-covariance matrix  S  of [y'.  x']'  is
I = [(B*B'+4') + e    B(D + C]
L *B'+C 0 ]
(3.26)
where B E  [bi bi bib4 1,5 bd and Cis the covariance matrix of x and y. The parameters
occurring in S (B, C, (D, 9, e) are estimated on the basis of the matrix S of second sample
moments of x and y. In order to identify all parameters, a restriction on 0 has to be
imposed. Given this restriction and the structure that equation 0.26) imposes on the data,
LISREL computes FIML estimates of the parameters when [y', x'] is normally distributed,
i.e. when the following criterion is minimized
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in 'S 1 + tr [SE-'] 0.2D
For the moment we assume that e is diagonal and C is the null matrix. The latter are
sufficient conditions for identification. Of course, the meaning of those restrictions is that
the correlation between the observed legal indices of central bank independence (y) is only
caused by the latent optimal degree and that the measurement errors (y) are uncorrelated
with the observed explanatory variables (x).
3.4.3 The Empirical Results
Now we will estimate the relationship between the optimal degree of central bank conserva-
tiveness and the economic and political factors in a country as specified by equations 0.23)
- (3.25).
Next, given the parameter estimates we compute ("predict") OC for each country and make
a comparison between the optimal degree of conservativeness and the legal indices of
central bank independence.
The first row of Table 3.1 shows the estimation results, based on e diagonal and C the null
matrix.   From  this  row  it  can  be  seen  that all explanatory variables, except for NAIRU  have
the expected sign. However, only the VPROD is significant at a 90% confidence level. The
relatively low t-values of the explanatory variables could perhaps be attributed to the
imposed restrictions." In order to investigate the validity of these restrictions univariate
Lagrange Multiplier tests are carried out.
The  last  four  rows of Table  3.1  give the estimation results  if we relax cumulatively  five
restrictions  on  C  and  0  respectively.    When  the test statistic, having a %21-distribution,  has  a
value larger than 2.71 the restriction is rejected at a significance level of 10%.
15 See in this respect: Aigner, Hsiao, Kapteyn and Wansbeek (1984, p. 1371).
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In the first regression, with all restrictions imposed, the constraint that the disturbances of
the GMT-index and the variance of productivity shocks (ai) are uncorrelated [E (72 X3)  =
0]  is  rejected.     The test statistic  has a value  of 6.74 which  is the highest  of all restrictions.
Therefore, we have lifted this restriction and tested the modified model.
Now the restriction on the covariance of the disturbances of the GMT-index and the
variance of shocks to the real exchange rate (VREER) [E(72 x6) =0] is rejected with the
highest test statistic.     So, this restriction  has been lifted. This process  goes on until there  is
no  restriction  left  with  a test statistic higher  than  2.71.
Then the Likelihood Ratio-test for the model to be of the specified structure gives a test-
statistic of 16.36 which is well below the critical value of 25.99 for a X218-distribution at a
significance level of 10%.
From the  last  row of Table  3.l i t can be  seen that all explanatory variables, except VPROD
and NAIRU,  have the expected  sign."
Now, we turn to the computation of OC for each country and make a comparison between
the optimal degree of conservativeness  and the legal indices of central bank independence.
Such a comparison is possible since both the optimal degree and the legal indices have been
normalized.
The values for the normalized indices are given in the first four columns of Table 3.2. "
Next the thus normalized indices are expressed as deviations from their means, called
transformed indices. The numerical values of the transformed indices (ALN-M etc.) can be
found in columns 5-8 of this Table. From these columns, it can be seen that all indices
classify the Bundesbank's independence as above average, whereas the opposite holds for
the Bank of England.
16            As said before, the coefficient on the NAIRU may be explained by accommodation of this variable
into the authorities' target. In the latter case higher unemployment rates imply less ambitious policies.
17         For example, according to the normalized Alesina index (ALN) the Netherlands is classified as 0.33.
This  number was computed using the following formula  ALN = [AL-AL.J/[AL-:ALm,n], where
AL = 2, AL- = 4 and At.„,in = 1.
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In order to confront the transformed indices with the optimal degree of conservativeness for
each country, we compute OC based on the last row of Table 3.1. The 'predictions' for OC
(similarly normalized and in deviation from its mean) can be found in the next column.
Of course, the numbers reflect the "distribution" of the determinants (the economic and
political factors) across the sample.  Now, a comparison between the optimal degree of
conservativeness and the legal indices can be made. We do this by calculating the average
ditTerence defined as
AVDIF - [OPCBCN- M] 0.28)[ALN-M] +[GMTN- M] + [ESN- M] +[LVAU-M]
4
The average difference is positive, if the average of legal indices exceeds the optimal
degree, and negative, if the optimal degree exceeds the average of legal indices.
A positive difference indicates that the actual monetary regime in a country - as proxied by
the central bank laws - can be seen as too conservative, whereas a negative average
difference indicates that the legal degree should be increased to bring it closer to the social
optimum.
Positive average differences - of 0.24 or higher - are found for Germany and Switzerland,
implying that the monetary regimes in those countries can be seen as  "too conservative" .
Negative average differences - of -0.21 or lower - are observed for Sweden and the United
Kingdom, meaning that OC exceeds the legal degree of central bank independence and that
the latter should be increased.
For the other countries the average differences are relatively small, indicating that there is
no reason to adjust the central bank law in these countries from the perspective of the
ultimate determinants."   In some countries - notably France and Spain - the central bank
18         In a separate technical appendix (available on request) we also calculate the average differences for
the cases  with more restrictions  (rows  1-4 of Table  3.1). The positive numbers for Germany  and
Switzerland remain in place.  Also. the negative differences for Australia, Norway, Sweden and the
United Kingdom are robust. Again, relatively small differences are found for Belgium, Canada,
Finland, France, Italy, Japan and the United States.
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has, recently, been made more independent from government which can be explained by
another argument: a prerequisite for entering the third phase of Economic and Monetary
Union in Europe is, among others, the independence of the national central banks of the
participating countries.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we derived propositions concerning the relation between economic and
political factors and the optimal degree of central bank conservativeness (OC).
We have shown that OC is higher, the higher the natural rate of unemployment, the greater
the slope of the Phillips curve, the less inflation averse society, the smaller the variance of
productivity shocks, the smaller real exchange rate variability and the smaller the openness
of the economy. These propositions were tested for nineteen industrial countries, using a
latent variables method (LISREL) to distinguish between actual and optimal monetary
regimes. We find that some countries (Germany and Switzerland) seem to have a
suboptimally high degree of central bank conservativeness, whereas others (Sweden and the
UK) appear to have a suboptimally low degree.
Of course, our model could be extended with other determinants of central bank
conservativeness. For instance, Lockwood et al (1994) show how OC increases with
unemployment persistence whilst Levine and Pearlman (1995) demonstrate how this
variable relates  to both nominal  and  real wage rigidity. Moreover, Fratianni and Huang
(1995) suggest that central bank conservativeness and repumtion can be treated as partial
substitutes. Finally, one could extend the model with uncertainty about the policymaker's
preferences  due to political pressure.
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3.6 Appendix
The Data
NAIRU: R. Layard, S. Nickell and R. Jackman,
Unemployment,  Macroeconomic  Performance  and  the  Labour  Market,  Oxford,  Oxford
University Press, 1991.
Estimates for NAIRU 1960-1988, Table 14, Chapter 9.
WLEFT: A.J. Day (ed.), Political Panies of the World, London, Longman, 1988, (#
years that a left-wing party has been in the government, either alone or in a coalition) / (to-
tal # years), 1960-1993.
VPROD: OECD Main Economic Indicators.
Growth rate of GDP in US$ in 1985 prices and exchange rates, 1960-1993.
SLOPE: National Accounts of OECD Countries, 1960-1977, 1977-1989, 1978-1992.
1/[l  -  (Compensation of employees  paid by resident producers/GDP)], in current prices.
OECD, Paris, 1979, 1991, 1994.
OPEN: National Accounts of OECD Countries, 1960-1977, 1977-1989, 1978-1992.
(Imports of goods and services/GDP), in current prices. OECD Paris, 1979, 1991, 1994.
VREER: OECD National Accounts, Main Aggregates, Vol. I, 1960-1989, Paris,
1991.  Variance  of [(CPI inflation-GDP deflator)/OPEN], CPI inflation and GDP deflator
calculated from private final consumption expenditure price index and GDP price index,
respectively.
4   The Trade Off Between Central Bank Independence and
Conservativeness
4.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the following fundamental question. It tries to explain the optimal
degree of central bank independence and conservativeness by four economic and political
determinants (the natural rate of unemployment, society's preferences for unemployment
stabilization relative to inflation stabilization, the variance of productivity shocks and the
benefits of unanticipated inflation) both theoretically and empirically. The empirical results
are only given for the (twelve) member states of the European Union.
The  chapter is organized as follows. Central bank independence is included  in the model  of
a conservative central banker and the trade off between independence and conservativeness
is discussed in Section 2.  In this Section, also the relationship between (independence and)
conservativeness of the central banks and the four economic and political determinants is
investigated with an extension of the Rogoff (1985a) model. Furthermore, we test this
relationship empirically using a latent variables approach (LISREL) for nineteen industrial
countries including the member states of the European Union in Section 3. Also, the optimal
degree of conservativeness of the central banks is identified for twelve member states of the
European Union. Finally, our conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
4.2    The Rogoff Model
In the Rogoff (19853) model, society can make itself better off by appointing a conservative
central banker who does not share the social objective function, but instead places "too
large" a weight on inflation rate stabilization relative to output stabilization. In this
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simplified version, output is given by the Lucas supply function which is reformulated in
terms of unemployment u,:
u, =u-b(ir,-1r' + v,) (4.1)
where b  > 0 denotes the slope of the Phillips curve, A, is inflation, :r° is expected inflation,
u  > 0  is the natural rate of unemployment and  v, is a serially uncorrelated productivity
shock with mean zero and variance 0,2. The timing of events is as follows: first ,r' is set
(nominal wage contracts are signed), then the shock v, occurs and finally the central banker
Sets lit.
Figure 4.1 The Timing of Events
1                        2                        3                          4
Nominal wage Productivity CB sets monetary Output
contracts signed shocks realize policy determined
Society's loss function is given by:
12%2
St=-1rt +-U, (4.2)2      2
where the weight on output stabilization %  >  O. The target level of inflation and the target
level of unemployment are set to zero. Rogoff now shows that it is optimal for society to
choose a conservative central banker who assigns "too large" a weight to inflation in his
loss function:
L,= Lls,zI + Z-Ut (4.3)22
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where E, the additional weight on the inflation goal. lies between zero and infinity (0 < E
< 00).
Substituting  (4.1)  in (4.3), taking first order conditions with respect  to  Ir, and solving  for
rational expectations, we obtain:
Xb -    y.bl
;r,=-u                                 v,                                                                                                                              (4.4)
1+E 1+E+Xbz
1f = .Xb u (4.5)
1+E
b(1 + E)
Ul = U . V' (4.6)
1+E+Z b'
Policy rule (4.4) shows that the introduction of a conservative central banker (   >  0) leads
xb                               C   Kbl   Y  2to a lower inflationary bias (- u) and a lower variance of inflation i 0,·
1+E \.1+6 +XI,z 
The variance of output 1 .  I  a,, however, is an increasing function of theC    b(1 +E)   Y     2
Cl +E+.rbL/1
conservativeness of the central banker.   This is the trade off between credibility and
flexibility  that is already apparent  in the Rogoff model.  It  can be shown  that the optimal
value for 6, in terms of social loss function (4.2), is positive but finite.' This implies that it
is optimal for society to appoint a conservative central banker.
' Rogoff uses an envelope theorem to show this.  In the appendix we derive a closed-form solution to
this problem.
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4.2.1 From Conservativeness to Independence
The independence of a central bank can be seen as the extent to which it determines
monetary policy without interference of the government.   In the Rogoff model, this can be
incorporated in the loss function that determines monetary policy, M,. This function is a
weighted average of the central bank's loss function L, and society's loss function S, where
the  weight 0<y<1  is the degree of central bank independence:2
M,=YL,+(1-y)S, (4.7)





1+YE . % 1
2
So, what matters for monetary policy is YE: the produa of independence and
conservativeness of the central bank, or efective central bank independence. There is an
optimal degree of independence and conservativeness (ys') which minimizes society's loss
S,.   In practice, the degree of (legal) independence of a central bank is fixed as measured by
the legal indices of independence which reflect the central  bank  laws in various countries.
The level of conservativeness, however, can generally be chosen by the central bank.
Hence, a lack of central bank independence can be compensated by choosing more
conservative central bankers.   On the basis of economic and political determinants, we
determine the optimal degree of independence and conservativeness. Then, given the aaual
degree of independence for each country, we are able to identify its optimal degree of
conservativeness £' (see Figure 4.2).
2 This implies that central bank independence (» is defined aS the degree in which the central bank
determines effectively the monetary policy' s loss function  (M,).
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Figure 4.2 The Trade Off between Independence and Conservativeness
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4.2.2 The Optimal Independence and Conservativeness of a Central Bank
This brings us to a key issue in the political economy of central banking: the relationship
between institutional design and individual and collective preferences.  Here the question to
be dealt with is the normative issue of how conservative a central bank (CB) should be, i.e.
the optimal degree of conservativeness of a CB.
An important study in this field is Cukierman (1994). Building on the seminal paper of
Lohmann (1992), he wants to identify the economic and political factors that induce
politicians to delegate more or less authority to the central bank. His theory predicts that
central bank independence will be higher, the larger the employment-motivated inflationary
bias, the higher political instability and the larger the government debt are.
These predictions were tested and, subsequently, rejected by De Haan and Van 't Hag
(1995) using regression analysis (OLS method). In testing Cukierman's model, they
employ measures of central bank independence that in - Rogoffs (1985a) terminology -
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reflect the strength of the 'conservative bias' of the central bank as embodied in the law.   In
Cukierman's model, following Lohmann (1992), central bank independence is defined as
the cost of overriding the central bank, rather than as the degree of conservativeness.
Cukierman's (1994) theory also generates propositions about optimal regimes, whilst the
legal measures describe actual monetary regimes.
In this chapter we try to overcome these pitfalls. Building on the Rogoff (1985a) model, we
distinguish between independence and conservativeness of a CB. Using a graphical method,
we develop a new way of determining the optimal degree of independence and
conservativeness.  As in Lohmann (1992), this degree depends on the balance between
credibility  and flexibility. However, unlike Rogoff and Lohmann,  we are  able to express  the
upper and lower bounds of the interval containing the optimal degree of independence and
conservativeness in terms of the structural parameters of the model.
Furthermore, we derive a number of propositions concerning the relationship between
economic and political factors and the optimal degree of independence and
conservativeness.     We  show that optimal central bank independence and conservativeness  is
higher, the higher the natural rate of unemployment, the greater the benefits of
unanticipated inflation (the slope  of the Phillips curve),  the less inflation-averse society  and
the smaller the variance of productivity shocks.
After we have found the optimal degree of independence and conservativeness for each
country and knowing the actual degree of independence of its central bank, we can derive
the optimal degree of conservativeness of the CB.
Using ys instead of E in the expression for inflation (4.4) and the expression for
unemployment (4.6), substituting these two expressions into the Central Bank's loss
function (4.8) and taking expectations yields the following expected loss for society with a
central banker with independence y and conservativeness s:
E,-,S,-     Xib2 u' 2    1.                  b,
Zi 2 % i2  +    bl U+YE/  I        2
2(1 +76)        2(1 + 78+ 1,2  Z  /0'          2     '    2(1 + 1,8+bp  %  )2
'r' (4.9)
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The first term in (4.9) is due to the inflationary bias and can be reduced by making the
central bank more independent or conservative (a larger YE). The second term measures how
well the central bank manages to keep inflation constant. This variance can also be reduced
by making the central bank more independent or conservative. The third term is a dead-
weight loss due to the natural rate of unemployment. Obviously, this cannot be reduced
through monetary policy. The last term is the variance of unemployment (or output). This
term increases when the central bank becomes more independent or conservative. When we
drop the dead-weight loss and take the two variances together, we get the following:
%2 bl UZ    +Xbz((Ity£/+bl %)    2
E,AS,- 2(1+769    2(1+78+1,2% 32  "
(4.9')
credibility flexibility
The first term in (4.9') is related to the natural rate of unemployment and can be seen as the
credibility component  in the social  loss; the second  term is related  to the variance  of
productivity shocks and represents the,#exibility component in the social  loss.
Minimizing the expected social loss with respect to ys yields the following first order
condition:
d E,-, S, --  %: bz iii .'-      %: b4 YE al -0
d  (ys)        (1  + ys)'     (1 + 76 +  % bi  f
(4.10)
negative positive
The first term in (4.10) is always negative and reflects the credibility effect of a more
independent or conservative central bank: a higher yE reduces society's credibility problem.
The second term is always positive and reflects the flexibility effect of more central bank
independence or conservativeness: a higher yE; means less stabilization.
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4.2.3 The Determinants of Optimal Independence and Conservativeness
In Eijffinger and Schaling (1998) it is shown that a unique solution for the optimal ys exists.
Furthermore, the comparative static properties of this equilibrium are derived by means of a
graphical method as is illustrated in Figure 3. First, the first-order condition (4.10) is
rewritten as:
YE_ u 2 (1 + FE +Z bi )3 - F(,&) (4.11)aibi (1 + yE)3
The function F on the right-hand side of equation (4.11) is monotonically decreasing in 78.
The left-hand side is a 45° line through the origin and the intersection point gives the
optimal degree of independence and conservativeness  ys'. The comparative static properties
of the optimal degree of independence and conservativeness can be derived from the partial
derivatives of the function F.   If F shifts upward, the intersection point shifts to the right.'
3            For a formal derivation of the properties of the function F in the first-order condition, see Appendix
B in Eijffinger and Schaling (1998).
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Figure 4.3: Optimal Independence and Conservativeness
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It turns out that the higher the natural rate of unemployment (the higher u ), the higher the
optimal degree of conservativeness and independence  of the  CB. The intuition behind  this
result is the following. A higher natural rate of unemployment implies a higher time-
consistent  rate of inflation (See equation  (4.4)) and, consequently, a higher credibility
component of the social loss function. This means that society's credibility problem
increases. Hence, with an unaltered relative weight placed on inflation versus
unemployment stabilization the monetary authorities' commitment to fight inflation is now
too low.
The higher  society's  preferences for  unemployment  stabilization  relative  to  inflation
stabilization (the higher  x)  in a country, the higher the optimal degree of conservativeness
and independence of the CB. The underlying intuition is that, if citizens become more
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concerned with unemployment and more lax about inflation, the time-consistent inflation
rate goes up (See equation (4.4)). Therefore, society's credibility problem becomes more
pressing.  With an unchanged relative weight placed on inflation stabilization, the balance
between credibility and flexibility needs to be adjusted in favor of increased commitment of
fighting inflation.
The higher the variance Ofproductivity shocks (the higher a.2) in a country, the lower the
optimal degree of conservativeness  and  independence  of a  CB. This result  may  be
explained as follows.   If the variance of productivity shocks increases, ceteris paribus, the
economy becomes more unstable.  Thus, the need for active stabilization policy increases
(the flexibility component of the social loss function goes up).  With an unaltered relative
weight placed on inflation stabilization the balance between credibility and flexibility needs
to be shifted towards more monetary accommodation.
C          (1  + YE )1
If society  is  relatively  unconcemed  with  inflation  l X
>
2 b' Y I
the greater the benefits of
unanticipated  inflation (the higher  b)  in a country, the higher the optimal degree  of
conservativeness and independence  of a  CB. The intuition behind this proposition  is  that,  if
the benefits of unanticipated inflation rise (See equation (4.1)), it becomes more tempting to
inflate the economy. Therefore, society's credibility problem gains in importance.  With
the same emphasis on inflation stabilization, the balance between credibility and flexibility
needs  to be shifted towards increased commitment to price stability.
4.3     An Empirical Illustration of Optimal Conservativeness
In this Section, the economic and political determinants of the optimal degree of central
bank conservativeness and independence (YE.) discussed before are empirically investigated.
We will use, for that purpose, a latent variables approach (LISREL) to make a distinction
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between the optimal and actual degree of conservativeness and independence.4 The reasons
for this distinction are two-fold. First, the propositions derived in the former Section are
related to the optimal degree of conservativeness and independence and not to the actual
degree. These propositions formulate the relationship between the optimal degree  and  four
economic and political factors in a country:
the natural rate of unemployment (u);
society's preferences for unemployment stabilization relative to inflation stabilization (x);
the variance of productivity shocks (G,2); and
the  slope  of the Phillips curve  (b).
These determinants, reflecting the economic and political structure of a country, explain
theoretically the optimal degree of conservativeness and independence in that country.5
Second, there is also an identification and measurement problem. Whereas the determinants
will change.»equently during the sample period,  i.e. the period 1960-1993, the actual
degree may change much less in the same period. The stickiness may, for example, result
from the fact that central bank laws are very occasionally adjusted in the industrial countries
during the post-war period.
The actual degree of central bank independence is approximated by the legal degree,
according to the four main indices of central bank independence in the literature. The index
of Alesina (AL) is a narrow measure of independence and based on Alesina (1988,  1989).
The total index of political and economic independence of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
(GMT) is a broad measure based on Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). The index of
policy independence of Eijffinger and Schaling (ES) is, however, a narrow measure based
on Eijffinger and Schaling (1992, 19934 and extended by Eijffinger and Van Keulen
4            A clear overview of the latent variables approach is given by Aigner, Hsiao, Kapteyn and Wansbeek
(1984). For an application of this approach to the determinants of central bank independence only, see
chapter 3 and Appendix A.
5            The proxies for these economic and political variables and the sources of the data are given in
Appendix C.
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(1995). The unweighted legal index of Cukierman (LVAU) is a very broad measure of
independence and derived from Cukierman (1992). These four legal indices have been
lognormalized (AL, GMT, ES and LVA U)  so  that the  natural  logarithms  of their values  range
from  zero  to  one.
For our cross-country analysis, initially, a set of nineteen industrial (OECD) countries -
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States - is taken which are ranked by the above-mentioned indices.6
The sample period that we have chosen covers more than thirty years, namely the period
1960-1993 (for u : 1960-1988). The argument to choose such a long period is that it
contains many political and business cycles.
The idea behind the model is the following. The optimal degree of conservativeness and
independence is a function of the determinants, yE' = f(X), where f is a function and X are
the determinants. Taking logs, we rewrite the equation as log(7) = g(X) - log(s'), where g
is a function.   Now, we use the log of the legal indices as proxies for log(y) which we
interpret as actual independence. The residual (-log(g')), which we calculate by the
difference between the average of the (log) legal indices and g(X), can be interpreted as a
measure for optimal conservativeness. Using this approach has several implications. First,
by  interpreting the residual as optimal conservativeness, we implicitly assume that optimal
conservativeness is uncorrelated with the determinants. Put differently, the part of
independence that cannot be explained by the determinants, will be compensated by
conservativeness. Furthermore, it means that every CB has the optimal degree of
independence as long as the right level of conservativeness is chosen.
6            By including not only the twelve member states of the European Union but also seven non-member
states, we have sufficient data to estimate the LISREL model. For two member states - Greece and
Portugal -n o data on the natural rate of unemployment (u, proxied by NAIRU) were available,
whereas Luxembourg has a monetary union with Belgium.
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On the basis of the restrictions given in Appendix A, LISREL computes Full Information
Maximum Likelihood estimates of the parameters of the model, explaining the relationship
between the degree of central bank independence (y) and the explanatory variables (NAIRU,
WLEFT, VPROD and SLOPE). Then, using the parameters we have estimated, we predict
the optimal degree of central bank independence and conservativeness for each country
(OCI). The comparison between the optimal degree of independence and conservativeness
and the legal indices of central bank independence (AL, GMT,  ES and LVAU) can be
made. The difference between the optimal degree of independence and conservativeness on
one hand and the average of the lognormalized legal indices of central bank independence
(CBI) on the other hand, is interpreted as optimal conservativeness (OC).
If the predicted optimal degree of independence and conservativeness (OCI) exceeds the
average of legal indices (CBI), then the optimal degree of conservativeness (OC) is positive,
indicating that the central bank should be more conservative than the average central bank.
So optimal conservativeness, which is distributed around zero by definition, is a property
relative to the other countries in the sample. Of course, the optimal degree of
conservativeness is negative if the optimal degree of conservativeness and independence is
smaller than CBI.
4.3.1 Estimation Results
Table 4.1  shows the estimation results  for the optimal degree of conservativeness  and
independence (78') using a latent variables approach (LISREL).' For convenience the
restriction that the disturbance terms in the model are uncorrelated is imposed.8 From Table
7            The idea behind LISREL (Linear Structural Relations) is to compare a sample covariance matrix with
the parametric structure imposed on it by the hypothesized model. Under normality, LISREL
delivers Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimates of the model parameters. For more
details, see Appendix A.  See also Aigner et al. (1984).
8             Two of these restrictions, however, have to be rejected according to a univariate Lagrange Multiplier-
test and are, thereby, lifted.  For the relaxation of the restrictions, see Appendix B. Imposing or
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4.1,  it can be seen that only one explanatory variable (0) is significant at a 5% significance
level. Apparently, the benefits from unanticipated inflation do play an important role.  The
other explanatory variables have relatively low t-values which could, probably, be attributed
to the many restrictions still imposed on the model. Nevertheless, the model as such is not
rejected according to a Likelihood Ratio-test for the model to be of the specified structure
(see Appendix B).
Therefore, we have calculated the optimal degree of conservativeness and independence
(henceforth OCI) on the basis of the economic and political determinants for each country.
Given the aaual independence being the unweighted average of the legal indices of central
bank independence (CBI), we are able to determine the optimal conservativeness (OC) for
the twelve member states of the European Union.  Here we use an average of broad and
narrow indices. As the indices are highly correlated (see Eijffinger and De Haan (1996))
splitting the broad and narrow indices up wouldn't yield much different results.
Rogoff (1985a) has shown that society can make itself better off by appointing a
"conservative" central banker who places an additional weight on inflation stabilization
(price stability) than society. From Section 4.2 it is evident that central bank independence
and conservativeness are (close) substimtes of each other. An independent central bank can
afford to be less conservative than a dependent central bank. Therefore, the optimal
conservativeness may be interpreted as the degree of discretion (flexibility) in monetary
policy which can be afforded by the central bank: the lower the optimal conservativeness of
the central bank, the higher the degree of discretion it can afford in monetary policy
making.
relaxing these restrictions has no serious consequences. They are imposed initially because there is no
theoretical reason to assume a covariance.
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4.4 Conclusions
What are the main conclusions from the theoretical and empirical analysis on the optimal
degree of conservativeness? The optimal degree of central bank independence and
conservativeness depends positively on the natural rate of unemployment, society's
preferences for unemployment stabilization relative to inflation stabilization and the benefits
of unanticipated inflation and negatively on the variance of productivity shocks. Using a
LISREL-model we estimated the relationship between four proxies of legal central bank
independence and the four economic and political determinants. Then, we determine the
optimal degree of independence and conservativeness for each country based on the
determinants. Given the actual degree of independence we calculate the optimal degree of
conservativeness. Consequently, there appears to be a trade off between central bank
independence and conservativeness.
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4.5 Appendices
A. The Estimated Model
Let 7 be the latent dependent variable, i.e. the latent degree of central bank independence,
and x be the observed explanatory variables, in our case the four ultimate determinants of
central bank independence, satisfying a system of linear structural relations
7=B·x-E (A.1)
with B being the vector of coefficients and E the disturbances. It is assumed that y, x and £
have zero expectations, and that x and E are uncorrelated. Instead of the latent variable y,
the vector of proxies y is observed, such that
y=Ay+6 (A.2)
with 6 the vector of measurement errors, uncorrelated with y and g, but possibly correlated
among themselves and A = [1  1  1  1]'. The observed vectors x and y are measured as
deviations form their means, thus, having zero expectations and a covariance equal to E[x
y].  Also,  y  and  6  have zero expectations.
Therefore, y is a vector of observed legal indices of central bank independence (AL, GMT,
ES and LVAU), lognormalized so that the natural logarithm of their values range from 0 to
1 and measured in deviation from their means,





and x is a vector of observed explanatory variables, being the non-accelerating inflation rate
of unemployment (NAIRU), the percentage of years of a left-wing government (WLEFT),
the variance of output growth (VPROD) and the compensation of employees as share of






So, equation (A.2) becomes
AL. NM-     -1-          -M
GMT. NM        1             52
ES. NM          1             61
= .Y+ (A.2')
LVAU. M_    _1_         _64_
Furthermore, * and 4' are defined as the covariance matrix of x and the variance of 8,
respectively, and ®6 as the true variance-covariance matrix of 6. Then it follows from the
above assumptions that the variance-covariance matrix I of [y', x']' is
12 = [A(BcDB'+T)A'+es    AB*
L  OB'A'   0 ]               CAIL
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where A = [1  1  1  1]'  and  es is diagonal, which implies that the correlation between the
observed legal indices of central bank independence (y) is only caused by the latent optimal
degree (Tl)
The parameters occurring in I (B, 0, 7, G6) are estimated on the basis of the matrix S of
second sample moments of x and y. Given the structure that matrix (A.5) imposes on the
sample covariance matrix, LISREL computes FIML estimates of the parameters when [y',
x'] is normally distributed, i.e. when the following criterion is minimized
ln ID + tr [SE-'] (A.6)
B.         The Relaxation of Restrictions
In the first model, we imposed the restriction that the disturbance terms in the model are
uncorrelated. The statistics of this model show a Likelihood Ratio-test for the null hypo-
thesis that the predicted covariance matrix is of the specified structure against the alternative
that the covariance matrix is unconstrained.  For the first model, the null hypothesis is
rejected implying that the specified structure was not correct. Apparently, too many
restrictions were imposed. Testing structural models, a univariate Lagrange Multiplier-test
is carried out for most elements in the model matrices that are constrained to equal
constants.  When the test statistic, having a %21-distribution, has a value larger than 3.84 the
restriction is rejected at a significance level of 5% .
In the first regression, with all restrictions imposed, the constraint that the disturbances of
the GMT-index and the variance of productivity shocks (a,2) are uncorrelated is rejected.
The test statistic has a value of 10.00 which is the highest of all restrictions. Therefore, we
have  lifted this restriction and tested the modified model.     Now the restriction  on  the
covariance  of the GMT-index  and the ES-index is rejected  with the highest test statistic.    So
we  lifted this restriction. The modified model gives no restriction  with  a test statistic higher
than 3.84 and the Likelihood Ratio-test for the model to be of the specified structure gives a
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test-statistic of 14.86 which is well below the critical value of 22.31 for a %215-distribution at
a significance level of 10 %.
Table 4.2: Table based on Estimation with Cumulative Relaxation of Restrictions
Lifted Estimated Equation R2 and
Restriction DF
No Lifted yg'--0.028 *i i + 0.037 *x-0.009 * a.2 + 0.565 *b R2=0.43
Restriction (-1.283) (0.189) (-0.452) (2.070) DF=17
GMT, c,2      YE'=-0.019 * u +0.121 * % + 0.012 * a,2 + 0.700 *b R2=0.41
(-0.867) (0.591) (0.647) (2.669) DF=16
GMT, ES yg'=-0.019 * u +0.171 * % + 0.015 * a.2 + 0.706 *b R2=0.37
(-0.822) (0.800) (0.696) (2.501) DF=15
Note:  t-values in parentheses.
C.      The Data
As proxies for the ultimate determinants of the optimal degree of central bank conserva-
tiveness and independence, we have chosen the following economic and political variables.
Por  u  ,  the non-accelerating  inflation  rate  of unemployment  (NAIRU) is taken from Layard,
Nickell and Jackman (1991). They estimated the NAIRU for nineteen industrial countries
in the period 1960-1988. The proxy for society's preferences for unemployment
stabilization relative to inflation stabilization (%) is the number of years that a le,#-wing
(socialisO pany has been in government as a share of the total number of years.   For,  a left-
wing government has a higher preference for unemployment stabilization' and, thereby, the
9           We think that in general a left-wing government is more concerned with employment relative to
inflation  than a right-wing government.
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optimal degree of central bank conservativeness and independence increases under a left-
wing government.   The variance of productivity shocks (a,2) is proxied by the variance of
output growth (GDP) on an annual basis. We compute the slope of the Phillips curve (b),
using labor's income share in GDP.  Here we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function
and a competitive labor market (See also Schaling (1995)). Because data for labor's income
share are not available for all countries in our sample, we have taken the ratio between the
compensation Of employees paid by resident producers to resident households and  GDP.
E :     R. Layard, S. Nickell and R. Jackman, Unemployment, Macroeconomic
Pe,formance and the Labour Market, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991. Estimates for
NAIRU 1960-1988, Table 14, Chapter 9.
x:       A.J. Day (ed.), Political Parties of the World, London, Longman, 1988.
(# years that a left-wing party has been in the government, either alone or in a
coalition)/(total # years), 1960-1993.
C:: OECD, Main Economic Indicators, various issues.
Variance of growth rate  of GDP  in US$  in 1985 prices and exchange rates, 1960-1993.
b: OECD, National Accounts of OECD Countries, 1960-1977, 1977-1989, 1978-1992.
1/[1  -  (Compensation of employees  paid by resident producers/GDP)], in current prices.
OECD, Paris, 1979, 1991, 1994.
D. Closed-Form Solution
In this appendix we derive an expression for the optimal degree of independence and
conservativeness of a central bank as a function of the exogenous variables. We solve the
first-order condition, which is an equation of fourth degree, using Ferrari's method.
For notational convenience, we introduce the parametric abbreviations w .=   X- and
1+YE
D := - .   The first-order condition (4.10) can be rewritten as:
b*
C               Dla: 1          02 03%
 4 +3093=-30217/2-<D) I  i72 .119 1 ii·2
(D.1)
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9Dz                Y2Adding -92 + Y(92 + DV/)t- toboth sides yields'°:
4                      4
Dlal  02 2
(9 2 +   D " t i'1   = (- i D, + Y)1'2 +  1
DY
 f+ r I  '% 0.2)2 El   U j
The left-hand side of this expression is a perfect square.   If we can write the right-hand side
as a perfect square as well, then we will be able to solve the equation.  We want to
determine the auxiliary variable  Y so that the right hand side of this equation can be written
inthe form (ev + f)2. Ingeneral, A ,2+Bv,+C=(ev/+f)2 if 82 -4AC=O. Applied
to the right-hand side of equation (D.2) this condition yields:
)2
 iDY Di a;  Dl  -4(Y_in2"fly2 1 Dia:.r =O               (I).3)4 -     '          'ii,
This is an equation of third degree in K   Now we define Z: =Y-D 2  so that  Y=Z+D 2.1 1
Substituting this equation into equation (I).3), we obtain a third order polynomial in Z.  In
order to solve this third order polynomial in Z by Cardan's method, we first define the
following symbols:
Dla2
P:=  -zf- OD  + 4%) (D.4)U
1 ( \2
'o            In general, with f(x):= X4 + ax' + b x i t c x t d=0, add  2- t yl,x2 +E x| + 2-  to both4         2 3  4
sides.
11                                                                                                      a
When   f(x)  :=  x 3  +  ax 2  +  bx  +  c  =  0,  choose   z  .=  x  - - and f (z)  pz3    +   pz  + q Will
3
follow.
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04a  f           a,2 
' = u 2 LD + I - fiy (D.5)
A:= 4p3 + 27q2 (D.6)
A:=- 9-+. (D.D
2    7108
B:=-t_.fx. (D.8)2   1108
Now, a solution for Z' = Vi + V i,
| -4  2/  2
Z.  =1112&2 ili--D-,}  I   ";ar  tliS "D"r)'  +D2 D+,- f] ' (I).9)
+ 11« a:-D-z) D,", 1 02 D ( Qz  2
11 2U, <
U, .1   u'. '112.922(30+41'),+-4 D+Z- i-'1
With  Y' = Z' + D2  we know that the right-hand side of equation (D.2) can be written in the
D  al
1 DZ' + 1 Di    -2'
form  (e 9 + f)2 Take e= JZ' +D l  and f=                              u
44Z'  +  Dl
Now, the whole problem boils down to solving the following equation for F
DZaj \2
( 2 30 Z  + Dz h12 1 1 DZ'  + 1 DJ       -1
1 9 + -9 1
2        1   =   MVZ. + 1. D2   1                                  u                            0.10)C 2 44Z'  +  Dl
\ /
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This biquadratic equation can be split up into two quadratic equations with two (real and
complex) solutions each. The second-order condition fur a minimal loss that:
DZ al
49•3 + 9DVI2 + 6029. +D J  1    -2 ' >0 (D.11)
U
is satisfied for every V > O.  This is in line with the result in Rogoff (1985a) that it is
optimal to have a conservative central banker. Eliminating the solutions for the first-order
condition that maximize the loss, we obtain two candidates for the optimum:
VI, =-·i·D:k*111·1.D2 +Z. +f  D2 -z' :i:402 +4Z  l2     i72 J
02         <i D _ 4a: 1 (D.12)
Only one of these two roots is real. Which one is real, is determined by the last term in the
8 .2
last square root.    If  D>-'    '  then "+ should  be read as " + " , otherwise  as  "-".    The
U
optimal degree of central bank conservativeness and independence,  YE., can be computed
with yE'= -% -1,
W
5 Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique
5.1 Introduction
In writing about central bankers Milton Friedman once said: "From revealed preference, I
suspect that by far and away the two most important variables in their loss function are
avoiding accountability  on the one  hand and achieve public prestige  On the other".    More
recently, Alan Greenspan, 'the Delphic oracle of global financial markets', speaking to
Congress said:  "If I've made myself too clear,  you must have misunderstood me."
Hence, an important feature of central bank institutions is their adherence to secrecy.   The
latter is generally believed to be unjustifiable on moral grounds. For instance, Mayer
(1987, p.16) argues  that: "If governments derive their legitimacy  from the consent of the
governed, this should be informed consent". And Goodfriend (1986) reports on an
intriguing case study involving a graduate law student, David R. Merrill, who under the
auspices of the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, filed a freedom of information request
with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System over its failure to disclose its
minutes.
This chapter investigates society's incentives to design monetary institutions that allow  for
central bank secrecy.  We find that the main reason for central bank secrecy is its
potentially beneficial effect on stabilization policy. Contrary to Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986), we obtain this result even with a zero degree of persistence in the central bank's
objectives. Unlike Lewis (1991), this result does not require the social planner's future
preferences for policy objectives to change over time with changing economic
circumstances.
More specifically, optimal central bank secrecy involves trading-off the harmful effects of
uncertainty about monetary policy and the associated higher expected inflation, versus the
potentially beneficial effects on the stabilization of output. The latter trade-off depends on
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the severity of society's time-consistency problem vis-A-vis its need for stabilization policy.
The analysis predicts that if the credibility problem is large relative to the need for
flexibility, optimal central bank institutions will be very open and transparent and vice
versa. This reverses an earlier result by Garfinkel and Oh (1995).
Moreover it explains why high credibility institutions such as the Bundesbank and the future
European Central Bank (ECB), can a#brd to be relatively closed, and why low credibility
institutions such as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and Banco d'Espa a need to be very
open and need to publish e. g. inflation and monetary policy reports of some kind, in
addition to standard bank bulletins. Put differently, we clarify why "nouveau riche"
institutions with poor credibility  "talk",  and why institutions that have a great "wealth"  of
credibility can afford to whisper.
The  chapter is organized into three remaining Sections followed  by four appendices.    In
section  2 we present the model. Section 3 contains the derivation  of the relationship
between central bank secrecy, i.e. monetary policy uncertainty, and social welfare.  In
section 4 we look at three different cases with respect to the effects of monetary policy
uncertainty. Our conclusions are given in section 5. The appendices provide the
derivations of the policy outcomes, a generalization of the model and the optimal degree of
central bank secrecy.
5.2   The Model
In what follows, we model monetary policy uncertainty as a monetary policy game with
uncertainty about the central bank's inflation stabilization preferences. We assume that
there are two types of actors, wage-setters and the central bank. Wage-setters unilaterally
choose the nominal wage every period, and the central bank controls monetary policy.  The
sequence of events is as follows.   In the first stage, wage-setters sign one period nominal
wage contracts  [Gray (1976), Fischer (1977)]. Wage-setters know the domestic monetary
regime on average but there are random shocks to central bank preferences that cannot be
observed at the time wage contracts are signed. However, they know the variance of the
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shocks  and  take this information into account in forming their expectations.     In the second
stage a stochastic shock to the central bank's preferences realizes.  In the third stage
stochastic shocks to productivity realize. Similarly these shocks cannot be observed  at  the
time contracts are negotiated.  As will be shown below, the uncertainty associated with the
second and third stages of the game is, respectively, of the multiplicative [Brainard (1967)]
kind and the additive kind.  In the fourth stage, the central bank observes the value of the
productivity shock and, given its own preferences, reacts to the productivity shocks
accordingly.  In the fifth and final stage, competitive firms determine output. This timing
of events is summarized in Figure  5.1.
Figure 5.1 The Timing of Events
1                          2                        3                          4                            5
Nominal wage Shocks to CB Productivity CB sets monetary Output
contracts signed preferences shocks realize policy determined
realize
5.2.1 Uncertainty about Inflation Stabilization Preferences
Adopting the specification commonly used in the literature, output is described by a
reduced-form Lucas supply function:
y=b(,r-,r')+v (5.1)
where y is (the log of) output, inflation is denoted by x, nominal wage contracts signed at
time t-1 are proxied by the expected inflation rate ;r', v is a white noise shock to
productivity  with  zero  mean and variance  0,2    and  b  is the slope  of the Phillips curve.    The
natural level of output is normalized at zero. Society's loss function is given by
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S= a x2 + Cy- y.)2 Ofa<00 (5.2)
where a is society's relative weight of inflation stabilization relative to output stabilization.
We assume that y' > 0  so that the desired level of output is above the natural level.
The central bank's loss function is
L=a,Ki +Cy-y.)2 0<4<00 (5.3)
Note that in both loss functions the target rate of inflation is normalized to 0. In contrast to
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) (hereafter CM), deviations from the output target feature
quadratically in the central bank's loss function. This gives the central bank a role in
stabilizing supply shocks. Moreover, unlike CM, this feature will enable us to establish a
link between preference uncertainty and the level of inflation, even with a zero degree of
persistence in the central bank's preferences. Equation (5.4) specifies the stochastic
behavior' of the parameter a,
a,=a-x, with      Var[x,]   =  a:  ,  E,.1 [x,]   =  0  and  E, t [vx,]   = 0 (5.4)
The wage setters expect the central bank's preference for inflation stabilization to be a.
However, at any particular point in time because of the shock x,, the central bank may be
overly "conservative" or advocate too loose a monetary stance (be too "liberal"). A shock
to the central bank's preferences may occur if monetary policy is set by a monetary policy
board with changing membership, as e.g. the FOMC in the US and the Zentralbankrat in
' Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) introduce persistence and dynamize their problem by letting
a, =a-e, where e, =pe,_I tx, and O<p<1. Because-unlike their analysis- wedonot
require the stochastic central bank preferences to be serially correlated for secrecy to be desirable we
mp= 0.
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Germany. One might argue that the state of the economy or the realization of the
productivity shock v influences the appointment of new members. During a recession there
may be political pressure to appoint a more "liberal" member to the monetary policy board.
This implies that the assumption that E,.,[vxt] = 0 does not hold. However, changing this
assumption will not qualitatively change our results.
We see the variance of the agent's inflation stabilization preferences (0,2) as monetary
policy uncertainty.   In the limiting case that  03  = 0  (and  a,=a),  we are back in the
original Rogoff (19858) model. Importantly, the distribution of x, must be chosen in such a
way that a, is always positive. A negative preference weight on inflation implies a central
banker who actually loves inflation and therefore will set an infinite rate of inflation.   If the
wage setters know that there is a positive chance of having a central banker who loves
inflation, this probability, however small, will count heavily  in the formation of inflationary
expectations. Although there is no need to specify the distribution of x„ one could think of
it to be uniformly distributed on the [-h, h] interval with h<a. A normal distribution
clearly doesn't work here, because of its infinite support we can never exclude the chance
that a large shock occurs and a, becomes negative.
5.2.2 Time-Consistent Equilibrium
For simplicity, and with no loss of generality, we assume that the control variable of the
central  bank is inflation. Substituting  (5.1)  into  (5.3), the first-order conditions  for  a
minimum indicate
b
7[ = 2 (b,r' + y. -v) (5.5)
at + b
where y* > 0. Solving for rational expectations yields'
2           See Appendix A for details on the derivations in this Section.
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b.'r' = 0(.)-y (5.6)
a
where
a[(a+ bi)2 + af ](D(.)=- - (5.7)
a(a+ b 2)2  -b 2 a z
This function *(.) is shown graphically in Figure 5.2 with b = 1. In order to ensure that
4+blf
*(.) > 0, we require that d <    l,2  -  .  Note that for x, uniformly distributed on the
interval [-h, h], if h<a, this condition is always satisfied. The exact specification of 0
depends on the assumptions one makes. Details can be found in Appendix B.
For the case without preference uncertainty, it is straightforward to derive the expected rate
of inflation under discretion
„'= ty. (5.8)
a
Comparing (5.6) and (5.8), we can clearly see the effect of preference uncertainty on the
expected rate of inflation.
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Figure 5.2: The function *
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Equations (5.6) and (5.8) indicate that inflation expectations are proportional to the output
bias. y', a familiar conclusion in this literature. However (5.6) differs in a significant way
from (5.8), as a result of uncertainty regarding the central bank's preferences.
From (5.7), it is clear that, if the variance is not too large,' (I)(.)  > 0. Moreover, as can be
seen in Figure 5.2,  in the limiting case that ai  =0 and therefore  a,=a,then 0(.)  =1,
and (5.6) effectively collapses to the discretionary case given by  (5.8).
,                0,< «tp' , see equation (5.7). This condition is satisfied if x, is uniformly distributed on the
interval [-h, h] and if h  <  a.
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Using the previous results, it is straightforward to write the final solutions for output and
inflation. under  the  case of uncertainty about inflation stabilization preferences.    The
expression for the rate of inflation becomes
b   [   b
2 1.  b
;r, =a,+b2[1+-S-*(.)- V a,+bzv,
(5.9)
And similarly for output, the solution is
y,  =b(lr,-,r')tv, (5.10)
An important point arising from (5.9) is that although preference uncertainty exacerbates the
existing inflation bias problem, it cannot generate an inflation bias on its own. This fairly
intuitive point is clearly a function of the multiplicative nature of the problem.
Figure 5.3: The Central Bank's Reaction to a Preference Shock x
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Figure 5.3 shows the central bank's reaction to a preference shock x with the parameters a
=  1, b  =  l, y'  =  0.03 and the productivity shock v = 0. A positive preference shock
makes the central banker less conservative and leads to a higher rate of inflation.
Conversely, a negative preference shock makes the central banker more conservative and
leads to a lower rate of inflation. However, the effect of positive and negative preference
shocks on the rate of inflation is asymmetric. More specific, positive realizations of shock
x - more emphasis on output stabilization - are more inflationary than negative realizations
of shock x - more emphasis on inflation stabilization - are disin»tionary. With equal
probabilities of positive and negative shocks to the central banker's preferences*, expected
inflation will be adjusted upwards and the more so the higher the variance of the shocks
hitting the central bank's preferences. Therefore, it is clear that with uncertain preferences,
expected inflation is higher  than  in the discretionary case without uncertainty:    This  can  be
restated in a more technical way by noting that the expectation of inflation involves the
expectation of a convex function (i.e. equation (5.5)) of the preference shock, which will
always be higher than the value of this function at the (zero) expected value of the
preference shock. Hence our result is general and follows from Jensen's inequality.6
Please note that, unlike CM, this effect is present even with a zero degree of persistence in
the central bank's objectives. The reason is that in our model, unlike CM, output enters the
central bank's utility function quadratically. This, together with the rational expectations
hypothesis gives rise to the Jensen's inequality effect. The Jensen's inequality effect is not
present in the CM model because there economic activity features linearly in the central
bank's objective function.
4 However, results do not depend on a particular distribution of the disturbances to tile agent's
preferences.
5                   In the certainty case, the central bank would  set an inflation rate  of 3% .
b
6                Leta, bea random variable with mean  a,  and let  g(a  ): =--    be a convex function;  then' a, + bl
E[g(a,)] 2 g(a).
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Figure 5.4 The Central Bank's Expected Reaction Function with Uncertainty
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A similar picture to Figure 5.3 can be drawn for the central bank's reaction to a given
productivity shock v. The higher the variance of preference shocks, the stronger the
expected reaction to supply shocks, i.e. the higher the expected monetary accommodation of
any supply shock.   Note that the effect of more uncertainty on expected inflation is the same
as the effect of less conservativeness (a lower  a).    As is shown in Figure  5.4,  more
uncertainty about the central banker's preferences rotates the expected reaction function in
the same way as less conservativeness would do.
5.3   The Welfare Loss and Monetary Policy Uncertainty
Using the policy outcomes that we derived in the previous section, we can now turn to
welfare analysis. Previous studies, in particular Nolan and Schaling (1996) and Lossani,
Natale and Tirelli (1998) have argued that uncertainty about the policymaker's preferences
leads unambiguously to lower social welfare.  We find, however, that this is not necessarily
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the case. Monetary policy uncertainty may improve output stabilization  and  as a result  the
welfare loss may well be lower.
In order to assess the effect of monetary policy uncertainty on welfare, we decompose
society's expected loss in the inflationary bias, the variance of inflation, the output bias and
the variance of output.
E{S}=aE{,r,2}+E{(y-y')2}=a(ir"2 + Far{,r,}) + y' + Far{y, } (5.11)
Straightforward comparative statics demonstrate that rising uncertainty does increase the
inflationary bias.  That is
air'  =  20 (.)  b y*>0 (5.12)aa 2 Da: a
because
610(.)= a(a+b 2)3 >0 (5.13)
ar.: F-,- ,2,2  ,2 2 2
a a+0  )   -    a.  
The interpretation of this expression, which is unambiguously positive, follows on from our
remarks above.  To the extent that increasing uncertainty threatens agents' real wages, they
will build in an inflation rate hedge into their nominal contracts. Similarly,
a20(.)  =        21'2 a(a+b2)3 >0 (5.14)
Cay: )2         r_    -                                         1
 a(a+b2)2 -b2az 
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as long as  a(a+ bi )2 - b2 af >0, which is exactly the condition we imposed on the variance
of the shocks to preferences in the context of equation (5.7).   Thus, the inflation penalty
becomes steeper the higher monetary policy uncertainty.
From (5.12) and (5.13) we derive the following proposition:
Proposition 5.1: The greater monetary policy uncertainty (the higher af), the higher
expected inflation.
Proposition 5.1  shows that monetary policy uncertainty leads to higher inflationary
expectations.
As is shown in Appendix C the variance of inflation can be found to be
b2 a 2 r 3a21     2  F. (b l  )2
Far{,r}=(a+bi)2 [1 1 (a+ti)2-  1 (3. :2 4  by  1+-a*
fl
(5.15)
As  *(.)  is a positive function  of  a2  ,   it is clear  that the variance of inflation increases  with
monetary policy uncertainty.
DFar{,r}Therefore. > 0, and we have
aa :
Proposition 5.2: The greater monetary policy uncertainty (the higher a:),the higher the
variance of inflation.
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This  result  is very intuitive. Introducing a shock  to the parameter that determines inflation
stabilization yields  a more volatile rate of inflation. Propositions 5.1  and 5.2 also imply  a
positive relationship between the mean and the variance of inflation.  This is in line with a
large body of empirical evidence that suggests that the mean level and the variability of
inflation are positively correlated across countries (Cukierman  1992, p.180, Eijffinger and
De Haan, 1996 and Davis and Kanago, 1998).
To complete the welfare analysis, we now turn to the variance of output, which is the most
interesting part. Output variance can easily be calculated from (5.10) and (5.15)
'     '2.: 11-b'.(tt".1}]'Far{y}=(Ii- b2)2 Q:  1 (a+b2)4 IL    C a                        -   :              (5.16)+ (b 2  - 2a)0
Again, the first  term  does not depend on monetary policy uncertainty,  but  on the variance  of
supply shocks af However, the second term depends on monetary policy uncertainty
through  af  and (I)(.) Interestingly, the second part of the equation can be negative if the
central bank's expected conservativeness and the variance of productivity shocks af is large
and the principal's output target y' rather low. This means that monetary policy uncertainty
can have a stabilizing effect on output. From equation (5.16) we derive the following
proposition (see Appendix D):
1 -2 -
Proposition 5.3: If    . < _      .  .  . the variance of output is minimized at a positive
y  L         a   (2a-bi)
a: b 2(a+b,)1
level of preference uncertainty.
The expression for the variance of output also shows that the positive stabilizing effect of
monetary policy uncertainty depends on the variance of supply shocks.   If the variance of
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supply shocks a: is large enough, uncertainty about the central bank's inflation stabilization
preferences leads to a lower variance of output. The reason for this surprising effect can be
seen from Figure 5.4. The monetary authority's expected reaction to a supply shock is
stronger, the larger monetary policy uncertainty.    So, in effect an increase in monetary
policy uncertainty leads to less conservative behavior of the central bank.
The overall effect on welfare is not easily determined. Looking at equations (5.6), (5.15)
and (5.16), it is clear that the negative welfare effects of monetary policy uncertainty are
increasing in the principal's ambitious output target y' and independent from the variance of
productivity shocks af.  For the positive output stabilization effect exactly the opposite holds.
So,  if the ratio y*2 / a:  is small (and, therefore, the credibility problem small relative to the
flexibility problem), society may benefit from uncertainty about the policymaker's preferences.
5.4   Optimal Monetary Uncertainty
As was explained in the previous section monetary policy uncertainty may be beneficial for
society's welfare because the variance of output may be reduced. This implies that the trade
off between credibility and flexibility is influenced by uncertainty concerning the agent's
preferences.  In this Section we will determine the optimal level of monetary policy
uncertainty in terms of social welfare. Society's expected loss is given by the following
expression'
02      abzy.1  02   1  (92  + al) 2,2E{S} =y    + -2 a.  1   (7,0    y.2(a+bi)<b=-*+1 2 -2(a+b2)(:-  (5.17)a                   (a + bl )2      •      (2 + bl )4 l (a
0                                                                                    2
7              It can be obtained by substituting (5.6), (5.15) and (5.16) in (5.11).
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Figure 5.5 shows the credibility component  (Il)  and the stabilization or flexibility
component (I) of society's loss.  The r[ component, reflecting the inflationary bias, is
upward sloping because greater monetary uncertainty implies a higher rate of expected
inflation (see Proposition 5.1). However,  the I" component,  reflecting  the variance of
inflation and output, is downward sloping and has a minimum at af (see Appendix D).
This reflects Proposition 5.3 which states that greater monetary policy uncertainty may
reduce the variance of output and hence society's loss. Figure 5.5 shows that the social  loss
function S is minimized at  07.   If the credibility/flexibility ratio  y'z / af  is not too large,
the social loss is minimized at a positive level of monetary uncertainty.   This is formalized in
our next proposition (see Appendix D ):
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Proposition 5.4: It is optimal for society to have a central bank with uncertain preferences
•2        al(23-bl -3a)(07>0) ifandonlyift-< -
a, (a+b 2)2(abi +3aa+2bia)
As can be seen in the picture,  8-f  is an upper bound for the optimal degree of monetary
uncertainty.  As is shown in Appendix D, this upper bound shifts to the right if the
credibility/flexibility ratio  y'z / a,2 becomes smaller. This leads to the next proposition:
Proposition 5.5: The optimal degree of monetary uncertainty 07  has an upper bound 22
(07  5  a ). This upper bound goes up if the credibility/flexibility ratio y*2 / a, becomes
smaller.
From Proposition 5.4  it can be  seen that if society  does  not care about output stabilization at
all - that is if a approaches positive infinity - it is never optimal to have central bank
secrecy. The reason is that in this case the beneficial effects of preference uncertainty,  i.e.
output stabilization, are not valued by society.  This can be restated in a more technical way
by noting that if a -+ 00 the right hand side of the inequality approaches zero. With y 2 and
af both positive, the inequality will not be satisfied, implying that the optimal degree of
central bank secrecy is zero.
We now focus on the more realistic case where society does value output stabilization,
meaning that a is both positive and finite.  Then it follows that for central bank secrecy to
be  desirable, the severity of society' s time-consistency or credibility problem y'2, should
not be too large relative to its need for stabilization policy a,A .
At this point it is interesting and illuminating to contrast our result with Cukierman and
Meltzer (1986).  Like CM, we find that for central bank secrecy to be desirable three
conditions need to be satisfied. First, society must value unanticipated inflation (monetary
surprises); i.e. it should not focus exclusively on inflation stabilization. Second, the central
bank's preferences must be stochastic. Third, society's credibility problem should not be
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too pressing, relative to its need for a flexible response to supply shocks. The first two
conditions need also be satisfied in CM for secrecy to be beneficial.  That is, the monetary
authority must value surprises  and the monetary authority' s preferences  must be partly
private information. The third condition in CM is that stochastic central bank preferences
must be serially  correlated. To conclude, the main difference between our chapter and CM
is that we do not require stochastic central bank preferences to be serially correlated for
secrecy to be desirable.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have analyzed the effects of monetary policy uncertainty on social
welfare. We focus on expected inflation and the variance of inflation and output.  Five
propositions are derived in the chapter. The first one states that more uncertainty about the
policymaker's preferences leads to a higher inflationary bias.  This is due to the fact that a
central banker with uncertain preferences is perceived as less conservative by wage setters.
The second proposition states that more monetary policy uncertainty leads to a higher
variance of inflation. Intuitively, it is clear that the variance in the central banker's
preferences feed through  in a more volatile  rate of inflation. Proposition 5.1  and  5.2  are  in
line with a large body of empirical evidence that suggests that the mean and variance of the
inflation  rate are positively correlated across countries. Our third proposition  is  that  a
country with a serious flexibility problem relative to the credibility problem may reduce its
variance of output by appointing a central banker with uncertain preferences. Fourthly,
combining the three other propositions, we find that a country that faces large supply shocks
in relation to its output target may be better off with a central banker that has uncertain
preferences.     This  is  due  to  the  fact  that the average response  of the policymaker  to a Supply
shock is stronger than in the absence of preference shocks. Finally, the fifth proposition
derives comparative static properties for the upperbound of the optimal level of monetary
uncertainty.
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To conclude, optimal central bank secrecy involves trading-off the harmful effects of
uncertainty about monetary policy and the associated higher expected inflation versus the
potentially beneficial effects on the stabilization of output. The latter trade-off depends on
the severity of society's time-consistency problem vis-A-vis its need for stabilization policy.
The analysis predicts that if the credibility problem is large relative to the need for
flexibility, optimal central bank institutions will be very open and transparent and vice
versa. Moreover it explains why high credibility institutions such as the Bundesbank and
the future European Central Bank (ECB), can aford to be relatively closed, and why low
credibility institutions such as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and Banco d'Espafta need
to be very open and need to publish e. g. inflation and monetary policy reports of some kind,
in addition to standard bank bulletins.  Put differently, we clarify why '*nouveau riche"
institutions with poor credibility  "talk",  and why institutions that have a great "wealth"  of
credibility can afford to whisper.
5.6 Appendices
A.   The Derivation Of Equation (5.6)
Taking expectations across expression (5.5):
EOr) = E<1_- b(bm' + y') (A.1)
C 4  + b' /1
This expression requires us to take the expected value of ratios of the inverse of a random
variable. This can be achieved through a Taylor series expansion.
Our problem is to expand X/Y about the respective means. Assuming that the first two
moments of EIX/}0 exist then we can write down the expression:
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64. Px        1 z cov[x Y] +4 var[Y] (A.2)CY) Py My    Alr.
This is the (second-order) approximation used in the chapter, therefore we can write
E a,  bl =(6+bi)2 +a:.                                                    (A.3)(a+ b 2)3
So  substituting  (A.3)  in (A.1) gives
lr'  =(by'  + b2,r) (A.4)0    [(a+b2)2  + a2]
(a+ b 2)3
And rearranging gives
,  by' f a(a+b2)2 +a  \1
X =-,_ (A.5)
a    la(a + b  )2 -b202)
which is expression (5.6) in the text.   It is clear that as af -4 0 the first part of the
expression on the right hand side collapses to unity, and (A.5) is equivalent to (5.8).
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B.    The  General  Case
If we replace the central bank's loss function (5.3) with a more general loss function, the
expected  rate of inflation changes  in the following  way.
L=a,ir 2+q, (y-y.)2 (B.1)
a,=a-xt with      Var[x,]   =  a:  and  E,.i[x,]  =  0
q, =q-e,    with   Var[(DJ = a«,2, E,t[o),] = Oand E,.i[x,o),] = a.,0
Using the derivations from Appendix A we obtain an expression for the inflationary
expectations.
1.' -Ilitt.':it'_11}.by.  with  R. i.: - Ib'.,f - Ca - q" ).„
We choose q=1  and c«,2 = 0,0,  = O s o that R = a,2  >  0 and monetary policy uncertainty
leads to higher inflationary expectations.
Beetsma and Jensen (1998) choose  b=1  and  a:   =  a«,2  =  -0.0,  so that R  =  O and monetary
policy uncertainty  has no effect on inflationary expectations.
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C.  The  Variance of Inflation
1   [  .f   bi  1    1
7T,
=
a, + b2 Lby  ti + 1 *f- b.]
(C.1)
1            .f  bi  3With X = and  Y=b y  1 1+ -0 1-b v, X and  Y are independent and the variance of
a, + b
2 Ca)
XY can be written as
Far{XY} =vj Far(X) + vi. Far(Y) + Far(X)Far(Y) (C.2)
With E1.    1    1 - (a+b')2 +-03 and Far'    1    1-  - al wefind that
Ca, + b2 J (a+bz), (a, +bi J (a +b2)4
b2(:r2  [     30 2       94   1      2   1-   C   bl  ) 2Far{,r} -
(3 +bi )2 [11  (3 +b i)2   1  (3 -1. bl )4       (a +bL). L      C       a
I _a,     .  I bY' 11 + -== *y    .      (C.3)
For the sake of simplicity we approximate further and find
biap r 302  1    02   F .C  bl  1 2
Far{x} x - .  -I l l   -    S     1 1   -   S
(a + b' r L     (a + bi )2 ]    (a + b2)4 P.  lit -:- *ill                                   (C.,)
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D. Optimal Central Bank Secrecy
1.  Condition when preference uncertainty is desirable  for the variance of output
In order to derive a necessary and sufficient condition for preference uncertainty to be
desirable for the variance of output, we evaluate the first derivative of the variance of output
in the point 03 =0.
lim (D.1)DFar(y) =
bi Cy'ib(a + bi )2 + 32 (bi  -23)03)
0:00 QZ az (a + bz )4.
If the expression in (D.1) is negative, then the variance of output is minimized for a  >0.
This condition can be rewritten as:
bi (yoib(a + b2)2 + 32(bi  - 23)02) y.2  32(23 -bl)
"    < 0 0.-< - (D.2)
a2(a + bi)4 a'      bl (a + b2)2
2. Condition when preference uncertainty is desirable for social welfare S (al>0)
Along similar lines as the previous condition, we can derive:
-3
lim L E<O* > yl <    _         a   (23 -b 2 -3a) (D.3)
qi -,O aa: 0-,2   (a+bl)2(Zbz +3aa+2b2a)
3. The determination of af
As said before  it is crucial  to  find out where  r is minimized.     From the first-order condition
at this point its first derivative will be zero. This first-order condition can be written as
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  2  = 0 45 Qi = G(al) (D.4)I
where
6(a:)=                      -                                                                                   (I).5)
(2a- bl -3a)a,6(3(a + bi )2 - blaj 1      a(Ii + bz )2
bzy'2(a+bl)6(bi +a)             bi
*, -2 - 2y-     a  (2a -b   - 3a)If the credibility-flexibility ratio --:- 5 _ a solution for af exists and is
af      (a + bz)(bz + a)
unique.  To see this we use Brouwer's fixed point theorem.  If the credibility-flexibility
ratio is not too large
36 232(23 -bz -3a)-(a + b2)y'2(b2 + a))
G(0)=   1
v , 20  andbzy'2(bi +a)
G  a(a +b 9 2 1  _      a(a +.b_1-
<0. Together  with G being a monotonically decreasing
bz    )  -     b,
function of af we are now ready to prove
0 5 a: 5 6(0).
Proof. The left-hand side of equation (D.4)  is a 45° line through the origin.   This line must
intersect the function G at one and only one point that is bounded between 0 and G(0).
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ay(a : )From (D.4) it follows that     .    2.  >0. This implies that if the credibility-flexibility ratiolaI
0  i. 2 
goes down, the function G(o ) shifts upward.  As a consequence, the equilibrium value of
a-  increases.
6 Incentive Contracts for Central Bankers under Uncertainty
6.1 Introduction
In the literature on reform of monetary institutions two ways have been advocated to reach
low inflation. A survey of this literature can be found in Eijffinger and De Haan (1996).
The  first  is the legislative approach,  i.e. to establish  by  law an independent central  bank
with an exclusive mandate for price stability. The major academic contribution in this area
is Rogoff (1985a). Rogoff develops a model in where monetary policy is delegated to a
central banker (the agent)  who  is more inflation averse than society  (the principaD.  The
result is a lower inflation rate, but this is at the expense of a distorted response to output
shocks. Thus, the Rogoff model features the famous credibility-flexibility trade-off.
The  second  is the targeting or contracting approach to monetary policy.   The  idea  is  to  let
the political principal of the central bank impose an explicit inflation target for monetary
policy and make the central bank governor explicitly accountable for his success in meeting
this target. Academic contributions in this area are Persson and Tabellini (1993), Walsh
(1995) and Svensson (1997a). Walsh has shown that an optimal linear inflation contract can
eliminate the inflationary bias without distorting stabilization policy.  Thus the credibility-
flexibility trade-off is eliminated' and makes inflation targeting superior to Rogoffs
conservative central banker. Moreover, Svensson (1997a) has shown that the linear contract
can be mapped into an optimal inflation target. This means that these delegation
arrangements are equivalent. They are both able to produce the pre-commitment outcome.
However, both Walsh (1995) and Svensson (1997a) on the one hand, and Rogoff (1985a) on
the other assume symmetric infonnation in the principal-agent relationship. More specific,
' However, McCallum (1995) argues that the Walsh contract merely shifts the credibility problem from
the policymaker to the principal.
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they assume that both the political principal and the private sector know the central banker's
preferences.
This assumption was abandoned by Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997) and - most recently -
by Beetsma and Jensen (1997).
Building on the contracting approach, Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997) demonstrated that
if a monopolistic trade union has more information about productivity shocks than the
principal, maximum social welfare can be achieved by having a conservative central banker
with perverse preferences on top of the contract. Thus, - notwithstanding an optimal
contract - Rogoffs conservative central banker is restored.
Beetsma and Jensen (1997), building on earlier work on preference uncertainty by Briault,
Haldane and King (1996) and Nolan and Schaling (1996), derive the very interesting result
that - if the private sector and the political principal have imperfect information about the
central banker's preferences - the equivalence between the linear Walsh contract and the
Svensson inflation target breaks down. They show that the optimal linear inflation contract
performs strictly better than the optimal inflation target when there is uncertainty about the
central banker's preferences.
However, they model the central banker's preference uncertainty as 'pure' uncertainty. This
implies that in their model there is no effect from preference uncertainty on the private
sector's inflation expectations. Thus, inflation expectations are invariant to this kind of
monetary policy uncertainty.
In this chapter, building on earlier work in this area2, we investigate the effects of relaxing
this restriction. Using a model that is otherwise similar to theirs, we find results that are
very different - and sometimes - exactly the opposite - of the Beetsma and Jensen (1997)
model.
For instance, we find that it is optimal for the government to impose an inflation target on
the central bank which depends on the degree of uncertainty about its preferences. This is in
sharp contrast to Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that the optimal inflation target does
not depend on the degree of preference uncertainty and is the same as in the Svensson
2           In particular Nolan and Schaling (1996).
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(19973) model. Therefore here - contrary to BJ - certainty equivalence does not hold, and
the optimal inflation target with uncertain central bank preferences does not correspond to
the optimal target derived by Svensson (1997a) in the absence of uncertainty about central
bank preferences.
Further, for the case of the Walsh contract we find that it is optimal to offer a linear
inflation contract to a central banker that does not depend on the degree of uncertainty about
its preferences. Again, this is in sharp contrast to Beetsma and Jensen (1997) (hereafter
BJ). who find that the optimal linear contract does depend on the degree of preference
uncertainty.  Here our result is the same as in Walsh (1995) for the case without preference
uncertainty. Hence, certainty equivalence does hold and the optimal linear inflation contract
with uncertain central bank preferences is identical to the optimal Walsh contract in the
absence of uncertainty about central bank preferences.
Finally,  we find that in case of uncertain central banker preferences the optimal delegation
arrangement is a combination of a linear inflation contract and a quadratic contract.   Here
the quadratic contract is equivalent to a Rogoff (1985a) conservative central banker. Again,
this is different from Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that a combination of a linear
inflation contract, an inflation target and a quadratic contract performs best.
Moreover, our result is in line with Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997), and hence suggests
that their 'restoration' of Rogoff appears to be a very robust result indeed.
The  chapter is organized  into six remaining sections followed  by four appendices.  In  Section
2 we present the model. Section 3 looks at the optimal inflation target. In Section 4 we
examine the linear inflation contract. Section 5 compares the inflation target with the linear
contract. Section 6 considers quadratic contracts. Our conclusions are given in Section 7.
The appendices provide the derivation of inflation expectations in the presence of non-
linearities, the optimal inflation target, the optimal linear contract and the characterization
of quadratic contracts.
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6.2   The Model
We use a standard credibility model [Walsh (1995), Svensson (1997a)].   In line with the
credibility literature output is described by a standard reduced-form Lucas supply function:
y = lr- le +V (6.1)
where y is (the natural log of) output; inflation is denoted by A and nominal wage contracts
signed at time t-1 are proxied by the private sector's expected inflation rate. v is a supply
shock with  E[v] = 0 and   E v Z ] = a,2. From these distributional characteristics it follows that
the log of the natural rate of output is zero.
The welfare loss of the government (and of society) is given as
 C   *12  i   . 1
S=   E G 19-y  3   + v r- ,r  ) 1 Y.>0 (6.2)
where the government's inflation target is zr' , and y' denotes the government's preferred
value for output. Given this specification it follows that the government's relative weight of
inflation stabilization relative to output stabilization  - by convenient normalization  - is unity.
This  simplifies the algebra without affecting the generality of results.
6.2.1 No Delegation of Monetary Policy
Now following Svensson (1997a) and Beetsma and Jensen (1997), purely for illustrative
purposes we first discuss the benchmark cases of pre-commitment and discretion and then
delegation arrangements. This means that for the moment monetary policy is not delegated
to an independent central bank, but set directly by the government.
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Pre-commitment
Monetary policy involves the choice of the inflation rate, which is assumed to be under the
direct control of the authority who is in charge of monetary policy. The benchmark solution
is obtained when the government is able to commit ex ante to some announced inflation
rate. The optimal state-contingent monetary policy rule is found by minimizing equation
(6.2)    subject  to  (6.1)  and the restriction that inflation equals announced inflation  on
average. The solution is characterized by the following expressions for respectively,
expected inflation, the variances of inflation and output, and the government's welfare loss
Ec; [,r] =  ir'  ,   1/ar,r  =   a,f  ,    Vary =   Far,r
.2
1 2
s = 22     4 a' (6.3)
Discretion
As is well known, the policy rule that implies (6.3) is time-inconsistent and therefore not
credible [Persson and Tabellini (1990)] if implemented by a government whose objective
function is given by equation  (6.1). Once nominal wages  have  been  set, the government has
the incentive to raise the inflation rate in order to stimulate output. To satisfy the incentive
constraint, the equilibrium inflation rate must be optimal for the government when it takes
wages and thus inflationary expectations as given. The discretionary equilibrium is found
by minimizing (6.2) subject to (6.1), taking inflation expectations as given. This yields':
EG[;r] = ir' + Y 
             The variances of inflation and output are identical to those under pre-commitment.
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.2   1   2S=y     + -4" (6.4)
Expected inflation exceeds the optimal inflation rate by y' because of the incentive to create
surprise inflation in order to bring output closer to its target y' >0. Clearly, social welfare
is higher under pre-commitment than under discretion. Hence, the government may try to
improve its utility by delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank.
6.2.2   Delegation of Monetary Policy
For the remainder of the chapter we assume that actual monetary policy is delegated to a
central bank that has full instrument independence but uncertain preferences. More
specifically, we assume that the central bank has the following loss function:
1 G         · \2     L        w         . \21
L=2 lly -y  3   +Cl-x''vr-,r  ) J (6.5)
where x is a stochastic parameter unobserved by both the government and the private
sector.  Thus, the central bank's weight on inflation stabilization is continuously hit by the
preference disturbance term x, which is a random variable with  E[x] = 0 and E[x]2  = af .
Moreover,  it is assumed  that x i s independent  of v, hence  E[vx] =0,  and that  x  <1 with
probability one.
This specification follows Briault, Haldane and King (1996) and Nolan and Schaling (1996),
and differs from other authors who have stressed the role of imperfect information about the
central bank's preferences.4
4                For example, Beetsma and Jensen (1997) constrain the sum of the weights on   y - y'  2 and
(,r-,r')2 to be  (l t x) + (1-x) =2, as in society's loss function. but they assume the relative
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The timing of events is as follows. First monetary policy is delegated to the central banker.
Then inflation expectations are formed.  Next, the supply shock, v, hits the economy and,
finally, monetary policy is selected by setting the inflation rate.
6.3   The Optimal Inflation Target
We now consider the case of delegation with an inflation mrget. This means that the central
bank no longer has goal independence. Rather the government imposes its own inflation
target for the central bank to adhere to. This is similar to the situation in the United
Kingdom where the Bank of England sets short-term interest rates independently, but where
the inflation target (for this period 2.5 %)  is set by the government. Under the above
arrangements the central bank's loss function becomes
1 |t         .\2     /        M          h 121
L=2[CY-y  3   +Cl-x''Vr-,r  1 J (6.6)
where irh is the central bank's inflation target that is chosen by the government.
The central bank sets monetary policy, which involves the choice of the inflation rate. The
central bank then sets inflations so as to minimize (6.6) subject to (6.1), having observed the
supply shock and taking inflation expectations as given.
weights on output and inflation variances random. Using the notation of this chapter, the BJ results
are obtained by having L =  1(1 + *Xy-y' Y + 0 - x "-iT'    .  Our specification has the
implication that inflation expectations for any given monetary regime depend on  a  .  This allows us
to derive results that are very different - and sometimes the opposite - of their model.
5          Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) examine the case where the authorities can set the control variable
only imperfectly.  That is, Tr,  =Trp +W, . where W - N(O,at) andp indicatesaplanned
variable. We assume that there are no monetary control errors, that is at  =0.
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The first-order condition for a minimum implies the following reaction function
b l t·tb :\\
;r =,r    + - U'   - VT    -,r    + vv (6.D2-x
The term (irb - ir' + v)is the output level consistent with the inflation target. It follows
upon  substituting  7rh   for  ;r in (6.1).    If y' exceeds this level, the central bank has an
incentive to set inflation above the inflation target.
An important property of  (6.7) is that the effects of preference shocks on inflation are
asymmetric.  To see this consider the following example.
Setting  y' - (,r h - ;r' + v) = 1  and  irh =O,i f there is no preference uncertainty, implies that
inflation is 0.50%.  Now, if x=  + 0.50, inflation increases by 17 basispoints to 0.67%.
However a negative preference shock of the same size decreases inflation by 10 basispoints
to 0.40%. Hence, a positive preference shock has more inflationao impact than the
disin#ationary impact of a negative shock.
The above example was constructed for a given level of expected inflation. To solve for
private sector inflation expectations  take the mathematical expectation (at time  t-1)  of
equation (6.7).6 This yields
4+02;re = ;rh + (Dy. where  (D =        z (6.8)
4- 012
It is useful to consider the limiting value of x'  for  the case without preference uncertainty
lim Tr' = Tth + y. (6.9)
o:-DO
6            The technical issue here, as we show in Appendix A, is that this involves taking expectations in the
presence of non-linearities.
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Equations (6.8) and (6.9) indicate that inflation expectations are proportional to the output
bias y' and the inflation target imposed by the government, a familiar conclusion in the
literature. However (6.8) differs in a significant way from (6.9), as a result of uncertainty
regarding the central bank's preferences. It can be seen that with uncertainty about inflation
stabilization preferences expected inflation is higher than in the standard case. The reason is
that positive shocks to  x - more emphasis on output stabilization - are more in»tionary than
negative shocks - more emphasis on inflation stabilization - are disinflationary. With equal
probabilities of positive and negative shocks to the central banker's preferences', expected
inflation will be adjusted upwards and the more so the higher the variance of the shocks
hitting the central bank's preferences.
This can be restated in a more technical way by noting that the expectation of inflation
involves the expectation of a convex function  of the preference shock, which will always be
higher than the value of this function at the (zero) expected value of the preference shock.
Hence the channel through which the uncertainty affects expected inflation is the Jensen's
inequality   effect.8
Realized inflation under a given target follows upon inserting (6.8) back into (6.7)
jr=/re + 1(1 -*0-x)ly._-1- v (6.10)
C 2-x ) 2-x
It is important to realize that now - unlike BJ - monetary policy will on average not coincide
with policy in the absence of uncertainty about the central banker's preferences.   If we set
the preference shock equal to zero in (6.10), monetary policy will still react to the degree of
preference uncertainty (through the variance term in *).  Thus, in this respect certainty
7 However, results do not depend on the symmetry of this distribution.
8              1.e.  E -L.'1(;re  +y.)+7: , El _L.il,;r,  +1 EG'  -(:r'  -,r'  + v)). This effect isnot
(2-x) £2-x)    2
present in the BJ model because they constrain the sum of the weights on output and inflation in the
central banker's loss function to be the same as in society's loss function.
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equivalence  does  not  hold. The reason  is  that the central banker optimizes its policy taking
inflation expectations as given. Since private sector inflation expectations depend on the
second moment of the distribution of x (see equation (6.8)) so does the central bank's
monetary policy stance.
Combining (6.1) and (6.10) yields realized output as
  -(1-00-x)ly. + 1-x v (6.11)
C  2-x 3 2-x
From (6.10) and (6.11) it can be seen that inflation and output differ from their expected
values when either  x or v differ from their (zero) expected values.
For the moment, assume that the supply shock is zero.  Then the way the model works is
extremely simple. Suppose there is a positive shock to the central banker's preferences
(x> x'). This implies that output will be above the natural rate. Conversely, if there is a
negative realization of x (more emphasis on inflation stabilization) actual inflation will be
lower than expected. Consequently, output will be below its natural level.
It is important to realize that the inflation surprise (be it positive or negative) is completely
unaffected by the level of the imposed inflation target. Put differently, the delegation
parameter ;r , has no effect on how the uncertainty about the central banker's preferences is
transmitted to inflation and output. This important result was derived earlier by Beetsma
and Jensen (1997).  Here we show that their result continues to hold when private sector
inflation expectations reflect the uncertainty about the central banker's preferences (through
the term  (D ).
To  see this consider equation  (6.8). A change in ;rb changes inflation expectations one-for-
one.  Hence, the central banker's incentive to set inflation above the target is unaffected,
because  (:rh - ir' + v  in (6.7) is unaffected.
Put differently, the choice of inflation target has no implications for stabilization policy.  By
inspecting (6.10) and (6.11), it can be seen that the term irh does not affect the deviations
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of realized inflation from expectations  (ir -,r') or output from  its (zero) trend.    Thus,  the
variances of output and inflation are independent from the choice of inflation target.




f  al  2
Fary= Farx + 03  -ll + -f)" (6.13)
To find the optimal inflation target, the government chooses the value of ;rb that minimizes
IP subject to (6.8),(6.10) and (6.11)
The optimal inflation target, denoted  by   Abi is:9
2.  =12  -« (6.14)
As before it is useful to consider the limiting value of ;rh. for  the case without preference
uncertainty
lim Trh. = 7[* -yI (6.15)
a --DO
This is the Svensson (1997a) result about the 'inflation target-conservative' central bank
where the inflation target equals the socially best inflation  rate  less  the  inflation  bias.
If af >0. equation (6.14) reveals that it is optimal for the government to impose an
inflation target on the central bank which depends On the degree of uncertainty about its
preferences. This is in sharp contrast to Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that the
9          See Appendix B for the derivation.
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optimal inflation target does not depend on the degree of preference uncertainty and is the
same as in the Svensson (1997a) model. Therefore here - contrary to BJ - certainty
equivalence does not hold, and irh' does not correspond to the optimal target derived by
Svensson (1997a) in the absence of uncertainty about central bank preferences.
The intuition behind our result is simple. First, from (6.12) and (6.13) we know that the
choice of inflation target has no effect on the stochastic components of the government's
loss  function.  Thus,  the  inflation target  is  chosen  so  as  to equal expected inflation to the
socially desirable inflation rate. Since, expected inflation depends on 02 (through  *),  the
optimal inflation target also depends on ai . Finally, comparing (6.14) with (6.15), it can
be seen that with preference uncertainty the optimal inflation target is 'stricter' (lower) than
the Svensson target. The reason is as follows.  As is clear from (6.8), central banker
uncertainty implies higher inflation expectations. To offset this additional inflation bias the
degree of 'target conservativeness' has to increase as well.
6.4    The Optimal Linear Inflation Contract
Having characterized the optimal inflation target, we now turn to the case where delegation
takes the form of a simple linear inflation contract. Walsh (1995) has shown that - in the
absence of uncertainty about central bank preferences -such a contract can remove the
inflation bias under discretion while still allowing the central bank to react optimally to
supply shocks.
Thus, the trade-off between credibility and flexibility as emphasized by Rogoff (1985a) and
others is eliminated, and the pre-commitment outcome can be attained.
The contract adds a linear cost to the central bank's loss function.  Let the added linear cost
to inflation be f(,r- tr'), where f  is a constant.
Then the central bank is assigned the loss function
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rt        . 12/ 1 . \2 L=1 [Cy-y  3  +C t- xA,r-,r  )  1+ f; (ir - ir' ) (6.16)
The central bank chooses inflation so as to minimize (6.16) subject to (6.1) having observed
the supply shock and taking inflation expectations as given.
From the first-order condition we obtain the following reaction function:
c e rl L;r=,r't_LG'-vr'-,r tvv-- (6.1D2-x 2-x
As before,  the term   r'  -,r' + v   is the output level consistent with the socially optimal
inflation rate x', i.e. the output level that follows upon substituting ir' for ir  in (6.1).   If
y'   exceeds this level,  then the central  bank  has an incentive  to set inflation above the social
optimum.
Comparing (6.17) and (6.7) it can be seen that the central bank's reaction function under a
linear inflation contract looks very similar to the reaction function under the optimal
inflation target. In both cases the effects of preference shocks on inflation are asymmetric,
with positive shocks increasing inflation by more than negative shocks decreasing it. There
are two differences. The first is that in (6.17) the government imposed inflation target ;r  is
replaced by the socially optimal inflation rate. Secondly, under a linear contract inflation
decreases with f . The reason is that an increase in f raises the central banker's marginal
loss from higher inflation.
Taking expectations  (at time  t-1)o f the central bank's reaction function under a linear
contract gives inflation expectations as
tr' = x. + *Cy. - f ) (6.18)
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where the term * has the same meaning as in the private sector's forecasting rule under an
optimal inflation target.'°
Please note that, unlike Beetsma and Jensen (1997), uncertainty about the central banker's
preferences increases inflation expectations. The intuition is similar  to  the  case  of the
optimal inflation target. Positive preference shocks are more inflationary than negative
shocks are disinflationary. Hence with equal probabilities of positive and negative shocks
expected inflation will be adjusted upwards, and the more so the higher the variance term in
*.
From  expression  (6.18)  it is clear that inflation is expected to exceed its social optimum
whenever y' >f,i n which case the marginal benefits of inflation are greater than the
marginal costs, i.e. the incentive to inflate dominates the disciplining effect of the contract.
Inserting  (6.18)  back  into (6.17) actual inflation  is
lr= 1r' +  1-*(1-,)}(y. -f )--v (6.19)2-x ' 2-x
As in the case of the optimal inflation target, it is important to realize that - unlike BJ -
monetary policy does not coincide with policy in the absence of uncertainty about the
central banker's preferences.   If we Set the preference shock equal to zero in (6.19)
monetary policy will still react to the variance term in * .  Thus, in this respect certainty
equivalence does not hold. The reason is that the central banker optimizes its policy by
taking inflation expectations as given. Since inflation expectations depend on the variance
of the preference shocks (through Jensen's inequality; see expression (6.18)) so does the
central bank's reaction function.




10 The derivation is similar to the case of an optimal inflation target, for more details see Appendix A.
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As in the case of the optimal inflation target, inflation and output deviate from their
expected values when either x or v differ from their (zero) expected values. But compared
with (6.10) and (6.11), the solutions for inflation and output differ in an important aspect:
the delegation parameter f , now affects how uncertainty about the central banker's
preferences feed into inflation and output.
Here we show that their result still holds if private sector inflation expectations depend on
the uncertainty about preferences.
For the moment, suppose that the supply shock is zero. Following BJ, from (6.17) it can be
seen that the contract affects the inflation rate through two channels. The first channel
operates directly by increasing the marginal loss of inflation. Consider a marginal increase
in f  starting from f=0. The direct effect is then given by the term -f /2-x.   So this
effect is uncenain and ultimately depends on the realization of x . The second, indirea
channel operates through inflation expectations.   Here it is equal to -(If (see equation
(6.18))."
The combined direct and indirect effects of the contract imply that any deviation of x from
its (zero) expected value will have smaller effects on actual inflation and output.  Thus, with
a contract in place, i.e. f >0, - contrary to the case of an optimal inflation target - the
transmission of preference shocks to inflation and output is dampened.
Now, consider the effects of a supply shock. The transmission of this shock to inflation and
output is affected by the preference shock. Consider a positive realization of x .  This
means that there is more emphasis on output stabilization which increases the willingness of
the  central  bank to accommodate supply shocks. Hence, the higher  x the  more such shocks
are dampened before they pass on to output. The flipside of the coin is that inflation
volatility is less well cared for. Of course, if x is negative the reverse is true.  Then, the
"            In the BJ model the direct effect is deterministic and - using the notation of this chapter - equal to
-f/2.  BJ haveno effect from preference uncertainty on expected inflation so 0-*land the
indirect effect in their model is -f .
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central bank dampens the impact effect from the supply shock on inflation and output is
allowed to fluctuate more.
Under a linear contract, i.e. if f >O,i t i s clear that the role of fluctuating preferences in
the transmission of supply shocks to inflation and output is significantly reduced. Thus,
there will be less scope for the central bank to impose its 'own' preferences on society and
distort stabilization policy by 'overstabilizing' either inflation or output.
This can also be seen from the expressions for the variances of inflation and output
Var. -  G. -•.,•t -11),.., 11'41.43 1+'4t}
(6.21)
f   2)
Vag  =  Far ir + a..  -1. 1+ 11'f,2
(6.22)
Through the first term on the right hand side of (6.21) the contract affects the variability of
inflation and, through (6.22)), of output.
To find the optimal linear inflation contract, the government chooses f so as to minimize
If;   subject to  (6.18),  (6.19),  and (6.20). Using the first-order condition, the optimal value
Of f, denoted by ./7  , is given by: 1.
fi --4 (6.23)
This expression reveals that it is optimal to offer a linear inflation contract to a central
banker  that does not depend  On the degree of uncertainty about its preferences.   This  is  in
sharp contrast to Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that the optimal linear contract does
depend  On the degree of preference uncertainty.
i2 See Appendix C for the derivation.
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Please note that our result is the same as in Walsh (1995) for the case without preference
uncertainty. Hence, contrary to BJ for the case of a linear contract, certainty equivalence
does hold. The value f;  corresponds to the optimal Walsh contract in the absence of
uncertainty about central bank preferences.
6.5    The Linear Walsh  Contract versus the Svensson Inflation Target
In this section we compare the outcomes for inflation and output under a Walsh contract
with the outcomes under a Svensson inflation target. In absence of uncertainty about the
central banker's preferences, Svensson (1997a) has shown that the linear Walsh contract is
equivalent with the Svensson inflation target. Both achieve optimal stabilization without an
inflationary bias.  We will show that this equivalence no longer holds when disturbances to
the central banker's preferences are introduced.
Optimal Linear Inflation Contract
Under the optimal linear inflation contract the inflationary bias is eliminated so that
expected inflation is equal  to the inflation target  (this  can  be  seen  from  (6.18)).    Thus  the
credibility problem is solved.  To see how the linear contract performs with respect to
smbilization policy we need to look at the variances on inflation and output. By substituting
f = y' into (6.21) and (6.22) we get
al f    3al    a4 )
Farm = -4'll +4*-+ 11 J
Vag - 'f- 1 -9 + %-i (6.24)
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Optimal Inflation Target
The optimal Svensson inflation target also solves the credibility problem.  So in this respect
it is identical to the linear inflation contract. However, its stabilization properties are
different from the linear inflation contract.
The variances of inflation and output under an optimal inflation target can be found by
substituting   71 8 = Tr' - (Dy' into (6.12) and (6.13). This yields
Far,r =21. 1 + 30: + 211 1 40:y.2
4 l   4   16)  4-ajy
Vary = Et 1 - 21 + 21)  I
40:y"
(6.25)
4        4     16     (4-a'Y
Comparing (6.24) and (6.25),  it is clear that in the presence of uncertainty about the central
banker's preferences the Walsh contract unambiguously yields a lower variance of inflation
and a lower variance of output than the Svensson inflation target. This means that the
optimal linear inflation contract yields a lower expected loss to the government and,
therefore, is strictly superior to the optimal inflation target. This result is similar to BJ.
However, in their model stabilization policy under a linear inflation contract is at the cost of
expected inflation being below the socially optimal inflation rate. This trade-off is not
present in this chapter.
The intuition behind this result is simple. In Section 6.3 we showed that with an inflation
target, the delegation parameter Ah, has no effect on how the uncertainty about the central
banker's preferences is transmitted to inflation and output. Put differently, the choice of the
inflation target has no implications for stabilization policy. Thus, the variances of output
and inflation are independent from the choice of inflation target.
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From Section 4 we know that this is no longer true under a linear contract. With the optimal
contract in place, i.e. f; = y  9 - contrary to the case of an optimal inflation target - the
transmission of preference shocks to inflation and output is dampened. Because the role of
fluctuating preferences in the transmission of supply shocks to inflation and output is
significantly reduced, the variances of inflation and output will be lower than in the case of
an optimal inflation target.
The policy implications of this result are clear. It suggests that - in the presence of
uncertainty about the central banker's preferences - the best institutional arrangement is to
grant the central bank instrument independence and to make it accountable for its monetary
policy performance by imposing a linear inflation contract. Moreover, this delegation
arrangement has the appealing property that the optimal linear inflation contract is
independent  from the degree of preference uncertainty. So there  is  no  need  for  the
government (the principal)  to make delegation arrangements conditional  on this uncertainty.
In other words, the legislator needs less information than in the case of the optimal inflation
target (where the target does depend on  of) and still reaps the rewards of better
stabilization policy than in the case where policy is set by a central bank with an optimal
inflation target.
6.6   Quadratic Contracts
Even though the optimal linear contract is superior to the optimal inflation target, it does not
achieve the pre-commitment solution. The reason is that the interaction between the supply
shocks and preference uncertainty generates excess macroeconomic variability.
We address this problem by expanding the set of admissible contracts to include quadratic
contracts. A quadratic contract penalizes quadratic (squared) deviations of inflation  from
some target.
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6.6.1   Combination of a Linear and a Quadratic Contract
More specifically, to moderate the excess macroeconomic variability under the linear
inflation contract we examine the combination of a linear and a quadratic contract. Let the
'2
added quadratic cost to inflation be  .4 (,r -x'), where  f   is a constant.  Then the central
bank is assigned the loss function
1-xi .12   1 1 .\2 .   f,    ·),I.(8=  2- lit-lr j +i(y-y j +f'(ir-7[ )+ 22(lr-lr j (6.26)
From (6.26) it can be seen that -i f f  >0- the quadratic contract is mathematically
equivalent to Rogoffs (1985a) conservative central banker. Of course, if this parameter is
negative, we have a liberal central banker.
The optimal delegation arrangement is found in two steps. The first step is to solve for the
optimal linear contract, taking .4 as given. The second step is to solve for the optimal value
Of fl.
As was shown in the previous section, the variances of inflation and output do not depend
on the parameters of the Walsh contract when the parameter f is optimally chosen. Adding
a quadratic penalty on inflation does not change the optimal Walsh contract. Therefore, in
this  section  we  have two independent instruments  for two problems.     We  use the linear
penalty term to eliminate the inflationary bias and we use the quadratic term to minimize the
welfare loss to society caused by the variance of inflation and output. The quadratic term
then brings a trade-off between the variance of inflation and the variance of output as is
well-known from the Rogoff model. From Appendix D it follows that the optimal
combination of a linear and a quadratic contract is
9a:f.· =yi O<f< (6.27)
4 + 3a:
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Thus, in order to mitigate excess macroeconomic variability - due to the interaction between
supply shocks and preference shocks - the linear Walsh contract needs to be augmented
with a conservative central banker. This result was first found by Herrendorf and
Lockwood (1997). Here we show that their result - which follows from information
asymmetries between a monopolistic trade union and the political principal with respect to
productivity shocks - continues  to  hold  in our setting." The Walsh contract  cum
conservative central banker result is also found by Beetsma and Jensen (1997). Thus, the
Herrendorf-Lockwood result appears to be very robust indeed.
6.6.2   Combination of an Inflation Target and a Quadratic Contract
As was shown in the previous section the optimal inflation target performs worse - in terms
of social welfare - than the optimal linear contract. More specifically, because the inflation
target has no effect on the transmission of uncertainty about the central banker's preferences
to inflation and output, macroeconomic variability is higher than with an optimal linear
contract. Thus, social welfare with an optimal inflation target will be even further away
from the first-best pre-commitment outcome than in the case of a linear contract.
To mitigate this sub-optimal volatility, we now consider a combination of an optimal
inflation target and a quadratic contract. Under this delegation scheme the central banker
minimizes
Lf'  =  12 K{"- 'r')2 +  (y- y.)1 + f{"- ir.)2 (6.28)
13 As can be seen in Appendix D, the combination of an optimal linear Walsh contract and a quadratic
contract gives the Rogoff result that the variance of inflation decreases with A whereas the variance of
output increases with A (for a sensibly small).
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As before, the optimal delegation arrangement is found in two steps. The first step is to
solve for the optimal inflation target, taking -6 as given. The second step is to solve for the
optimal value ofA.  As was shown in the previous section, the variances of inflation and
output do not depend on the inflation target Irb. Thus, adding a quadratic penalty on
inflation does not change the optimal inflation target. This means that, - as before - we
now have two independent instruments for two problems.  We use the inflation target to
eliminate the inflationary bias, and we use the quadratic contract to minimize the welfare
loss to society caused  by the excess macroeconomic variability.
From Appendix  D it follows that the optimal combination of an inflation target and a
quadratic contract is
le"   =  12  -44,              f   > j; (6.29)
From (6.29) it follows that the Svensson optimal inflation target (which already depends on
the degree of preference uncertainty), also has to be augmented with a conservative central
banker. Moreover, in Appendix D we show that now the central banker has to be even more
conservative. The additional variance that the inflation target generates, compared to the
Walsh result, can unambiguously be reduced by making the central banker more
conservative. This explains why the central banker has to be even more conservative when
he is assigned a Svensson target instead of a linear Walsh contract.
6.7    Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have investigated the effects of uncertain central bank preferences for the
optimal institutional design of monetary policy. We have studied this in the context of a
model that goes beyond 'pure' uncertainty. This means that we have relaxed the Beetsma
and Jensen (1997) restriction that the central banker's preference uncertainty has no effect
on private sector inflation expectations.
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As shown in the chapter this implies that monetary policy will on average not coincide with
policy in the absence of uncertainty.   In this respect certainty equivalence does not hold.
The reason is that the central bank optimizes its policy, taking inflation expectations as
given. Since private sector inflation expectations now depend on the degree of preference
uncertainty (being the variance of the preference shock) so does monetary policy. Hence,
through the expectations channel, preference uncertainty now has systematic (as opposed to
transitory) effects on policy. The implications of allowing the uncertainty to play a bigger
role are substantial.
First, the optimal inflation target that has to be imposed on the central banker now depends
on the degree of preference uncertainty, and has to be stricter (lower) the higher the
uncertainty. The reason  is that central banker uncertainty implies higher inflation
expectations. To offset this additional inflation bias the degree of 'target conservativeness'
has to increase as well.
This is in sharp contrast to Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that the optimal inflation
target does not depend on the degree of preference uncertainty and is the same as in the
Svensson (1997a) model. Therefore in our model - contrary to BJ - certainty equivalence
does not hold, and the optimal inflation target with uncertain central bank preferences does
not correspond to the optimal target derived by Svensson (1997a) in the absence of
uncertainty about central bank preferences.
Further, for the case of the Walsh contract we find that it is optimal to offer a linear
inflation contract to a central banker that does not depend on the degree of uncertainty about
its preferences. Again, this is in sharp contrast to Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that
the optimal linear contract does depend  on the degree of preference uncertainty.  Here  our
result is the same as in Walsh (1995) for the case without preference uncertainty. Hence,
contrary to BJ for the case of a linear contract certainty equivalence does hold, and the
optimal linear inflation contract with uncertain central bank preferences is identical to the
optimal Walsh contract  in the absence of uncertainty about central bank preferences.
Next, comparing the linear Walsh contract and the optimal inflation target, we find that the
optimal linear inflation contract yields a lower expected loss to the government and
therefore is strictly superior to the optimal inflation target. This result is similar to BJ.
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However, in their model stabilization policy under a linear inflation contract is at the cost of
expected inflation being below the socially optimal inflation rate. This trade-off is not
present in this chapter.
To conclude, we find that in case of uncertain central banker preferences the optimal
delegation arrangement is a combination of a linear inflation contract and a quadratic
contraa. Here the quadratic contract is equivalent to a Rogoff (1985a) conservative central
banker. Again, this is different from Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that a
combination of a linear inflation contract, an inflation target and a quadratic contract
performs best."
The policy implications of this result are clear. It suggests that - in the presence of
uncertainty about the central banker's preferences - the best institutional arrangement is to
select a central banker that is more inflation averse than society, grant the central bank
instrument independence and to make it accountable for its monetary policy performance
by imposing a linear inflation contract. Moreover, this delegation arrangement has the
appealing property that the optimal linear inflation contract is independent from the degree
of preference uncertainty. Thus, there is no need for the government (the principal) to make
delegation arrangements conditional on this uncertainty. In other words the legislator needs
less information than in the case of the optimal inflation target (where the target does
depend on  03) and still reaps the rewards of better stabilization policy than in the case
where policy is set by a central bank with an optimal inflation target.
14 It is possible to extend the analysis to the case where the central bank's preferred output level is
uncertain as well.  This case is analyzed by Walsh (1997). However, he abstracts from a random
weight in the central bank's objective function.
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6.8 Appendices
A. Private Sector Inflation Expectations
Optimal Inflation Target
Taking expectations across expression  (6.7)
/1-x)E(,r) = E -LA(,r' + y') + ;rhEI - (A.1)\.2-x/ \2-x
This expression requires  us  to  take the expected value of ratios of random variables.   This
can be achieved through a Taylor series expansion.
Our  problem  is to expand X/Y about the respective means. Assuming  that the first  two
moments of Eg/KI exist we can write down the expression
d n. Fi__ic /1 +
Cy)  MY  gy'        Py
ov[X, Y]+ --5-var[Y] (A.2)
This is the (second-order) approximation used in the chapter, therefore we can write
C 1 1 4+Q2 /1-x)  4- 2Ei -I. --i and El- 1.-- (A.3)\.2-x) 8 2-x)  8
So substituting (A.3) in (A.1) and rearranging gives
4 + 02 . h
tr      -    4-g, .y     +
1, (A.4)
which is expression (6.8)  in the text. Again,  it is clear that as ai  -+ O the first part of the
expression on the right hand side collapses to unity, and (A.4) is equivalent to (6.9).
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Linear Inflation Contract
The derivation of private sector expectations for the case of a linear inflation contract is
similar to the case of an optimal inflation target (see above).
B.  The Optimal Inflation Target
Since the choice of inflation target does not affect the stochastic components of the
governments expected loss, its problem is
AtinE,[ C'.- A.),1                           08.1)
subject to
1re = xh + (Dy. (6.8)
The first-order condition (FOC) for minimizing (It.1) with respect to ;rh is
' aire
("' -X.,ap  = (*-i)= 0 (B.2)
It follows that the FOC can be written as
1re = 1 at.3)
Substituting (6.8) for /r' yields
2=  2  - (by. (B.4)
which is equation (6.14) in the main text.
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C. The Optimal Linear Contract
The government's problem is
Afn E«[; (". _ 1'.}2 + ; (Far,r + Fag)                                                                          (C.1)
subject to (6.18), (6.21) and (6.22)
The first-order condition (FOC) for minimizing (B.1) with respect to f is
E«(„. _„· a' + 1 [ovarir 1 DVaryl = 0 (C.2)4; 5[ 4   « J
Substituting for ;r'  from (6.18) and using that ar' / di = -* we get
E«(-cD'(y'-L})+2[ 4 1 4 ]-                  (C.3)lf' Farir       al''agl  _  o
Then expanding OVary   as 8Var y
8Varlt 8'ary
24\ Ovar,r Ef,  Ek- and rearranging we get
F Dvar,Il
-(*2(y. - f)) + [-*--1 = 0 (C.4)
Finally, using that from (6.22) - =
 ar,r   -at(0 + 1)(y. - f )
4                4
the government's FOC can be written as
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_ 802 + 2(  + cD)0:  Cy. _ I) = 0                                                                                      (c.*
It can be easily seen that the optimal linear contract then is
f =4 (C.6)
which is equation (6.23) in the main text.
D. Quadratic Contracts
Optimal quadratic contract with optimal Walsh contract
01 C 3a2 at 1 yvai(,6 + 2)2Far,r = 1 -Ill  ' 1 (D.1)
(,4 + 2)'l      (f + 2)2     (f + 2)4   1  ((fl + lX«4 + 2)2 - a:)2
Fag= 0,2 f(t f +112   (2./,2 +1>J,      a,
(fi + 2)2 lw 2      1        (4 + 2)2        (,6 + 2)4                              
                       (I).2)
The optimal value for ,4 is found  at
6    =                            60  
                                          
                                   69 2 E G(fz) (I).3)
(12 + 2)2 + 306 1 (fi + 2) (6 + 2)2 + 303  
9a 2
Since,  G(0) -  -- 3=   , 6(00) = 0,  and  G i s monotonically decreasing  in «4, there is a
4 + 3a:
unique solution to (D.3).
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Optimal quadratic contract with optimal Svensson target
Farx = 0-,2       11      30.:       1       0:         1          Y.201 (fi + 2)2 (D.4)
(fz + 2)2  l       (fl + 2)2      (fl  + 2)4 J     ((fl + l)(f, + 2)2  -a:  
a,2   (41 + 1)2   (2.,4 + 1)0.  I    a,     I     y"-aiz (fi +2)2Vary=,r    -vIC  2
(32 + 2)  < (-4 + 2)2       («fi + 2)4 3    ((fl +  XL + 2)2 -02)2    (D.5)
The optimal value  for A is found  at
6  =G(f2) 1 (D.6)0242 (,4 + 2)6 (Of+3)(fz + 2)2  + =2)02((4 + l)(f2 + 2)2- aj)1 ((.6 + 2)2 + 30. )
Comparing (I).6) to (D.3) it is clear that the solution to (D.6) is found at a higher value for
f . so we need a more conservative central bank under a Svensson inflation target than
with a linear Walsh contract.
7   A Theory of Central Bank Accountability
7.1 Introduction
Nowadays, many countries have established an independent central bank. The government
delegates monetary policy to an independent institution that focuses primarily on price
stability. By delegating monetary policy making to an independent central bank, the
government can achieve a lower rate of inflation by reducing the inflationary bias.  This
benefit of enhanced credibility comes at the cost of less flexibility  in reacting  to  supply
shocks. However, there is an obvious risk in giving away control over monetary policy.
There must be a mechanism that ensures that monetary policy is set in a way that is
compatible with society's best interest. As Stiglitz (1998) notes "Monetary policy is a key
determinant of economic performance...  [and that]  ...this key determinant of what happens
to society - this key collective action - should be so removed from control of
democratically elected officials should at least raise questions."   One way or the other,
central banks must be accountable to democratically elected institutions. Fischer (1994),
Levy (1995), Nolan and Schaling (1996), Briault, Haldane and King (1996) and De Haan,
Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1998) have discussed this accountability issue.  De Haan,
Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1998) distinguish three features of central bank accountability:
- Who takes the decisions about the ultimate objectives of monetary policy?
- How transparent is actual monetary policy?
-  Who bears final responsibility for monetary policy?
In this chapter we present a theoretical model of central bank accountability. We focus on
transparency of actual monetary policy and on thefinat responsibility for monetary policy.
The third feature of accountability, setting the ultimate objectives of monetary policy, is
related to the question of goal independence of a central bank.
Goal independence can be defined in a strict sense and in a broader sense. Debelle and
Fischer (1995) use the strict definition as they write, " . . .a central bank has goal
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independence when it is free  to  set the final  goals of monetary policy. " According to these
authors, this implies that  " . . . a central bank with goal independence could, for instance,
decide that price stability was less important than output stability and act accordingly.
However, as De Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1998) note, "where a central bank has
both instrument and goal independence, the body charged with holding the central bank
accountable is not provided with an effective statutory yardstick to evaluate the performance
of the  bank,  and  thus  to  hold  the bank accountable  for its conduct of monetary policy.
Therefore, this strict definition of goal independence is not very useful in a discussion of
central bank accountability.  In a broader sense, the German and Dutch central bank have
goal independence because they are free to pursue a low rate of inflation free of political
interference, whereas, for instance, the Bank of England has a precisely described inflation
target in a contract with the government. This broader definition is more useful in practice.
However, as said before, setting the ultimate objectives of monetary policy is not considered
in this chapter.   For a discussion we refer to chapter 6 of this book.
Our model builds on earlier work by Lohmann (1992) and Nolan and Schaling (1996).  The
government delegates monetary policy to a conservative central banker. However, the
government and society don't know exactly the central banker's preferences for inflation
stabilization relative to output stabilization. The extent to which the central bank has private
information about its preferences is determined  by the transparency of monetary policy.
After the central bank has proposed its preferred rate of inflation, the government can
decide to override the central bank at a fixed cost.  In this set up, the central bank is
partially independent.   The cost of overriding is related to the question of who has final
responsibility for monetary policy.  If this cost is prohibitive, final responsibility lies with
the central bank.  If, on the other hand, this cost is negligible, final responsibility rests with
the government.
In this chapter we want to discuss the implications of these two types of accountability for
macroeconomic outcomes. In particular, we look at the effects on the level of inflation and
the  stabilization of supply shocks.
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We show that more transparency leads, in expectation, to a lower rate of inflation and less
stabilization of supply shocks.    A  low  cost of overriding leads  to a higher  rate of inflation
and more stabilization of supply shocks.
7.2   The Model
Output is determined by a simplified Lucas supply function:
y = lr- 1   + V with  v - NG,al) (7.1)
where y is the log of output,  1r the actual rate of inflation,  f the expected rate of inflation
and v a random supply shock. The government and society do not like inflation and output
to deviate from their desired levels (without loss of generality the desired rate of inflation is
normalized at zero) Moreover, the government incurs a fixed cost c if it decides to
override the central bank.  As in Lohmann (1992), the nature of this cost is determined by
the political institutions  in the society. The dummy variable 5 takes a value  of  1   if the
central bank is overridden and a value of 0 if it is not overridden. The following loss-
function  for the government results:
LG   =     1[2  +    (y-y. )2 +6 c (7.2)
where y'  >  0 is the government's output target. The government delegates monetary policy
to a conservative central banker with stochastic preferences. The central bank's
conservativeness is embodied  in a quadratic contract with parameter A.    The  central  bank
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has private information about the realization of the uniformly distributed preference shock
x.  The central bank's loss function is as follows'
1-x   1
4, = -2-,r] +2(y-y )2 +f 2'r2, withx
- U[-h,hland h <«4 (7.3)
Without delegation of monetary policy, the government would set a discretionary inflation
rate that minimizes its loss:




If monetary policy is delegated to the central bank, the rate of inflation is set in order to
minimize the central bank's loss function:




Since, as in Rogoff (1985a), the central bank is always more inflation averse than the
government (4 -x>  0), the conservative central bank has a lower inflationary bias than the
government but it responds less actively to supply shocks.
After monetary policy is delegated to the central bank and the central bank has Set the
inflation rate, the government has to decide whether to override the central bank or accept
the central bank's inflation rate as is given in (7.5).
If the government overrides, we use (7.4) in (7.2) with (7.1) and 6 =  1 t o find its loss to
be:
z We ensure that the central bank is always more conservative than the government by assuming
h <fi.  Without this assumption, the central bank could be overridden for accommodating too
much to supply shocks, which complicates the analysis considerably.
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La (,rG ) =  (y' + ir' - v)2 + C (7.6)
If the government chooses to accept the central bank's inflation rate, we use (7.5) in (7.2)
with (7.1) and 6 = 0, to find its loss to be equal to:
LG (1rc'B ) = ,    (y    + A'- v)
2 (7.7)1+ (x-1 -fi)2
2(x -2-f i)
The government's decision problem is whether to override the central bank or accept the
inflation rate. Minimizing its loss, the central bank will be overridden if:
LG(AG)<LG(ACB) (7.8)
If the government finds that the cost of overriding the central bank is higher than the benefit
of setting the government's preferred inflation rate, the central bank is independent.   The
region of independence of the central bank depends on the cost of overriding (c), the degree
of conservativeness of the central bank (fz) and the realization of the stochastic supply shock
v and the preference shock x. Substituting the government's loss with overriding (7.6) and
the government's loss with delegation of monetary policy (7.7) in the condition for
overriding the central bank (7.8) we find that the central bank will be independent if




However, if the cost of overriding is low enough (c < . (y' + ;r' - v)2 ) the4(x -2-f i) '
central bank cannot set its preferred rate of inflation without being overridden. Instead, it
will act in such a manner that the government is indifferent between overriding or not.
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Thus, depending on the realization of the shocks, the central bank will either be independent
((x, v) € I)  or it will accommodate  ((x, v) E  A).    In the latter case, the central  bank will  set a
rate of inflation that is a weighted average of the government's preferred inflation (7.4) and
the central bank's preferred rate (7.5):
;rAC.C.  -01rc, + (1- 0),r<.11 -
2 -0(x-A) Cy'+,re-v),05051 (7.10)
2(2-x + fz)
If the central bank Sets this inflation rate, inserting (7.10) in (7.2) and using (7.1) we find
that the government's loss will be:
1+(x-1-6)2-0(x-6)2(1-40) .
4 OrAcr ) =
2(2 -x+ .4)2 -
          (Y     tx'-  v)
2
(7.11)
The central bank will always accommodate so that the government is indifferent between
overriding or not. Therefore, the central bank chooses 0 such that  LG (A AL (.) = LG (TI G ).
Equalizing (7.2) and (7.11) we find that
        2(2 -x+f i ) if (x, v) E A
0 =           y'+K'- vN - fil (7.12)
0                              if (x,v) e  I
Inserting the expression for the weight given to the government's preferred inflation rate
(7.12)  into  (7.10) this results  in the following  rate of inflation  if the  central  bank
accommodates'
y' + lr'-V      r       i -        "      C  '        e        
lT AC C
= vcsgnVi -x/sgnly  +,r   -v)
2
The signum-operator: sgn(x)=1 if x>O, sgn(x)=-1 if x<0 and sgn(x)=0 if x=0.
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Using our assumption that the central bank will always be conservative, whatever its
preference shock may be 42 > x), we can write:
y' + X' -V      r       I  *        e       1
 Ac'(' - 2
-Vcsgnly +7r -v (7.13)
Figure 7.1 shows what monetary policy looks  like  if the government faces a positive  cost of
overriding a conservative central bank.  In the center of the figure, around v = y' + 3r', the
central bank is independent and sets its preferred rate of inflation. However, on the left-
hand side and on the right-hand side of this region of independence, the central bank must
accommodate to the government's preferred rate of inflation. In these region of
accommodation, the government finds the cost of the (in its view) insufficient stabilization
of supply shocks so high that it would not accept the central bank's preferred rate. Parallel
to the government's reaction function, at a distance that depends on the cost of overriding
(*  to be precise) there are two lines. The crossings of these lines with the reaction
function of the conservative central bank determine the region of independence, which lies
between the two crossing points.
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Figure 7.1 Actual Monetary Policy with a Positive Cost of Overriding
·.. Government's
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7.3    Accountability through Transparency
Shocks to the central bank's preferences influence the slope of the reaction function of the
independent central bank. A positive shock makes the central bank less conservative so that
it reacts stronger to supply shocks.  In the graph, the reaction function becomes steeper and
the region of independence increases. A negative preference shock has an opposite effect.
The central bank becomes more conservative, the slope of the reaction function becomes
flatter and the region of independence will be smaller. However, the effect of a positive
preference shock is stronger than the effect of a negative preference shock. The reason for
this asymmetry is the same as the 'Jensen-inequality effect' that is present in the models of
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chapters 5 and 6. Because of this asymmetry, a lower variance of preference shocks makes
the expected slope of the independent central bank's reaction function flatter, as is shown in
Figure 7.2. Therefore, the expected region of independence becomes smaller and the
expected rate of inflation decreases.  This is our next proposition:
Proposition 7.1: The expected region of independence (conditional  on the realization of
supply shock v) decreases if the central bank becomes more transparent.
Proof·· The central bank becomes more transparent if the central bank's preferences become
less uncertain, or h decreases. From chapters 5 and 6 (and this chapter's appendix B) we
know  that less preference uncertainty makes the central bank effectively more conservative.
From Figure  7.1  and  7.2  it is clear that more conservativeness, which means a flatter
central bank's reaction function, makes the region of independence smaller.  For a formal
proof, see appendix A.
Next, we want to show the effect of accountability through transparency on the expected
rate of inflation. We expect that transparency leads to lower inflationary expectations since
lower preference uncertainty leads effectively to a more conservative central bank.  This is
formalized in the following proposition:
Proposition 7.2: If the transparency of monetary policy increases (h decreases), the
expected rate of inflation decreases.
Proof See appendix B
To  complete the analysis  of the effects of accountability through transparency,  we  have
looked at the stabilization of supply shocks. This leads to the next proposition:
Proposition 7.3: If the transparency of monetary policy increases (h decreases), there is less
stabilization of supply shocks.
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proof· See appendix B
Figure 7.2: The Central Bank Becomes More Conservative
..... .        Government's
X reaction function
 Conservative central
 bank's reaction function
\.






The transparency type of accountability leads to a lower expected rate of inflation and less
accommodation of supply shocks, especially within the region of independence. Therefore,
this type of accountability is most appropriate fur countries with a serious credibility
problem (high y') relative to their flexibility problem (a,2 ). Clearly, this type of
accountability does not reduce the effective independence of the central bank. Although the
region of independence becomes smaller, the macroeconomic outcomes move in the central
bank's preferred direction when transparency is increased.
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Transparency can be achieved by a central bank through publication of relevant
information. Publishing minutes of meetings and giving a motivation for the actions that are
taken increase transparency and reduce the uncertainty about the central bank's preferences.
7.4    Accountability through Final Responsibility
Another way to increase accountability of a central bank is to shift the final responsibility
for monetary policy in the direction of the government, away from the central bank.   In our
model we do this by making the cost of overriding (c) lower.  As is shown in Figure 7.3,
the distance between the government's reaction function and the two lines parallel to it
becomes smaller.   Inevitably this also reduces the effective independence of the central
bank.
Proposition 7.4: The expected region of independence (conditional on the realization of
supply shock v) becomes smaller if the final responsibility for monetary policy shifts in the
direction of the government.
proof: If the final responsibility for monetary policy shifts in the direction of the
government, the cost of overriding (c) becomes lower. Comparing Figure 7.1 with Figure
7.3 it is easy to see that the expected region of independence becomes smaller if the cost of
overriding becomes lower. In appendix A this is shown formally.
Proposition 7.5: If the final responsibility for monetary policy shifts in the direction of the
government (c decreases), the expected  rate of inflation increases.
Proof: If c decreases,  the inflation rate set by the accommodating central banker increases
for  v <y' + x' and decreases by the same amount for v > y' + 1r'. However, since the
probability density of the supply shock v is higher for v < y' + ;r', the expected rate of
inflation will increase.
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Proposition 7.6: If the final responsibility for monetary policy shifts in the direction of the
government (c decreases), there is more stabilization of supply shocks.
proof From Proposition 7.4 is straightforward that the region of accommodation increases
when the final responsibility for monetary policy shifts in the direction of the government.
There will be more stabilization for shocks that were within the region of independence
befure the shift of final responsibility and within the region of accommodation after the
shift.
Figure 7.3: The Cost of Overriding Becomes Lower
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Achieving accountability by lowering the cost of overriding (lower c) makes the region of
independence smaller. However, in this case the expected rate of inflation goes up and the
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(expected) slope of the reaction functions doesn't change. Lowering the cost of overriding
makes the central bank more flexible towards shocks that fell just inside the region of
independence before the lowering in the cost of overriding and fall in the region of
accommodation after the change. Therefore, achieving central bank accountability by
moving the final responsibility for monetary policy in the direction of the government is
most appropriate for countries that have a serious flexibility problem relative to the
credibility problem.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have investigated the effects of accountability on macroeconomic
outcomes.   In the analysis, we have focused on two types of accountability: accountability
through transparency and accountability through final responsibility. Transparency reduces
the uncertainty about the central bank's preferences and can be achieved by publication of
relevant information. For instance, publishing minutes of meetings and inflation reports
that give a motivation for the actions that the central bank has taken increase the
transparency of monetary policy.  We show that, although transparency makes the region of
independence smaller, effective central bank independence increases with transparency.
This leads to a lower expected rate of inflation and less stabilization of productivity shocks.
So, more transparency shifts the balance of credibility vs. flexibility in the direction of
credibility. Therefore, achieving accountability through transparency is especially attractive
for countries that face a serious credibility problem relative to the flexibility problem.
The other way of achieving accountability that is studied in this chapter is shifting final
responsibility for monetary policy in the direction of the government. The government is
under democratic control from the parliament. By shifting final responsibility to the
government, indirectly the parliament has more influence on monetary policy.  In our
model, shifting this responsibility is implemented by lowering the cost of overriding the
central bank.  We find that effective central bank independence decreases when the final
responsibility shifts in the direction of the government. This leads to higher inflationary
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expectations and more stabilization of supply shocks. Achieving accountability by shifting
final responsibility for monetary policy in the direction of the government therefore appears
most appropriate for countries that face a serious flexibility problem relative to their
credibility problem.
7.6 Appendices
A. The Expected Region of Independence
The central bank is independent if
2,/2(,4 +2-x)              .              2*(.4 +2-x)y. t're <v<y   + ;re I (A.1)
fl-x                 fl-x
With  x - U[-h, h] the expected region of independence is:
4-( f+b) 242(   f +h)
y' + ;re - 2 1'7 - li;.£- log-f-2-h < v<y' +7r'  + 2JI + -h' log  2     1        (A.2)J                                                            C       6 -hyl
In order to show that the region of independence increases with h, it is sufficient to show
a -log 2 -
that >O with 0<h<fz.11;     i t)
8h
Il log 6-thl
<h    6 -h)_lf 2Ah A + hl      1
8,4            - lf& -/12    log-ji-2-h)=: 7- Ar(h) (A.3)
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It is easy to show that H(h) is a continuous function for 0<h<fi.  Furthermore,
lim H(h) = 0  and  - -
>0  and therefore HB)  >  0 and   - H(h)> 0.
aH Ch)  _      4hl  fl
h-+0
ah         (h' -ftY
Therefore, the expected region of independence becomes larger if h increases and,
conversely, becomes smaller  if h decreases (Proposition 7.1).
From (A.2) it is also easy to show that the expected region of independence becomes
smaller if the cost of overriding (c) becomes lower (Proposition 7.4).
B. The Expected Slope of the Central Bank's Reaction Function
The expected slope of the conservative central bank's reaction function is given by
1 1        j         dr= _1_log< 2 +h+A  (B.1)
2h 12-x+15 2h <2-h+AJ
Along the same lines as the proof in appendix A, it is straightforward to show that this slope
is  increasing  with  h.
Lemma 1: Changes in the reaction function for supply shocks v < y' + ;r' are weighted
with more probability density than changes in the reaction function for supply shocks
V > Y.  + ire.
Proof.· It is important to note that the monetary reaction function of the conservative central
bank, the government and the accommodating central bank have a point of symmetry in
V = y  + 7re . Therefore, changes in the position or the slope of the monetary reaction
functions due to changes in h or c always have opposite effects on the realized rate of
inflation on either side of this point of symmetry. However, the distribution of the random
supply shocks v i s symmetric around v=0 and the probability density becomes smaller the
larger the distance between the supply shock and point of symmetry v = 0. Because
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y' + ;r' >0, the changes in the reaction function when v<y' + ir'  will be weighted with
more probability density then the (opposite) changes in the reaction function when
V > y  + 1Te .
Lemma 2: The expected rate of inflation within the region of independence decreases if
transparency of monetary policy increases.
Proof: As shown above, a lower h implies a flatter reaction function.  So inflation decreases
for  v<y'+,r' and increases with the same amount for v > y' + A' However, due to the
probability density function of v, the expected rate of inflation in the region of independence
decreases.
Lemma 3: The central bank's reaction to shocks that were within the expected region of
independence before the decrease in h and in the expected region of accommodation after
the change, will be weaker.
proof: Monetary policy can be summarized as ;r = Max tr ACC,lrc.A\f v < y.  + lr'  and
;r = Min{,rAcr, irc B }if v > y' + tr' .  If, due to a change in ;rc.8, the regime switches from
independence to accommodation, then there must have been a decreasing inflation for
v <y'+A'  and an increasing inflation for v > y' + ir' .
When we apply the probability density function on Lemma 3 we are able to show that the
expected rate of inflation for shocks that were within the expected region of independence
before the decrease in h and in the expected region of accommodation after the change. will
be lower.  When we combine this with Lemma 2, then we can prove Proposition 7.2.
8  Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this book we have studied the design of monetary institutions. In chapter 2 we have
investigated empirically the effect of the design of monetary institutions on macroeconomic
performance. Chapter 3 looked at the factors that determine the design of monetary
institutions. In chapter 4 we made a clear distinction between central bank independence
and  conservativeness.    Then we introduced preference uncertainty  in  our  model. In chapter
5  we  looked  at the effect of preference uncertainty on macroeconomic outcomes. Chapter  6
studied the effect of a linear inflation contract and an inflation target in the presence of
preference uncertainty. Finally, chapter 7 discussed the issue of accountability  of the
central bank.  In this final chapter we briefly summarize our main results.
Do monetary institutions matter for economic performance?
Chapter 2 is an empirical study into the effect of central bank independence (CBI) on
macroeconomic performance, in particular the level and variability of inflation and
economic growth.  The main conclusions of this analysis are the following.
First of all, both our model and estimation results give further support to the well-known
inverse relationship between the degree of central bank independence and the level of
inflation found by Alesina (1988, 1989) and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992).
Secondly, we find some empirical evidence - especially for the Cukierman and Grilli-
Masciandaro-Tabellini indices - that the more independent the central bank, the lower the
variability of inflation.
Thirdly, no relationship can be found between central bank independence and the level of
real output growth in the long run. Our interpretation of this outcome is that the attainment
and maintenance of low inflation by an independent central bank is not accompanied by
large costs or benefits in terms of sustainable economic growth. Fourthly and finally, our
estimation results reject clearly the proposition of a positive relation between independence
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and the variability of real output growth. An independent central bank does not lead to
more variable economic growth in the short run. In other words, inflation-averse central
banks do not bear the costs of triggering recessions nor do politically sensitive central banks
reap the benefits of avoiding recessions. The absence of a long-run trade off between CBI
and the mean and variance of economic growth implies that the establishment of central
bank independence in countries which did not use to have this, is a yree lunch" (Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991).
When looking at the differences between the two subperiods that we distinguish (1972 -
1982) and (1983 - 1992), there are three observations with respect to the poim estimates of
CBI that can be made for all four indices. First, the inflation reducing effect of a one-unit
increase of CBI, according to all indices, was larger in the first subperiod than in the
second. Interestingly, this doesn't hold in terms of elasticities. Secondly, after controlling
for initial GDP and the share of investment, a one-unit increase of CBI leads to more output
growth in the second subperiod than in the first. Thirdly, a one-unit increase of CBI leads
to a larger reduction of the variance of output growth in the second subperiod than in the
first.
What determines the design Of monetary institutions?
In chapter 3 we discussed the fundamental determinants of central bank conservativeness in
an open economy. We derived propositions concerning the relation between economic and
political factors and the optimal degree of central bank conservativeness.
We have shown that optimal conservativeness is higher, the higher the natural rate of
unemployment, the greater the slope of the Phillips curve, the less inflation averse society,
the smaller the variance of productivity shocks, the smaller real exchange rate variability
and the smaller the openness of the economy. These propositions were tested for nineteen
industrial countries, using a latent variables method (LISREL) to distinguish between actual
and optimal monetary regimes.  We find that some countries (Germany and Switzerland)
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seem to have a suboptimally high degree of central bank conservativeness, whereas others
(Sweden and the United Kingdom) appear to have a suboptimally low degree.
Of course, our model could be extended with other determinants of central bank
conservativeness. For instance, Lockwood, Miller and Zhang (1994) show how optimal
conservativeness increases with unemployment persistence whilst Levine and Pearlman
(1995)  demonstrate  how this variable relates  to both nominal  and  real wage rigidity.
How is central bank independence related to conservativeness?
Chapter 4 explicitly makes a distinction between central bank independence and
conservativeness. It turns out that what really matters in monetary policy making is
effective central bank independence, the product of central bank independence and
conservativeness.
The optimal degree of central bank independence and conservativeness depends positively
on the natural rate of unemployment, society's preferences for unemployment stabilization
relative to inflation stabilization and the benefits of unanticipated inflation and negatively on
the  variance of productivity shocks. Using a LISREL-model we estimated the relationship
between four proxies of legal central bank independence and the four economic and political
determinants.  Then, we determine the optimal degree of independence and
conservativeness for each country based On the determinants. Given the actual degree of
independence we calculate the optimal degree of conservativeness. Consequently, there
appears to be a trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness.
What is the  effect  of preference uncertainty on economic pel:formance?
Chapter 5 investigates the credibility/flexibility trade-off in the presence of uncertainty
about the central banker's preferences for inflation stabilization relative to output
stabilization.
In this chapter we have analyzed the effects of monetary policy uncertainty on social
welfare. We focus on expected inflation and the variance of inflation and output.  Five
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propositions are derived in the chapter. The first one states that more uncertainty about the
policymaker's preferences leads to a higher inflationary bias.  This is due to the fact that a
central banker with uncertain preferences is perceived as less conservative by wage setters.
The second proposition states that more monetary policy uncertainty leads to a higher
variance of inflation. Intuitively, it is clear that the variance in the central banker's
preferences feed through in a more volatile rate of inflation. These two propositions are in
line with a large body of empirical evidence that suggests that the mean and variance of the
inflation rate are positively correlated across countries. Our third proposition is that a
country with a serious flexibility problem relative to the credibility problem may reduce its
variance of output by appointing a central banker with uncertain preferences. Fourthly,
combining the three other propositions, we find that a country that faces large supply shocks
in relation to its output target may be better off with a central banker that has uncertain
preferences.  This is due to the fact that the average response of the policymaker to a supply
shock is stronger than in the absence of preference shocks. Finally, the fifth proposition
derives comparative static properties for the upperbound of the optimal level of monetary
uncertainty.
To conclude, optimal central bank secrecy involves trading-off the harmful effects of
uncertainty about monetary policy and the associated higher expected inflation versus the
potentially beneficial effects on the stabilization of output. The latter trade-off depends on
the severity of society's time-consistency problem vis-A-vis its need for stabilization policy.
The analysis predicts that if the credibility problem is large relative to the need for
flexibility, optimal central bank institutions will be very open and transparent and vice
versa. Moreover it explains why high credibility institutions such as the Bundesbank and
the future European Central Bank (ECB), can atrord to be relatively closed, and why low
credibility institutions such as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and Banco d'Espafia need
to be very open and need to publish e. g. inflation and monetary policy reports of some kind,
in addition to standard bank bulletins. Put differently, we clarify why "nouveau riche"
institutions with poor credibility "talk", and why institutions that have a great "wealth" of
credibility can afford to whisper.
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A  linear contract.  a  quadratic  contract  or an  inflation target for  the  central  banker?
In chapter 6 we have investigated the effects of uncertain central bank preferences for the
optimal institutional design of monetary policy.  We have studied this in the context of a
model that goes beyond 'pure' uncertainty. This means that we have relaxed the Beetsma
and Jensen (1997) restriction that the central banker's preference uncertainty has no effect
on private sector inflation expectations.
The  implications of allowing the uncertainty  to  play a bigger  role are substantial. First,  the
optimal inflation target that has to be imposed on the central banker now depends on the
degree of preference uncertainty,  and  has  to be striaer (lower) the higher the uncertainty.
The reason is that central banker uncertainty implies higher inflation expectations. To offset
this additional inflation bias the degree of 'target conservativeness' has to increase as well.
This is in sharp contrast to Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that the optimal inflation
target does not depend on the degree of preference uncertainty and is the same as in the
Svensson (1997a) model. Therefore in our model certainty equivalence does not hold, and
the optimal inflation target with uncertain central bank preferences does not correspond to
the optimal target derived by Svensson (1997a)  in the absence of uncertainty about central
bank  preferences.
Further, for the case of the Walsh contract we find that it is optimal to offer a linear
inflation contract to a central banker that does not depend on the degree of uncertainty about
its preferences. Again, this is in sharp contrast to Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that
the optimal linear contract does depend  on the degree of preference uncertainty.    Here  our
result is the same as in Walsh (1995) for the case without preference uncertainty. Hence,
contrary to Beetsma and Jensen for the case of a linear contract certainty equivalence does
hold, and the optimal linear inflation contract with uncertain central bank preferences is
identical to the optimal Walsh contract in the absence of uncertainty about central bank
preferences.
Next, comparing the linear Walsh contract and the optimal inflation target, we find that the
optimal linear inflation contract yields a lower expected loss to the government and
therefore is strictly superior to the optimal inflation target. This result is similar to Beetsma
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and Jensen. However, in their model stabilization policy under a linear inflation contract is
at the cost of expected inflation being below the socially optimal inflation rate. This trade-
off is not present in this chapter.
To conclude, we find that in case of uncertain central banker preferences the optimal
delegation arrangement is a combination of a linear inflation contract and a quadratic
contraa.  Here the quadratic contract is equivalent to a Rogoff (1985a) conservative central
banker. Again, this is different from Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that a
combination of a linear inflation contract, an in»Non target and a quadratic contract
performs best.
The policy implications of this result are clear. It suggests that - in the presence of
uncertainty about the central banker's preferences - the best institutional arrangement is to
select a central banker that is more inflation averse than society, grant the central bank
instrument independence and to make it accountable for its monetary policy performance by
imposing a linear inflation contract. Moreover, this delegation arrangement has the
appealing property that the optimal linear inflation contract is independent from the degree
of preference uncertainty. Thus, there  is  no  need  for the government (the principal)  to
make delegation arrangements conditional on this uncertainty. In other words the legislator
needs less information than in the case of the optimal inflation target (where the target does
depend on the degree of preference uncertainty) and still reaps the rewards of better
stabilization policy than in the case where policy is set by a central bank with an optimal
inflation target.
What   is  the  relationship  between  central  bank  independence  and  accountability?
In chapter 7 we have investigated the effects of accountability on macroeconomic outcomes.
In the analysis, we have focused on two types of accountability: accountability through
transparency and accountability through final responsibility. Transparency reduces the
uncertainty about the central bank's preferences and can be achieved by publication of
relevant information. For instance, publishing minutes of meetings and inflation reports
that give a motivation for the actions that the central bank has taken increase the
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transparency of monetary policy. Our model shows that, although transparency makes the
region of independence smaller, effective central bank independence increases with
transparency. This leads  to  a lower expected  rate of inflation  and  less  stabilization  of
productivity shocks.   So, more transparency shifts the balance of credibility vs. flexibility in
the direction of credibility. Therefore, achieving accountability through transparency is
especially attractive for countries that face a serious credibility problem relative to the
flexibility problem.
The other way of achieving accountability that is studied in this chapter is shifting final
responsibility for monetary policy in the direction of the government. The government is
under democratic control from the parliament. By shifting final responsibility to the
government, indirectly the parliament has more influence on monetary policy.    In our
model. shifting this responsibility is implemented by lowering the cost of overriding the
central bank.  We find that effective central bank independence decreases when the final
responsibility shifts in the direction of the government. This leads to higher inflationary
expectations  and more stabilization of supply shocks. Achieving accountability by shifting
final responsibility for monetary policy in the direction of the government therefore appears
most appropriate for countries that face a serious flexibility problem relative to their
credibility problem.
In this book we have studied the design of monetary institutions.   In the old days, traditional
political economy analysis treated monetary institutions as given. The economic
environment had to adapt to the way monetary institutions were designed.  In the new
political economy framework that is adopted in this book, the design of monetary
institutions is treated as endogenous. Monetary institutions should be designed in a way that
takes into account the economic environment and the people's preferences. Further analysis
of this three-way interaction between the macroeconomic environment, (collective)
monetary policy preferences and the design of monetary institutions constitutes our research
agenda for today and for the future.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
In dit boek wordt ingegaan op het ontwerp van monetaire instituties, in het bijzonder
centrale banken. Hoofdstuk 2 is een empirische studie naar het effect van centrale-
bankonafhankelijkheid op macro-economische grootheden als inflatie en groei. In hoofdstuk
3 worden de factoren bekeken die bepalend zijn voor de manier waarop centrale banken
worden opgezet.  In het vierde hoofdstuk wordt een duidelijk onderscheid gemaakt tussen
centrale-bankonathankelijkheid ('independence') enerzijds en conservativiteit
('conservativeness') anderzijds. Vervolgens introduceren we preferentie onzekerheid in ons
model. Het effect van preferentie onzekerheid op macro-economische uitkomsten wordt
geanalyseerd in hoofdstuk  5. In hoofdstuk 6 combineren  we een centrale  bank  met
onzekere preferenties met een lineair inflatie contract of een expliciete inflatie doelstelling.
Tenslotte presenteren we in hoofdstuk 7 een theoretisch model van democratische
verantwoording ('accountability') van de centrale bank.
Zijn monetaire instituties van betang voor economische uitkomsten?
Hoofdstuk 2 is een empirische studie naar het effect van centrale-bankonafhankelijkheid op
macro-economische grootheden, in het bijzonder het niveau en de variantie van inflatie en
economische groei. De belangrijkste conclusies van deze studie worden hieronder op een
rij gezet.
Ten eerste, zowel in ons theoretisch model als in de empirische resultaten vinden we een
negatief verband tussen centrale-bankonafhankelijkheid en het gemiddelde niveau van
inflatie. Dit ondersteunt de bevindingen van eerdere studies van Alesina (1988, 1989) en
Cukierman, Webb en Neyapti (1992).
Ten tweede vinden we aanwijzingen - vooral voor de Cukierman en Grilli-Masciandaro-
Tabellini indices - dat een meer onafhankelijke centrale bank leidt tot een lagere variantie
van inflatie.
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Ten derde vinden we geen verband tussen centrale-bankonafhankelijkheid enerzijds en lange
termijn reale economische groei. Onze interpretatie van dit resultaat is dat het bereiken en
behouden van een lage inflatie door een onafhankelijke centrale bank niet gepaard gaat met
hoge kosten of baten in termen van reele economische groei. Tenslotte kunnen we op basis
van onze resultaten de hypothese dat er een positief verband zou bestaan tussen centrale-
bankonafhankelijkheid en de variantie van reele economische groei duidelijk verwerpen.
Het ontbreken van een lange-termijn afruil tussen centrale-bankonafhankelijkheid enerzijds
en stabiele economische groei anderzijds betekent dat het onafhankelijk maken van een
centrale bank gezien kan worden als een "free lunch" (Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini,
1991).
Als we kijken naar de twee sub-periodes die we onderscheiden (1972 - 1982) en (1983 -
1992), zijn er drie resultaten die in het oog springen. Ten eerste is het marginale effect op
inflatie van meer centrale-bankonafhankelijkheid voor alle indices groter in de eerste sub-
periode dan in de tweede. Dit resultaat vinden we niet als we naar elasticiteiten kijken.
Ten tweede, rekening houdend met het initiate output-niveau en de investeringsquote, leidt
een stijging van centrale-bankonafhankelijkheid tot meer output groei in de tweede sub-
periode dan in de eerste. Tenslotte leidt een meer onafhankelijke centrale bank tot een
grotere reductie  in de variantie van outputgroei  in de tweede sub-periode  dan  in de eerste.
Wat  bepaalt  het  ontwerp  van  monetaire  instituties?
In hoofdstuk 3 worden de determinanten van centrale bank conservativeness in een open
economie bestudeerd. We leiden proposities af over het verband tussen economische en
politieke factoren enerzijds en de optimale graad van centrale bank conservativeness
anderzijds. We laten zien dat optimale conservativeness hoger is naarmate de natuurlijke
werkloosheid groter is, de voordelen van onverwachte inflatie groter zijn, de maatschappij
minder inflatie avers  is, de variantie van productiviteitsschokken lager  is, de variantie  van
de reele wisselkoers lager is en de economie minder open is. Vervolgens hebben we deze
proposities getest voor negentien geindustrialiseerde landen met behulp van een latente
variabelen methode (LISREL) om onderscheid te maken tussen werkelijke en optimale
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monetaire regimes. Het blijkt dat sommige landen (Duitsland en Zwitserland) een sub-
optimaal hoge graad van centrale bank conservativiteit hebben, terwij 1 andere landen
(Zweden en het Verenigd Koninkrijk) een sub-optimaal lage graad van conservativiteit
hebben.
Uiteraard kan dit model worden uitgebreid met andere determinanten van centrale bank
conservativiteit. Lockwood, Miller and Zhang (1994) hebben bijvoorbeeld laten zien hoe
optimale conservativiteit stijgt met persistentie in de werkloosheidsgraad en Levine and
Pearlman (1995) tonen het verband aan tussen optimale conservativiteit enerzijds en
nominale en retle loonstarheid anderzijds.
Wat is het verband tussen centrale-bankonafhanketijkheid en conservativiteit?
In hoofdstuk 4 maken we expliciet onderscheid tussen centrale-bankonafhankelijkheid en
conservativiteit. Het blijkt dat efectieve centrale-bankonathankelijkheid (het product van
onafhankelijkheid en conservativiteit) datgene is wat echt van belang is voor monetair
beleid.
De optimale graad van centrale-bankonafhankelijkheid en conservativiteit hangt positief af
van de natuurlijke werkloosheid, de maatschappelijke preferenties voor werkloosheids-
stabilisatie relatief ten opzichte van inflatiestabilisatie en de opbrengst van onverwachte
inflatie en negatief van de variantie van productiviteitsschokken. Gebruik makend van een
LISREL-model schatten we het verband tussen vier proxies voor centrale-
bankonafhankelijkheid en vier economische en politieke determinanten. Vervolgens bepalen
we de optimale graad van onafhankelijkheid en conservativiteit voor elk land, met behulp
van de schattingen en de determinanten. Gegeven de werkelijke graad van
onafhankelijkheid berekenen we de optimale graad van conservativiteit. Uiteindelijk blijkt
er een afruil te bestaan tussen centrale-bankonafhankelijkheid en conservativiteit.
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Wat is het effect van preferentie-onzekerheid op economische grootheden?
In hoofdstuk 5 bestuderen we de afruil tussen geloofwaardigheid ('credibility') en
f exibititeit ('flexibility') als er sprake is van onzekerheid over de preferenties van de
centrale bankier.  Er is onzekerheid over het relatieve gewicht dat de centrale bankier
toekent aan inflatiestabilisatie ten opzichte van outputstabilisatie.
In dit hoofdstuk kijken we naar het effect van monetaire beleidsonzekerheid op sociale
welvaart. We richten ons hierbij op verwachte inflatie en de variantie van inflatie en
output. Er worden vijf proposities afgeleid. Ten eerste vinden we dat meer onzekerheid
over de preferenties van de beleidsmaker tot een hogere gemiddelde inflatie leidt.  Dit komt
doordat vakbonden een centrale bankier met onzekere preferenties zien als minder
conservatief. De tweede propositie stelt dat meer monetaire beleidsonzekerheid leidt tot een
hogere variantie van inflatie. De inturtie van dit resultaat is duidelijk: meer variantie in de
preferenties van de centrale bankier leidt tot meer variantie in de inflatie.  Deze twee
proposities zijn consistent met een grote hoeveelheid empirische literatuur waarin een
positieve correlatie tussen het gemiddelde en de variantie van inflatie wordt gevonden.  De
derde propositie stelt dat een land met een relatief groot flexibiliteitsprobleem ten opzichte
van het geloofwaardigheidsprobleem de variantie van output zou kunnen reduceren door een
centrale bankier aan te stellen met onzekere preferenties. Vervolgens combineert de vierde
propositie de eerste drie proposities en stelt dat een land dat geconfronteerd wordt met grote
aanbodschokken, beter af kan zijn met een centrale bankier met onzekere preferenties.  Dit
komt doordat de gemiddelde reactie van de beleidsmaker op een aanbodschok sterker is met
dan zonder preferentieonzekerheid. Tenslotte geeft de vijfde propositie de comparatief-
statische eigenschappen voor de bovengrens van de optimale graad van preferentie
onzekerheid.
Samenvattend wordt de optimale graad van onzekerheid omtrent de preferenties van de
centrale bank bepaald door de afruil tussen de schadelijke effecten van onzekerheid voor het
niveau en de variantie van inflatie en de mogelijk gunstige effecten voor de stabiliteit van
output. Deze afruil hangt weer af van de relatieve zwaarte van het tijdsinconsistentie
probleem ten opzichte van de noodzaak voor stabilisatie.
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Volgens deze analyse moet in landen waar het geloofwaardigheidsprobleem groot is ten
opzichte van het flexibiliteitsprobleem de centrale bank zeer open en transparant zijn.
Bovendien wordt verklaard waarom instituties met veel geloofwaardigheid zoals de
Deutsche Bundesbank en de Europese Centrale Bank (ECB) zich kunnen veroorloven
relatief gesloten te zijn terwijl instituties met weinig geloofwaardigheid zoals de Banco
d'Espaiia en de Reserve Bank of New Zealand zeer open moeten zijn en inflatierapporten en
monetaire beleidsrapporten moeten publiceren naast de gebruikelijke verslagen.
Een lineair contract,  een kwadratisch contract of een expliciete inflatie doelstelling voor de
centrate bankier?
In hoofdstuk 6 gaan we in op de effecten van onzekere centrale bank preferenties voor het
optimale ontwerp van de centrale bank.  De rol van preferentie-onzekerheid is in ons model
groter dan bij Beetsma en Jensen (1997).  In ons model introduceren we preferentie-
onzekerheid op een zodanige manier dat zij een effect heeft op inflatieverwachtingen van het
publiek.
Een gevolg van deze verandering is dat de optimale inflatiedoelstelling die de centrale bank
meekrijgt nu afhangt  van  de  mate van preferentieonzekerheid. De inflatiedoelstelling wordt
lager (dus strikter) naarmate er meer onzekerheid is over de preferenties. De reden
hiervoor is dat meer preferentieonzekerheid leidt tot hogere inflatieverwachtingen.  Om
deze hogere inflatieverwachtingen te keren, zal de centrale bank een lagere
inflatiedoelstelling moeten hebben. De optimale inflatiedoelstelling in ons model is dus
lager dan die van Svensson (1997a).
Voor het Walsh-contract vinden we dat het optimaal is een lineair inflatie contract op te
stellen dat nia afhangt van de mate van preferentie onzekerheid.  Ook dit is in contrast met
Beetsma en Jensen die vinden dat het optimale Walsh-contract wel afhangt van de mate
waarin onzekerheid bestaat over de preferenties van de centrale bank.
Vanuit een sociaal welvaartsperspectief blijkt dat, indien er sprake is van preferentie-
onzekerheid, het optimale Walsh-contract altijd een lager verlies oplevert dan de optimale
expliciete inflatiedoelstelling. Beetsma en Jensen komen ook tot deze conclusie, maar in
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hun model leidt stabilisatie onder een lineair inflatie contract tot een verwachte inflatie die
lager ligt dan de maatschappelijk gewenste inflatie. Deze afruil is in ons model afwezig.
Op basis van ons model kunnen we de conclusie trekken dat in de aanwezigheid van
preferentieonzekerheid een combinatie van een lineair inflatiecontract en een kwadratisch
contract optimaal is. Een kwadratisch contract is equivalent met een conservatieve bankier
A la Rogoff (1985a).   Met deze conclusie wijken we ook af van Beetsma en Jensen die
vinden dat een combinatie van een lineair inflatiecontract, een inflatiedoelstelling en een
kwadratisch contract optimaal  is.
De beleidsimplicaties van deze resultaten zijn duidelijk. Ze suggereren dat - als er sprake is
van preferentieonzekerheid - het optimaal is een conservatieve bankier aan te stellen en deze
verantwoordelijk te maken voor zijn acties door hem een lineair inflatiecontract mee te
geven. Deze combinatie van een lineair en een kwadratisch inflatiecontract is bovendien
onafhankelijk van de mate van preferentieonzekerheid.  Bij het opstellen van het contract
hoeft de regering (de principaal) dus geen informatie te hebben over de mate van
onzekerheid. Met andere woorden, de regering heeft minder informatie nodig dan in het
geval van een optimale inflatiedoelstelling (die wel afhangt van de mate van onzekerheid) en
bereikt ook nog betere stabilisatie dan in het geval van een centrale bank met een optimale
inflatiedoelstelling.
Wat  is   het  verband  tussen  centrale-bankonafhankelijkheid  en  accountability ?
In hoofdstuk 7 bestuderen we het effect van accountability op macro-economische
uitkomsten. We richten ons op twee soorten accountability: accountability door
transparantie ('transparency') en accountability door eindverantwoordelijkheid ('final
responsibility'). Transparantie maakt de onzekerheid omtrent de preferenties van de
centrale bank kleiner en kan bereikt worden door publicatie van relevante informatie.  Zo
kunnen bijvoorbeeld het publiceren van de notulen van vergaderingen ('minutes of
meetings') en het uitgeven van inflatierapporten die de acties van de centrale bank
motiveren de transparantie van het monetaire beleid vergroten. We tonen aan dat met meer
transparantie de effectieve centrale-bankonafhankelijkheid toeneemt, hoewel het gebied van
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productiviteitsschokken waarin de centrale bank onafhankelijk is kleiner wordt.
Transparantie leidt tot een lagere inflatieverwachting en minder stabilisatie van
productiviteitsschokken. De balans tussen geloofwaardigheid en flexibiliteit verschuift dus
in de richting van geloofwaardigheid. Daarom is accountability door transparantie vooral
interessant voor landen met een serieus geloofwaardigheidsprobleem ten opzichte van het
flexibiliteitsprobleem.
De andere manier om accountability te bereiken die in hoofdstuk 7 bestudeerd wordt is om
de eindverantwoordelijkheid voor het monetair beleid meer bij de regering te leggen.  De
regering staat op haar beurt weer onder democratische controle van het parlement.  Door de
eindverantwoordelijkheid voor het monetair beleid in de richting van de regering te
schuiven, krijgt het parlement indirect meer invloed op het beleid.  In ons model wordt dit
bereikt door de kosten die verbonden zijn aan het ingrijpen door de regering in het beleid
van de centrale bank te verlagen. We vinden dat effectieve centrale-bankonafhankelijkheid
afneemt als de eindverantwoordelijkheid voor monetair beleid meer bij de regering wordt
gelegd. Dit leidt tot hogere inflatieverwachtingen  en meer stabilisatie van aanbodschokken.
Deze manier van accountability leidt tot meer flexibiliteit en daarom vooral geschikt voor
landen met een relatief groot flexibiliteitsprobleem.
In dit boek hebben we het ontwerp van monetaire instituties bestudeerd. Vroeger, in de
traditionele politieke economie werden instituties als gegeven (exogeen) beschouwd.  De
economische omgeving moest zich aanpassen aan de manier waarop instituties waren
vormgegeven.  In de nieuwe of positieve politieke economie, zoals toegepast in dit boek,
wordt het ontwerp van instituties als endogeen beschouwd. Monetaire instituties moeten
zodanig worden opgezet dat er rekening gehouden wordt met de economische omgeving en
de  preferenties  van de bevolking. Een verdere analyse  van deze interactie tussen de macro-
economische omgeving, (collectieve) monetaire beleidspreferenties en het ontwerp van
monetaire instituties maken onderdeel uit van de onderzoeksagenda voor de toekomst.
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